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ABSTRACT

An abstract o f the dissertation o f Jeffrey Alan Fletcher for the D octor o f Philosophy in
Systems Science presented M ay 6, 2004.

Title: Fundamental Conditions for the Evolution o f Altruism:
Towards a Unification o f Theories

In evolutionary theory the existence o f self-sacrificing cooperative traits poses a
problem that has engendered decades o f debate. The principal theories o f the evolution
o f altruism are inclusive fitness, reciprocal altruism, and m ultilevel selection. To
provide a framework for the unification o f these apparently disparate theories, this
dissertation identifies two fundamental conditions required for the evolution o f
altruism: 1) non-zero-sum fitness benefits for cooperation and 2) positive assortm ent
among altruistic behaviors. I dem onstrate the underlying similarities in these three
theories in the following two ways.
First, I show that the gam e-theoretic model o f the prisoner’s dilem m a (PD) is
inherent to all three theories. W hile the PD has been used extensively to model
reciprocal altruism, I dem onstrate that the n-player PD captures fundam ental aspects
o f multilevel selection and inclusive fitness in that N PD model param eters relate
simply to Sim pson’s paradox, the Price covariance equation, and H am ilton’s rule. The
tension between hierarchical levels that defines a PD reflects the tension between

Abstract

levels o f selection that is explicit in multilevel selection theory, and im plicit in the
other two theories.
Second, H am ilton’s rule from inclusive fitness theory applies to the other
theories. As mentioned, I dem onstrate that this rule relates to m ultilevel selection via
the NPD. I also show that Q ueller’s generalization o f H am ilton’s rule applies to the
conditional strategies o f reciprocal altmism. This challenges the selfish-gene
viewpoint by highlighting the fact that it is the phenotypes o f others, not their
genotypes, that is critical to the evolution o f altruism.
I integrate the PD and H am ilton’s rule as follows: the evolution o f altruism in
general involves PD situations in which H am ilton’s rule specifies the necessary
relationship between 1) the degree o f non-zero-sumness within the PD and 2) the
degree o f positive assortm ent am ong altruistic behaviors.
Additional contributions o f this research include a dem onstration that random ly
formed associations can provide the necessary positive assortment for strong altruism
to evolve, the development o f a new selection decom position that is symmetrical to
the Price equation, and a gam e-theoretic analysis showing the essential sim ilarity o f
weak and strong altruism under selection.
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Preface
Before I becam e interested in the evolution o f altruism, my research focused on a
different topic. I was doing investigations in a relatively new discipline called
A rtificial Life, w hich uses com puter simulations to study life-like processes.
Specifically, this research (Fletcher, Zwick, and Bedau 1996; Fletcher, Bedau, and
Zwick 1998) focused on developing inform ation-theoretic measures o f the match
between the com plexity o f challenges posed by an environment and the repertoire o f
evolvable responses to these environmental inputs within organisms. I planned to
build on this w ork for a Ph.D. thesis, but then I happened to read a Scientific American
article by Richard Dawkins (1995) that ultim ately set me on a different path.
D aw kins is both a popular science w riter and one o f the m ost eloquent and
staunchest proponents o f reductionism in evolutionary biology. His books, such as The
Selfish Gene (1976) and The Extended Phenotype (1982), are classics that have
influenced the thinking o f both evolutionary biologists and the general public about
w hat drives evolutionary change. Dawkins argues that much o f w hat w e see in the
natural w orld can be explained in terms o f the self-interest o f genes. In this view the
plethora o f elaborate mechanisms for accomplishing tasks such as securing nutrition
and shelter, and handling competitive and cooperative social interactions are ju st
m anifestations o f genes endeavoring to increase their representation in future
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generations. W hat I found troublesome about D aw kins’ arguments was that there
seemed to be a limited role for the influence o f processes or properties that em erge at
higher levels o f organization than that o f the gene.
I was convinced that there should be some w ay to use evolutionary com puter
models to show that emergent phenom ena that affect the outcome o f natural selection
could not be attributed to their genetic basis alone. Although m any other arguments
have been m ade against D aw kins’ reductionism (e.g. W ade 1977b; Sober and
Lewontin 1982; Sober and W ilson 1998; Lewontin 2000; Gould 2002), I thought these
new com puter tools for m odeling evolutionary processes m ight be useful in
illustrating the limitations o f this viewpoint. Fortunately, at around this same time my
advisor M artin Zwick heard David W ilson and Leticia Aviles give talks on the role
m ultiple levels o f selection play in the evolution o f altruism. This led me to read Sober
and W ilson’s book Unto Others (1998) that chronicles the debate in evolutionary
theory about altruism and group selection.
It was clear after reading Unto Others that the evolution o f altruism was a perfect
exam ple o f higher-level emergent phenom ena that could not be explained only in
terms o f lower-level interactions among com peting genes. Additionally, the tension
between individual- and group-level selection described in the m ultilevel selection
process for altruistic traits seem ed to map naturally onto the tension betw een

individual and collective rationality described by the tragedy o f the com m ons or the
prisoner’s dilem m a (PD) o f game theory. Y et w hile the PD was being used to model

reciprocal altruism, its usefulness in m odeling the evolution o f altruism in general was
not appreciated. Thus this dissertation topic was conceived.
W hile this has been a very productive research area (and it feels like there is still
m uch more to be done), it has also taken a long time to get to this point. For seven
years after com pleting a M aster’s in Computer Science in 1995 I w orked as a software
development engineer for a startup company. During that tim e, com pleting course
w ork and doing research was an ever-dem anding “hobby” w hich I m ostly did during
evenings and weekends. A t first m y jo b was more than fulltime, then eventually parttime, and finally for almost two years now I have been able to focus prim arily on the
research for this dissertation. Over the last four years I have w ritten several papers (all
in collaboration w ith m y advisor M artin Zwick) that form the basis o f this dissertation.
Five papers have been accepted for publication (Fletcher and Zw ick 2000a; 2000b;
2001; 2004c; 2004b), four in conference proceedings, one in the Journal o f
Theoretical Biology, and two more m anuscripts for journal publication are essentially
complete. In addition, I collaborated on a paper with Leticia A viles and A sher Cutter
that has ju st been accepted to The Am erican Naturalist (Aviles, Fletcher, and Cutter
2004), but is not part o f this dissertation.
Chapters 3-5 form the heart o f the dissertation and below I give some o f the
history o f their development. Chapter 3 is the culmination o f w ork that was ultim ately
presented in three proceedings papers, as well as a manuscript subm itted to Science
magazine. The first o f these papers was presented in July o f 2000 at The W orld
Congress o f the Systems Sciences and ISSS Conference in Toronto, Canada (Fletcher
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and Zw ick 2000b). Later that sum m er I co-coordinated a workshop on “A L ife’s Role
in the Group Selection D ebate” at the ALife YII conference in Portland, Oregon
where I also presented a paper (Fletcher and Zwick 2000a). This was a very successful
workshop and other presenters and contributors included Athena A ktipis (2000),
Leticia Aviles (2000), Joshua M itteldorf (M itteldorf and W ilson 2000b), John Pepper
(2000a), and M ichael W ade (2000) as well as Richard M ichod (M ichod and Roze
2000a) who contributed a paper but was unable to attend.
In 2001 I was invited to a special 2-day workshop on the “Evolution o f Sociality”
at the W issenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Berlin Institute for A dvanced Study) in Germany
where I presented prelim inary findings on the relationship between the n-player PD
(NPD) and the Price covariance equation as well as an alternative selection
decomposition. This w ork com prised the last o f these proceedings papers which I
presented in October o f 2001 at the IEEE, Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Conference
in Tucson, A rizona and in an invited talk to the Ecology and Evolutionary Biology
Department at the U niversity o f Arizona. The Science submission received a very
strong review from D avid W ilson (who wrote to me directly after being asked to
review our paper by the Science editors), but was ultimately not selected for
publication. I plan to resubm it this paper to another journal soon, supported by new
findings detailed below as well as new work done on showing the equivalence
between w eak and strong altruism, which I first presented at an invited talk to the
Evolution, Ecology, and Biodiversity Seminar, Department o f Zoology, U niversity o f
British Colum bia in November, 2003.
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Chapter 4 grew out o f a main criticisms o f the Science m anuscript from one o f the
other reviewers. This review er stated that what we had shown about m aintaining
altruism through random group formation m ust only apply to w eak altruism. W hile
this assessm ent was based on a long-standing consensus in the literature that strong
altruism could not evolve in randomly formed groups, ultim ately I found it was based
on single-generation models by Hamilton (1975) and independently by W ilson
(1975a). It w as clear from our NPD model that an intermediate num ber o f generations
could be m ost favorable to the evolution o f altruism and I knew from our experimental
results that this was true o f both w eak and strong altruism.
In order to address these claims directly, I decided to use the original strong
altruism m odels o f Ham ilton and W ilson to show that this nearly 30-year-old general
consensus was incorrect. This research was first presented at the Evolution 2003
conference in Chico, California. In a fuller form it has just been published as a paper
entitled “ Strong A ltruism Can Evolve in Randomly Formed Groups” in the Journal o f
Theoretical Biology (Fletcher and Zwick 2004c). This paper forms the basis o f
Chapter 4. This research also led me to think more about the relationship between
strong and w eak altruism and to develop a game theoretic argum ent showing their
equivalence w hen under natural selection (Chapter 3).
Chapter 5 grew out o f initial difficulties I encountered in applying H am ilton’s

rule to a reciprocal altruism model. While I was convinced that the association
between behaviors rather than genotypes was key, m y attempts to use phenotype
frequencies in H am ilton’s rule had all failed until I came across Q ueller’s versions
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(1985; 1992b; 1992a). A lthough the example o f applying H am ilton’s rule to
conditional strategies in Chapter 5 is quite simple, as far as I know, it is the first time
someone has dem onstrated how these equations apply to reciprocal altruism. The
paper representing these findings (Fletcher and Zwick 2004b) forms the basis o f
Chapter 5 and has ju st been accepted into the proceedings o f the IEEE Congress on
Evolutionary Computation to be held in Portland, Oregon in June o f this year. The
m ajor them e o f this conference is a celebration o f the 20th anniversary o f Robert
A xelrod’s book The Evolution o f Cooperation (1984). The conference includes an
iterated PD com petition similar to those used as a basis o f this seminal book and
A xelrod will be giving the keynote address.
Fittingly, Chapter 5 also returns me to D aw kins’ selfish gene theory and other
narrow interpretations o f H am ilton’s rule in which altruistic behaviors are seen as
being encoded by genes that help other related copies o f themselves. Unlike
H am ilton’s versions o f his equations (on which D aw kins’ view point depends), in
Q ueller’s m ore general versions there are no terms for the genotypes o f others, only
their phenotypic behaviors. These m ost general interpretations o f H am ilton’s Rule
shows how genetically based altruistic traits can increase via interactions with
com pletely unrelated individuals or even individuals o f different species in symbiotic
relationships. Phenotype is an emergent property that depends on the interaction o f
genes and environmental conditions (including the behaviors o f others). It is others’
phenotypic behaviors that determine the fitness consequences o f social interactions to
individual’s and their genes.
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In summary, although the original m otivation for the research behind this
dissertation began with a negative reaction to D aw kins’ reductionist stance (and I was
ultim ately able to point out some o f the lim itations in the selfish gene perspective), my
research has focused more broadly on the fundamental conditions for altruism to
evolve across all theories. The evolution o f altruism is a rich and still controversial
area o f evolutionary theory, which continues to fascinate me and I am sure to continue
thinking about for m any years to come.

In short, the units o f competitive self-interest that make up a genom e are
utterly interdependent. H ow did the competitive process o f natural selection
shape so intricate a mutualism?
Egbert Giles Leigh, Jr, in Levels o f Selection in Evolution (1999)

Chapter 1
Introduction
Nature is replete with examples o f highly cooperative behaviors. From the very
effective cooperative hunting and food sharing in hum an tribes (even am ong non
relatives) (e.g. Boehm 1993; Hawkes 1993), to w orker bees and ants giving up their
own reproduction (e.g. W ilson 1975b), to the marvel o f the highly specialized and
diverse set o f individual cells that go into m aking up an individual organism such as a
bee or a person. Y et for every cooperative interaction it is also easy to imagine a way
in which one party could take advantage o f others to get a little bit more in the
cooperative exchange and thereby ultim ately m ake m ore copies o f themselves relative
to their m ore egalitarian cohorts. A hunter who risked a little less danger in the hunt or
took a little more than his share o f the food w ould have such an advantage, as would a
bee w ho had her own offspring, or a cell that made m ore copies o f itself at the expense
o f a well-functioning individual. These less cooperative people, bees, or cells we label
selfish or defectors w hile the less selfish are altruistic or cooperators. Flere altruism is
defined in a strictly evolutionary biology sense in that the fitness o f others is enhanced
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by being a cooperative hunter, bee, or cell at a fitness cost to the cooperator— that is
they could have made m ore copies o f themselves by being selfish.
This question is central to this dissertation: How can such cooperative or altruistic
behaviors evolve and be maintained in the face o f natural selection w hich should favor
the m ore selfish? W hile defections are known to occur in each o f these exam ples (lazy
or greedy hunters (W ilson 1998), cheating bees (Oldroyd et al. 1994), or cancerous
cells (Nowell 1976; Paulovich, Toczyski, and Hartwell 1997)), they are exceptions to
the rule. The three m ajor theories on the evolution o f altruism each answer this central
question differently and there is thus heated debate as to which theories are correct
and w hich apply in different situations (see Chapter 2). One o f the m ajor contributions
o f this dissertation is to show that the three m ajor theories all share fundamental
conditions and rely on the same basic mechanisms to explain the evolution o f
altruism. Identifying these basic requirements in each theory helps m ove us towards a
m ore unified understanding o f how altruism evolves. Fundamental aspects o f the
evolution o f altruism are em bodied in both H am ilton’s rule from inclusive fitness
theory and the prisoner’s dilem m a from game theory, and I show how both apply to
all three theories. Below I provide a preview o f each o f the following chapters
followed by a summary o f this dissertation’s contributions to our understanding o f
how altruism evolves.
Chapter 2 provides a literature review and background inform ation on several o f
the theories and concepts that are pertinent to this dissertation. I start w ith some
exam ples o f natural phenom ena w here cooperation or altruistic traits are well
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docum ented and then discuss the m ajor evolutionary explanations o f how such
behaviors can arise under the process o f natural selection. These theories are inclusive
fitness theory (which is closely associated with kin selection and selfish gene
theories), m ultilevel selection (an update o f group selection) theory, and reciprocal
altruism theory. I also discuss several concepts relevant to the evolution o f altruism
that are related to these theories and used in later chapters. These include H am ilton’s
rule, the prisoner’s dilemma (including iterated and n-player versions), the tragedy o f
the com mons, Sim pson’s paradox, and the Price covariance equation. N ote that
because each o f the chapters 3-5 is in the form o f a standalone paper, some o f this
background inform ation is repeated in the introductions or discussions o f those
chapters. In general Chapter 2 covers these topics in more depth.
Chapter 3 is based on an original insight that the tension between w ithin-group
and between-group selection described in m ultilevel selection theory is analogous to
the tension between individual and collective rationality described by a tragedy o f the
com mons or n-player prisoner’s dilemma (NPD). Although the prisoner’s dilem m a
(PD) has been used to investigate reciprocal altruism, it has not been used explicitly to
model multilevel selection. Here I show that an N PD model in m ultiple groups is a
simple yet powerful model o f the evolution o f altruism. It captures essential factors in
m odel parameters that relate sim ply to H am ilton’s Rule, the Price covariance

equation, and a useful alternative selection decom position I present here. Contrasting
this alternative decomposition with the Price equation demonstrates interaction effects
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between within- and between-group selection w hich are not captured in either
decom position alone.
This game theoretic model also allows me to demonstrate essential similarities
between strong and w eak altruism undergoing natural selection. Lastly, using periodic
random groupings o f non-conditional strategies I show that, in contrast to
conventional wisdom, strong altruism can be selected for and m aintained without
reciprocity. This model suggests a framework for unifying different approaches to the
evolution o f altruism. Chapter 3 is based on a m anuscript (Fletcher and Zw ick 2004a)
prepared for submission and draws on three previous proceedings papers (Fletcher and
Zwick 2000a; 2000b; 2001).
Chapter 4 provides a more thorough treatm ent o f the claim (m entioned above)
that strong altruism can indeed evolve in random ly formed groups. Currently there is
general agreement that altruistic traits involving an absolute cost to altruists (strong
altruism) cannot evolve when populations are structured with random ly formed
groups (Hamilton 1975; W ilson 1975a; N unney 1985a; W ilson 1990; N unney 2000;
Sober and W ilson 2000). This conclusion implies that the evolution o f such traits
depends upon special environmental conditions or additional organism ic capabilities
that enable altruists to interact with each other m ore than would be expected with
random grouping. Here I show, using both analytic and simulation results, that the

positive assortment necessary for strong altruism to evolve does not require these
additional mechanisms, but m erely that random ly formed groups exist for m ore than
one generation. Conditions favoring the selection o f altruists, w hich are absent when
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random groups initially form, can naturally arise even after a single generation within
groups— and even as the proportion o f altruists simultaneously decreases. The gains
made by altruists in a second generation within groups can more than com pensate for
the losses suffered in the first and in this way altruism can ratchet up to high levels.
This is true even if altruism is initially rare, migration between groups allowed,
hom ogeneous altruist groups prohibited, population growth restricted, or kin selection
precluded.
Until now random group formation models have neglected the significance o f
multigenerational groups— even though such groups are a central feature o f classic
“haystack” models (M aynard Smith 1964; W ilson 1987) o f the evolution o f altruism. I
also explore the important role that stochasticity (effectively absent in the original
infinite m odels) plays in the evolution o f altruism. The fact that strong altruism can
increase w hen groups are periodically and random ly formed suggests that altruism
may evolve more readily and in sim pler organisms than is generally appreciated. This
chapter is based on a paper recently accepted to the Journal o f Theoretical Biology
(Fletcher and Zwick 2004c).
Chapter 5 shows that very general versions o f H am ilton’s inclusive fitness rule
(developed by Queller (1985; 1992b; 1992a)) can be applied to traditional reciprocal
altruism m odels such as the iterated PD. W hile several theorists have shown that

multilevel selection and inclusive fitness models are alternative ways o f analyzing the
same basic mechanism (e.g. W ade 1980; Queller 1985; 1992b; Frank 1998; Sober and
W ilson 1998; Fletcher and Zw ick 2004a), reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness are
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generally considered different mechanisms (e.g. Axelrod and Ham ilton 1981; Dawkins
1982) by w hich cooperative, altruistic traits m ay evolve. By dem onstrating how to
apply H am ilton’s rule to a reciprocal altruism model with conditional strategies, I
challenge the view that these are different mechanisms and show that both inclusive
fitness (multilevel selection) models and reciprocal altruism models rely on the same
fundamental conditions: 1) sufficiently non-zero-sum helping behaviors being 2)
sufficiently positively assorted. I also discuss obstacles to this unified view, including
phenotype/genotype differences and non-additive fitness (or utility) functions that are
typical o f reciprocal altruism models. I then demonstrate how Q ueller’s versions o f
H am ilton’s rule remove these obstacles. Finally, the fact that Q ueller’s m ost general
version o f H am ilton’s rule focuses on the assortment o f phenotypes (behaviors) rather
than the traditional genotypes poses a challenge to the selfish gene perspective and
shows that inclusive fitness theory can even apply to cooperation across species in
symbiotic relationship. This chapter is based on a paper (Fletcher and Zw ick 2004b)
just accepted to the proceedings o f the 2004 Congress on Evolutionary Computation
to be held in Portland this summer.
Figure 1-1 illustrates areas within evolutionary theory on altruism w here this
dissertation m akes contributions and how these contributions fit into the larger context
o f current theory. It also indicates which o f the core chapters (3-5) addresses each
area.
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Figure 1-1. Schem atic o f Dissertation Core Findings in Chapters 3 to 5.
Solid lines show established relationships between the three major theories,
the N P D , H am ilton’s rule and associated phenomena. The dashed lines show
relationships new ly developed or substantially strengthened by this
dissertation along with the associated chapter numbers.

Chapter 6 provides a conclusion and discusses some o f the im plications o f this
work for unifying our understanding o f how altruism evolves. I also discuss how some
o f the paradoxes surrounding the evolution o f altruism fit into a larger fram ework o f
needing to explain causation at appropriate hierarchical levels. In addition, a better
appreciation o f the role both cooperation and com petition play in the evolution and
maintenance o f hierarchical biological systems may influence our understanding o f
hum an evolution as well as provide a richer basis for societal m etaphors drawn from
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biology. This final chapter also discusses possible future extensions to the research
presented here.
In summary, the m ajor contributions o f this dissertation include:
•

Identifying the fundamental conditions necessary for the evolution o f
altruism inherent in all three m ajor theories o f how altruism evolves.

•

Dem onstrating that the n-player prisoner’s dilemm a (NPD) in multiple
groups can be used as a fundamental model o f the evolution o f altruism in
that the paradox o f the PD captures the tension betw een different levels o f
selection and the parameters o f the N PD have simple and intuitive
relationships to H am ilton’s rule, the Sim pson’s paradox effect, and the
Price covariance equation.

•

Providing an integrated framework that can help social science researchers
who emphasize game-theoretic models to see their results in the context o f
H am ilton’s rule and multilevel selection, while also enabling biology
researchers who focus on relatedness to recognize the inherent gametheoretic character o f their models.

•

D eveloping an alternative selection decom position that is symmetric, but
different than the Price covariance equation and helps reveal its
underlying assumptions and limitations.

•

Showing that the distinction between strong and w eak altruism relies on
absolute fitness values, whereas selection relies on relative fitness, and
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therefore that the dynamics o f both types are sim ilar under natural
selection.
•

Overturning a nearly three decade old consensus among evolutionary
biologists that strong altruism could not evolve in random ly formed
groups.

•

Investigating the role that stochasticity can play in enhancing or
dam pening selection for altruistic traits.

•

Showing how the most general version o f H am ilton’s rule can be
successfully applied to reciprocal altruism models, even when fitness
functions are non-additive.

• Demonstrating that in its m ost general interpretation, the evolution o f
altruistic traits need not involve selfish genes helping other copies o f
themselves. This more general interpretation can be used to understand the
evolution o f cooperation between species— symbiotic relationships for
w hich the selfish gene interpretation has no direct role.
Finally, this dissertation allows me to discuss (in Chapter 6) broader implications
o f this research including how causal explanations and hierarchy interact in this
paradoxical and controversial arena o f theories on the evolution o f altruism, how both
competition and cooperation affect natural selection across different hierarchical
levels, how ideas from general systems theory apply to evolving biological systems,
and how our understanding o f competition and cooperation in biological systems may
both influence and be influenced by our understanding o f hum an social systems.

F or biologists, I think that the m oral is that it pays to be eclectic in our
choices o f theories. O f course, we have to avoid believing sim ultaneously in
two contradictory theories, or in any one theory that is contradicted by
observations that we think are correct. B ut this leaves plen ty o f room to be
reductionists in one context and holist in another.
John M aynard Smith, in conclusion to Shaping L ife (1998b)

This possibility o f group selection has been regarded as anathema by nearly
all evolutionary biologists, although entirely without empirical evidence.
Richard C. Lewontin, in review o f Unto Others (1998)

Chapter 2
Background
The m echanism s by which self-sacrificing, cooperative, or altruistic behavior may
evolve in biological systems have been vigorously debated over the last several
decades (e.g. W ynne-Edwards 1962; M aynard Smith 1964; W illiams 1966; W ilson
1975a; D aw kins 1976; W ade 1977b; 1985; Queller 1992b; W ilson 1997a; Lewontin
1998; Sober and W ilson 1998; Reeve 1999; Smuts 1999; Katz 2000). Proposed
explanations include reciprocal altruism where the self-interest o f individuals is served
by the exchange o f cooperation w ith others (Trivers 1971; A xelrod and Hamilton
1981; A xelrod 1984), inclusive fitness where the self-interest o f genes is served by
encoding actions benefiting copies o f themselves in other organism s (usually
relatives) (H am ilton 1964; 1970; 1972; 1975; 1987), and m ultilevel selection (often

Chapter 2—Background

11

called group selection) where the self-interest o f groups is served by the inclusion o f
altruistic m em bers and selection at other levels (e.g. gene or individual) is also
acknow ledged (W ilson 1975a; 1976; 1977; 1990; 1997a; 1997b; Sober and W ilson
1998; W ilson 2004). Although these explanations have m athem atically equivalent
aspects (W ade 1980; Queller 1985; 1992b; Frank 1998; Sober and W ilson 1998;
Fletcher and Zw ick 2004b) they clearly differ in their conception o f the causal level at
which self-interest drives selection for self-sacrifice.
The use o f different terms (e.g. altruism vs. cooperation) has also com plicated
this debate (Sober and W ilson 1998). Here I use the term altruism to describe selfsacrificing behavior where an actor causes others to receive fitness benefits (have
more offspring) at an immediate net fitness cost to itself. By im m ediate cost I mean
that there was another potential action in a particular social interaction that would have
resulted in the actor having more offspring relative to others (this assumes that the
actions o f others around the actor remained the same for that interaction). In many
cooperative interactions there is a potential to take advantage o f other cooperators as
defection is m ore advantageous. In such situations cooperation is altruistic and the
terms m ay be used synonymously.
M any different types o f such self-sacrificing, cooperative behaviors have been
observed. W ell defined examples from nature (som e o f which have been investigated
in com puter and mathematical models) include reproductive altruism— from femalebiased sex ratios (Colwell 1981; W ilson and Colwell 1981; H erre 1985; N unney
1985a; A viles 1993) and slower parasite reproduction in the evolution o f
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virulence (Bull 1994; Lenski and M ay 1994; Frank 1996; M iralles, M oya, and Elena
1997) to the extreme forms o f reproductive sacrifice found in eusocial insects (Rissing
and Pollock 1987; Rissing et al. 1989; Bem asconi and Strassmann 1999) and in slime
molds (M atapurkar and W atve 1997; Ennis et al. 2000; Strassmann 2000; Strassmann,
Zhu, and Queller 2000; Velicer, Rroos, and Lenski 2000). Exam ples o f altruism also
include social forms o f cooperation such as alarm calling (Sherman 1977; Hoogland
1983; Pepper and Smuts 2000), feeding restraint (Hart, Kohler, and Carlton 1991;
Hemptinne and Dixon 1997; Pepper and Smuts 2000; 2002), cooperative colonization
o f new territory (M itteldorf and W ilson 2000a; Giraud, Pedersen, and K eller 2002;
Rainey and Rainey 2003), and cooperative hunting (Packer and Ruttan 1988; Packer et
al. 1991). Genomic coordination and integration is another exam ple o f altruism where
the normal— and under appreciated— fact o f cooperation is revealed when it is
underm ined by the reemergence o f lower-level selfish genetic structures (Cosmides
and Tooby 1981; Eberhard 1990; Turner and Perkins 1991; H ickey 1992; N unney and
M iller Baker 1993; W erren and Beukeboom 1993; Albert et al. 1996; Camacho et al.
1997; Smith 1998). Finally, altruistic cooperation is involved in the origin o f new
levels o f organization such as multicellularity (M aynard Smith and Szathmary 1995;
M ichod and Roze 2000b; 2001) and in symbiosis (M aynard Smith 1991; M argulis
1993; Frank 1997). There are also o f course m any examples o f selfish behavior, but
the paradox for evolutionary biology is: w hy should there be self-sacrificing behaviors
in systems evolved via natural selection— why haven’t exclusively selfish strategies
won the competition o f survival o f the fitte st?
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In addition to the examples o f cooperation listed above, there are also many such
behaviors among humans including well studied examples such as food sharing, risk
sharing in peasant farming (Scott 1976), and sharing o f limited w ater resources
(Lansing 1994) in less m odem societies, as well as more m odem exam ples such as the
tons o f food quietly donated to the Oregon Food Bank each day or m ore celebrated
sacrifices such as those o f firefighters in New Y ork’s W orld Trade Center or soldiers
on the battlefield.
In this dissertation I focus on abstract theoretical models o f the evolution o f
altruism that contain no explicit analog o f human society or psychology. I am
interested in the m ost fundam ental mechanisms by which cooperation can arise and be
maintained. Thus m y findings m ay be better suited for helping us understand the
origins o f cooperative interactions in the prim ordial soup (such as the cooperation
among cells in m ulticellular organism s) than for addressing w hy a person would
volunteer in a soup kitchen. Nevertheless, human evolution has also been subject to
these fundamental processes and in the concluding chapter I will touch on how this
research m ay influence our understanding o f human behavior as w ell as how the
emphasis on com petition in evolutionary theory m ay provide an incomplete picture for
those who justify com petitive hum an behavior in terms o f w hat is “natural.”
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The Group Selection Controversy
One explanation for how altruistic behaviors m ight evolve through the process o f
natural selection (in both humans and other organisms) is the one given by Charles
Darwin: groups o f organism s w hose m em bers make sacrifices for each other m ight be
more fit as groups and out com pete other groups with less cooperative members. As
Darwin put it (in somewhat antiquated terms):
It m ust not be forgotten that although a high standard o f m orality gives but
slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other
men o f the sam e tribe, y e t that an increase in the number o f well-endowed
men and advancement in the standard o f morality will certainly give an
immense advantage to one tribe over another. There can be no doubt that a
tribe including many members who, fro m possessing in a high degree the
spirit o f patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always
ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves fo r the common good,
w ould be victorious over m ost other tribes; and this would be natural
selection. A t all times throughout the w orld tribes have supplanted other
tribes; and as m orality is one important element in their success, the
standard o f m orality and the num ber o f well-endowed men w ill thus
everywhere tend to rise and increase. (Darwin 1871 p. 166)
Yet it is also true that within a group (tribe) individuals would show variation in their
levels o f com petitiveness and the more selfish o f these would be at a selective
advantage com pared to other members within their group. In this quote Darwin is not
addressing the emphasis he placed in his earlier w ork (1859) on individual variation in
traits leading to disproportionate individual reproductive success. This opposition o f
forces contributes to the confusion in analyzing the evolution o f altruistic behavior.
Natural selection among groups m ay favor groups with altruistic individuals whereas
natural selection w ithin a group favors selfish individuals. W hat actually evolves is a
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net result that depends on the relative strengths o f the selective forces occurring at
different levels.
There is also considerable debate about what constitutes altruism. D avid W ilson
(1979; 1990) distinguishes “strong” altruism where there is a net absolute cost to an
altm ist and “w eak” altruism where there is ju st a relative cost com pared to other group
members. Others have ignored or disagreed with this distinction preferring to reserve
the w ord altruism only for the strong category (Nunney 1985b; M aynard Smith 1998a;
N unney 2000). This debate continues 25 years later (Nunney 2000; Sober and W ilson
2000) and rests on w hether one measures fitness in absolute or relative term s. For
instance, D avid W ilson has ju st published a paper entitled “W hat’s w rong with
absolute individual fitness?” (2004). I weigh in on this debate in chapter 3 using a
game theoretic analysis to clarify the issues.
John Pepper (2000b) has made a similar distinction o f “w hole-group” altruism
where altruists contribute to a common good that has some m arginal benefit to
themselves and “other-only” altruism where altruists give only to others and receive
nothing back. This distinction m ay be more useful than the strong vs. w eak distinction
because the w ay in w hich one calculates assortment (the r term in H am ilton’s rule—
discussed further on) is different for each type. Other-only altruism is always strong,
but whole-group altruism can be strong or weak depending on w hether the altruist’s
share o f the benefit it provides to the group exceeds its cost. The reason w eak altruism
may still be considered altruism is that relative to others the altruist receives less
benefit than it provides others.
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Despite the com plicated nature o f this issue, one m ight expect that m ore than 130
years after D arw in’s explanation the notion o f m ultilevel selection w ould be well
developed in evolutionary biology. In fact this is far from true. The very existence o f
group-level selection as a significant natural process is highly controversial,
passionately argued, and not generally supported by such prom inent evolutionary
thinkers as John M aynard Smith (1964; Maynard Smith and Szathm ary 1995; 1998a)
and Richard Dawkins. Dawkins goes so far as to com pare the appeal o f group
selection to am ateur inventors’ fascination with perpetual motion m achines (1982).
However, the disfavor with group selection is not due to any definitive p ro o f
against it or lack o f evidence for it (e.g. see Goodnight and Stevens 1997 for a review
o f experimental evidence). In Unto Others Elliot Sober and D avid W ilson (1998)
chronicle the history o f the group selection controversy. As they point out, this history
is hardly w hat the philosopher o f science Thomas Kuhn (1970) w ould call “normal
science” in w hich com peting theories and hypotheses are tested and then augmented,
rejected, or accepted. Rather group selection theory was discredited w ithout actually
being disproved. Sober and W ilson (1998) present a strong case for m ultilevel
selection theory, but the m ixed reaction among the reviews speaks to the ongoing
passion in this debate (Lewontin 1998; M aynard Smith 1998a; N unney 1998; Reeve
1999; Smuts 1999; Sansom 2000).
W hile group selection arguments can be traced back to D arwin (see quote above),
the publication o f Anim al Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior by V.C. W ynneEdwards (1962) who prom oted group selection wholeheartedly kindled the m odem
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debate. W ynnne-Edwards saw lim iting the exploitation o f resources as beneficial to
groups at the expense o f individuals that restrain themselves. He then argued that
many group behaviors such as the flocking o f birds or the vertical m ovem ent o f
plankton were m echanism s by w hich groups could assess their density and act
accordingly. Arguments explaining behaviors in terms o f the group or species level
were common, but not well formulated. At the same tim e W illiam Hamilton was
developing his formal theory o f inclusive fitness focused on selection at the level o f
genes (1963; 1964). W ynne-Edwards seems to have overstated the case for group
selection. In his words: “Evolution at this level can be ascribed, therefore, to what is
here term ed group-selection— still an intraspecific process, and, for everything
concerning population dynamics, much more im portant than selection at the individual
level.” W ynne-Edwards realized that individual selection m ust also play a role, but
claimed that w here the two w ere in conflict “ ...group selection is bound to win,
because the race will suffer and decline, and be supplanted by another in which
antisocial advancement o f the individual is more rigidly inhibited” (1962 p. 20). In this
way he explained m any adaptations as being for the good o f the species.
This book provoked a strong reaction among evolutionary biologists, none so
effective as that o f George W illiam s in Adaptation and N atural Selection (1966).
W illiam s’ book addressed the kinds o f behaviors that W ynne-Edwards had claim ed

were group selected. W illiam s argued that when both individual and group selection
scenarios could explain a behavior, individual selection was the m ore parsim onious
and should therefore be preferred. However, Stephen Gould (G ould 2002) has argued
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that W illiams incorrectly applies the idea o f parsim ony in logical arguments (O ccam ’s
razor) to argue that simpler mechanistic explanations about how nature works should
be preferred over m ore complicated ones. Thus, Gould argues that W illiam s is making
a case for reductionism rather that parsim ony. In addition, Sober and W ilson point out
that arguments based on parsim ony “certainly do not substitute for a critical test o f
hypotheses that make different and m utually exclusive predictions” (1998 p. 38). Yet
W illiams also offered such a verifiable test concerning sex ratios. He was aware o f
Fisher’s (1930) analysis showing even sex ratios are individually selected and
concluded that skewed sex ratios would be evidence o f a group adaptation.
Unfortunately, he lacked adequate data about real examples in nature o f biased sex
ratios: “I conclude that there is no evidence from data on sex ratios to support the
concept o f biotic adaptation” (1966 p. 152). (W illiams used biotic adaptation to mean
group adaptation.)
Ironically, only a year later Hamilton published a paper in Science entitled
“Extraordinary Sex Ratios” (1967) in which he discussed several examples from
nature o f biased sex ratios. Although he did not em phasize group selection which
already had a bad nam e, in a footnote Ham ilton did acknowledge that w hat actually
evolved was a balance between individual selection and group selection.
Unfortunately, m ost biologists m issed the connection between W illiam s’ verifiable

test o f group selection and H am ilton’s paper. Instead the latter was interpreted as
furthering W illiam s’ work o f explaining apparent group adaptations as truly
individual. As Sober and W ilson (1998 p. 42) put it, “A t the very time that group
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selection theory was entering its dark age, the empirical evidence that should have
counted as evidence fo r group selection was accepted as a triumph o f individual
selection theory!” It w asn’t until 1981 that the connection was made betw een
W illiam s’ test and the accumulating evidence o f biased sex ratios in nature (Colwell
1981; W ilson and Colwell 1981). Even then m any biologists “couldn’t believe that an
adaptation as w ell-docum ented as female-biased sex ratios m ight count as evidence for
a theory as heretical as group selection. Even now the dust has not entirely settled.”
(Sober and W ilson 1998 p. 43)
Group selection still carries a significant stigma in evolutionary biology. In The
M ajor Transitions in Evolution John M aynard Smith and Eors Szathm ary (1995 p. 12)
state that: “The idea o f levels o f organization, and hence o f levels o f selection, is
central to this book.” Y et only a few pages earlier they claim (1995 p. 8): “The
transitions m ust be explained in terms o f im mediate selective advantage to individual
replicators: w e are com m itted to the gene-centered approach outlined by W illiams
(1966), and m ade still more explicit by Dawkins (1976).” W hen discussing the origin
o f life and m olecular hypercycles they state, “M olecules that ‘sacrifice’ them selves by
producing replicases that serve the good o f the hypercycle are ‘altruists’ in a
sociobiological sense. To stabilize the hypercycle, one needs conditions in w hich
altruists can spread, or at least coexist with ‘cheaters’” (1995 p. 53). Then on the same
page they assume molecules compartmentalized into groups will autom atically cease
to compete am ong themselves, and further they invoke kin selection in the case w here
molecules are not compartmentalized. It is very surprising that the kinship o f
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m olecules w ould be appealed to w ithout offering any plausible m echanism for such an
unlikely claim! A fter all, these molecules do not have genes or heritable genetic traits.
Here are their words:
To p u t hypercycles in compartments is, in effect, to create individuals with
vertical transmission o f genetic information, fro m parent to offspring. Given
vertical transmission, the evolution o f cooperation between the p a rts o f an
individual is to be expected. B ut i f as we have argued, early chemical
reactions occurred on surfaces, we can ask whether cooperation could evolve
w ithout compartments, because neighboring molecules w ould be genetically
related. (M aynard Smith and Szathmary 1995 p. 53)

W hen discussing aggregates o f slime mold cells that form fruiting bodies with
stalks, the authors note that individual selection would not favor the formation o f nonreproductive parts such as the stalk. As with many such cases in this book, kin
selection is appealed to, but M aynard Smith and Szathmary also add:
B ut this cannot be the whole story, since cheaters will inevitably arise: when
that happens, they are presum ably eliminated because aggregates containing
cheaters are less efficient in dispersing spores. This explanation is at present
speculative, and should be checked by genetic studies on natural populations.
(M aynard Smith and Szathmary 1995 p. 214)
The authors’ tentativeness concerning m ultilevel selection is evident in this last
quote, as is their ambiguity about it throughout the book. In a m ore recent and less
technical version o f this work they note, “W e have to explain how com plex entities
evolved, despite selection between their components favoring selfish behavior”
(M aynard Smith and Szathmary 1999 p. 20). Yet multilevel selection is conspicuously
absent from their list o f possible explanations. In fact they state that, “A n adequate
account requires that we explain the origin o f the higher-level entity in term s o f
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selection acting on the lower-level entities” (M aynard Smith and Szathm ary 1999 p.
19-20). I f one o f our m ost prom inent evolutionary biologists has trouble being clear
about m ultiple levels o f selection in these recent and important works, it is no wonder
biologists in general are confused and divided on the subject. Below I discuss each o f
the three m ain theories o f how such altruistic or cooperative behaviors arise in the face
o f natural selection.

Multilevel Selection Theory
In its m odem form multilevel selection theory was initiated in the 1970’s by David
W ilson (1975a; 1976; 1977) and supported by the empirical experiments and analyses
o f M ichael W ade (1977a; 1978; 1979). It differs significantly from the idea o f species
adaptations that ignited the group-selection controversy (W ynne-Edwards 1962)
discussed above in that it is focused on elucidating (with both mathem atical and
empirical foundations) the more com plicated mechanisms o f sim ultaneously acting
selective forces. M ultilevel selection theory (a generalization o f group selection
theory) is a straightforward extension o f D arw in’s (1859) theory o f natural selection.
Natural selection o f a trait requires three basic ingredients: phenotypic variation in the
trait, fitness consequences associated with these variations, and reproduction with
heritability o f the trait. M ultilevel selection theory says that if these three ingredients
are present at any level in a hierarchy, then natural selection will take place at that
level. I f traits experience selective pressure at m ultiple levels, then w hat actually
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evolves will be the result o f the relative strength and directions o f these m ultiple
forces.
In some cases these selective pressures m ay act in the same direction. For
example, individuals who are fast runners m ay be selected for within a group. In
addition, groups that contain fast runners m ay be selected for at the group level. For
instance, groups o f fast runners m ight out compete groups o f slower runners in
hunting ability or warfare. This assumes that the necessary ingredients for natural
selection are present at the group level— namely, variation in aggregate running ability
among groups, competition between groups where running speed affects group
success (fitness consequences), and new groups reflect the running abilities o f their
parent groups (heritability). Although it may be more common for selective forces at
different levels to be com plementary, group selection has been most clearly argued in
cases w here the selective forces are in opposition. Altruistic behavior, by definition, is
such a case.
Several researchers have related m ultilevel selection to ecological considerations
and population dynamics. For instance, several studies have shown that altruism can
evolve even when group structure is ill-defined. W ilson coined the term “trait-group”
(1979) to describe interactions that m ay be structured with regard to some traits, but
not others— and not necessarily due to physically defined groups. For instance even in
populations that are well m ixed physically, conditional strategies (Trivers 1971;
W ilson 1975a; Sober and W ilson 1998) m ay lead behavioral interactions to be
grouped. In uniform environm ents groups can emerge due to restricted m obility
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(viscous populations). W hile it has been shown that in viscous populations in uniform
environm ents only weak altruism can evolve (Wilson, Pollock, and Dugatkin 1992),
more recently, m odeling o f non-uniform dynamic environments has shown that the
strong form o f altm ism can also evolve in viscous populations due to the ability o f
groups o f altruists to disproportionately expand into areas o f environmental
disturbance (Harms 2000; M itteldorf and W ilson 2000a).
In contrast to these external influences on population structure (e.g.
environmental disturbances) populations can experience their own internal dynamics
based on the effects o f non-zero sum interactions and variation in cooperation. Leticia
Aviles (1999) has shown that under harsh conditions populations m ay depend on the
synergistic effects o f group living to survive, but cooperation in established social
groups m ay lead to disruptive population dynamics, i.e. boom and bust. Over multiple
generations periodic or chaotic dynam ics can arise. W hereas the above studies showed
the positive effect o f environm ental disturbances on maintaining altruism, here
internal population dynamics, due to cooperation itself, may play a role in providing
increased opportunities for the formation o f groups and the success o f altruism.
Groups o f non-sim ilar individuals m ay also experience m ultilevel selection. This
is especially noteworthy because selection among groups o f symbiotic m utalists shows
that gene-level selection is not fundamental since symbiots are unrelated. Steven

Frank (1997) reviews several models o f selection for symbiotic groupings. In addition,
selection has been experimentally dem onstrated at the level o f com munities
(Goodnight 1990a; 1990b; 2000) and even at the ecosystems level (Swenson, W ilson,
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and Elias 2000). Steven Gould has argued that selection may take place even at the
species level over geologic time (2002). The eukaryotic cell itself m ay be the result o f
selection am ong groups o f non-sim ilar individuals, i.e. groups o f organelles that form
the eukaryotic cell (M argulis 1970; 1993; M argulis and Sagan 2002).
Finally, m ultilevel selection when applied to levels at and below that o f the
individual m ay be critical to our understanding o f the origins o f life and the formation
o f more com plex and hierarchical living systems. As previously m entioned it is
striking that tw o works dealing explicitly with these issues (M aynard Smith and
Szathmary 1995; 1999) rely so little on levels o f selection arguments, even if
m ultilevel selection is im plicit in the mechanisms described. Some investigations o f
the origins o f living cells depend on competition between com partm entalized
protocells (Grey, Hutson, and Szathmary 1995; Szathmary and M aynard Smith 1997).
Richard M ichod and Dennis Roze (M ichod 1997; M ichod and Roze 2000b; 2000a;
2001; Roze and M ichod 2001) have modeled the transition from single cell to
m ulticellular life. Applying multilevel selection ideas they have exam ined methods by
w hich individuals m ust reduce within-organism variance in order to benefit
themselves by discouraging lower level selection among the individual’s constituent
parts. They argue that such mechanisms are critical to the evolution o f higher level
entities such as multicellular organisms.
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Simpson’s Paradox
The evolution o f an altruistic trait involves a fundamental paradox that m ust be dealt
with by all theories on the evolution o f altruism— how does a trait that causes others
to have m ore offspring actually end up with more copies o f itself? From the group (or
multilevel) selection viewpoint the trait m ust be decreasing within each group, but
increasing overall. This is an exam ple o f Sim pson’s paradox (1951) and Sober and
W ilson (1998) have shown it to be key in understanding m ultilevel selection theory—
groups m ust vary in their com position and those with a higher proportion o f altruists
must contribute more to the overall population than those with a low er proportion.
A non-biological example helps illustrate the phenom ena o f Sim pson’s paradox.
A t the U niversity o f California at Berkeley in the 1970s, the percentage o f women
graduate school applicants accepted was significantly lower than the percentage o f
men accepted (Cartwright 1978). Yet, when the University looked at each department
they found none were accepting a smaller percentage o f women. A gain the answer to
this paradox lies in the fact that different departments varied in their contribution to
the whole. In this case, the cause for this varied contribution was that w om en were
applying in greater numbers to departments that accepted a low er percentage o f
applicants.
Imagine 70 wom en and 30 m en apply to departm ent A w hich has 20 positions. If
there is no bias with regard to sex, 14 w om an and 6 men are accepted. D epartm ent B
receives 30 applications from w om en and 70 from men and has 50 positions. Here, if
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there is no bias, 15 women and 35 men are accepted. Y et if w e aggregate these results,
41 o f 100 m en are accepted, whereas only 29 o f 100 women are accepted. These
results are summarized in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1. Example of Simpson’s Paradox

Apply
to A
70

Accepted
to A (%)
14 (20%)

Apply
to B
30

Accepted
to B (%)
15(50%)

Apply to
A+B
100

Accepted to
A + B (%)
29 (29%)

Men

30

6 (20%)

70

35 (50%)

100

41 (41%)

Total

100

20 (20%)

100

50 (50%)

200

70 (35%)

Women

To return to multilevel selection, groups dominated by cooperators m ay grow
much faster than other groups due to the benefits o f mutual cooperation and therefore
contribute m ore to the total, even though within these faster growing groups the
proportion o f cooperators is declining. One o f the contributions o f this dissertation is
to show how Sim pson’s paradox naturally emerges out o f the n-player PD model o f
multilevel selection that I present in chapter 3.

The Price Equation
George Price, an eclectic and troubled American chemist, game theorist, and science
journalist traveled to England in 1967 at the age o f 44 to work (w ithout any formal
training in biology) on the problem o f the evolution o f altruism. In a b rief period
between 1970 and 1973 he made three very significant contributions to evolutionary
theory (Frank 1995a). The first was a revolutionary hierarchical m odel o f selection
based on covariance that formalized the tension between w ithin-group and between-
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group selection (Price 1970; 1995) and helped launch the resurgence o f the group
selection view point as m ultilevel selection theory:
_ cov(w ,,g,) | E (w iAqi)
E (w ,)

E( wf)

or equivalently

(2 . 1)

’

AQ = AQb +AQ b,

( 2 .2)

where w, is a m easure o f group fitness, here the growth rate o f each group («,'/«,), E is
the expectation, and AQb and AQw are the Price between- and w ithin-group
components o f change in overall cooperator frequency, respectively. (The Price
equation is covered in more detail in the next chapter.) This equation (Eq. 2.1) had an
important influence on Hamilton that led him to modify his inclusive fitness theory
(discussed in the next section). As Hamilton wrote, “Price had not like the rest o f us
looked up the work o f the pioneers when he first became interested in selection;
instead he had w orked out everything for h im se lf’ (1996 p. 172). Ham ilton goes on to
relate the result o f his interactions with Price: “ ... I now had a far better understanding
o f group selection and was possessed o f a far better tool for all forms o f selection
acting at one level or at m any than I had ever had before” (1996 p. 173). In chapter 3 I
explore the relationship between the Price equation and our model o f m ultilevel
selection. I also develop an alternative selection decom position that highlights the
underlying assumptions o f the Price equation as well as its limitations when there are
interaction effects between within-group and between-group selection.
Price’s second m ajor contribution was in launching Evolutionary Game Theory
(M aynard Sm ith and Price 1973). M aynard Smith read P rice’s initial paper on the
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subject and tried to interest him in further development, but as he put it:
“Unfortunately, Dr. Price is better at having ideas than publishing them ” (1972 p. viii).
M aynard Sm ith w ent on to develop Evolutionary Game Theory (1982) w ith little input
from Price. P rice’s final major contribution was to prove that F isher’s Fundamental
Theorem o f N atural Selection (Price 1972; Frank 1995a) applied as broadly as Fisher
had claim ed— som ething that most evolutionary theorists had com e to doubt. Shortly
after this burst o f am azing contributions to evolutionary theory, Price drifted away
from his academ ic pursuits. He gave away the bulk o f his possessions and spent the
last couple o f years o f his life ministering to the less fortunate on the streets o f London
until his death by suicide in 1975.

Inclusive Fitness and the Progressive Generalization
of Hamilton’s Rule
George W illiam s, an initial and formidable critic o f group selection is very clear in his
position that the only reasonable mechanism for the development o f group adaptations
is group selection:
...group-related adaptations must be attributed to the natural selection o f
alternative groups o f individuals and that the natural selection o f alternative
alleles within populations will be opposed to this development. I am in entire
a g ree m e n t w ith the rea so n in g b eh in d this conclusion. O n ly b y a th e o ry o f

between-group selection could we achieve a scientific explanation o f grouprelated adaptations. (Williams 1966 pp. 92-93)
His criticism o f group selection was that many traits that looked to some observers
like group adaptations were really individual adaptations with advantages to
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individuals, i.e. bird ’s morning songs and zoo plankton’s migration to surface waters
at night (W ynne-Edwards 1962). Group selection was theoretically possible, but he
believed it was “im potent and not an appreciable factor in the production and
maintenance o f adaptation” (1966 p. 8). O f course altruistic behavior poses an
especially difficult challenge to his line o f reasoning because by definition altruistic
acts are not individually advantageous. He proposed two mechanisms by which
altm istic behavior could be explained by individual selection. The first relied on
H am ilton’s (1963; 1964) idea o f inclusive fitness to explain altruism between
relatives. The second claim supposed that general mechanisms for parental care were
sometimes m istakenly focused on non-relatives.

Kin Selection
In kin selection Hamilton developed a gene-level explanation o f how altruism among
relatives could evolve. In its simplest form, a single gene can have allele X which
causes an altruistic behavior at cost c to its own fitness and benefit h to recipients o f
the altruistic act. If the benefit is received by relatives that also contain the allele X,
then the fitness o f allele X can be calculated in terms o f copies o f itself in future
generations directly descended from X and copies o f X due to the benefit it gave
relatives. For instance, if at cost c to its own fitness there is a 1/8 chance that benefit b
on average falls to an organism with the X allele, then b = 8c is the balance point. If b
> 8c then the altruistic behavior would tend to increase the copies o f X in future
generations; if b < 8c then the altruistic behavior would tend to decrease copies o f X
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and be selected against. Here the 1/8 ratio corresponds to a cousin because cousins
share 1/8 o f their alleles. More generally Hamilton “imagined that an individual might
try to m axim ize a quantity that includes its own fitness plus the fitness o f others,
w eighted by the degree to which they were genetically related. This becam e the notion
o f inclusive fitness.” (Sober and W ilson 1998 p. 66) In this case the inclusive fitness
o f an altruistic trait is given by H am ilton’s Rule (1964) which specifies in deceptively
simple term s the conditions for the trait to increase:
rb>ct

(2.3)

w here r is the “coefficient o f relationship”, b is benefit to recipients, and c is the cost
to the altruist.
In this general form, where the inclusive fitness is calculated in term s o f the
percentage o f genes shared (not ju st the altruistic gene), synergistic and epistatic
effects between genes are ignored. For instance, is having 8 times the chance o f
passing on 1/8 o f your genes really equivalent to passing on all o f your genes as a
whole? In addition, this raises the issue o f w hat it means for genes to be the same— the
same base pairs (same allele) or the same phenotypic consequence? Gradually the
m eaning o f r has m oved away from the strict idea o f relatedness by descent as
inclusive fitness theory has matured.
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Positive Assortment
H am ilton’s r term is a measure o f assortment and there is positive assortm ent (r > 0)
when altruistic types (or more accurately behaviors1) are clumped or grouped. For
other-only traits r = 0 for a random binom ial distribution and can range from r - - 1
for a uniform distribution (all group have the same proportional com position as the
overall population) t o r = 1 when all groups are homogeneous w ith respect to types (or
behaviors). For w hole-group traits r = l/n for a random binom ial distribution into
groups o f uniform size n and can range from r = 0 for a uniform distribution to r = 1
when there is complete grouping (all groups are homogeneous). Because in wholegroup altruism some o f the behavior o f an individual comes back to itself there is
always some positive assortment except in a uniform distribution.
As m entioned above, H am ilton’s interactions with Price w ere an im portant step in
the progressive generalization o f H am ilton’s rule. Using Price’s model, Hamilton
(1970; 1972; 1975) showed that for selective forces favoring altruism to be stronger
than individual selection favoring selfishness, there must be a positive assortment
among altruists. In keeping with the focus on the gene level, Ham ilton expressed this
association at the genetic level, but switched to using the phrase “coefficient o f
related ness” to describe his r term— the positive regression betw een genes regardless
o f relationship by descent:

1 This distinction between genetic types and phenotypic behaviors is covered in the next section.
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(2.4)

where Ga is the genotype o f the potential actor, Go is the genotype o f others the actor
interacts with, cov is covariance, and var is variance. Here r is the m easure o f the
positive regression or assortment among genes for altruism, and can be interpreted as
measuring how likely it is that the benefit offered by altruists fall to other altruists. As
Ham ilton put it, “the existence o f the positive correlation r could be interpreted as
im plying in this case that there is a chance r that the b units o f fitness are definitely
given to a fellow altruist, while with chance (1-r) they are given ... to a random
m em ber o f the population.” 1 (1975 p. 140). The higher this chance o f genes for
altruism benefiting other genes for altruism (r), the lower the m argin o f benefit over
the sacrifice (b/c) needed in order for altruism to evolve. Groups are im plicit in both o f
H am ilton’s formulations, but the first concerns benefit to relatives in im plied kin
groups (kin selection), whereas here benefit goes to fellow altruists (those w ith the
altruist gene) regardless o f lineage.
Richard Dawkins misses the revision that Ham ilton (1975) m akes to his inclusive
fitness concept and sees this 1975 paper as being supportive in the battle against group
selection which he colorfully characterizes thus:
We painfully struggle back, harassed by sniping fro m a Jesuitically
sophisticated and dedicated neo-group-selectionist rearguard, until we
fin a lly regained D a rw in ’s ground, the position that I am characterizing by
the label ‘the selfish organism ’, the position which, in its modern form , is
dom inated by the concept o f inclusive fitness. (Dawkins 1982 p. 6)

1 The variable names have been changed in this quote to match the notation used in this dissertation.
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Yet, here are H am ilton’s own words from his paper:
Because o f the way it was fir s t explained, the approach using inclusive
fitn ess has often been identified with ‘kin selection ’ and presented strictly as
an alternative to ‘group selection ’ as a way o f establishing altruistic social
behavior by natural selection (e.g. M aynard Smith 1964; Lewontin 1970).
B ut the foregoing discussion shows that kinship should be considered ju s t one
way o f getting positive regression o f genotype in the recipient, and that it is
this positive regression that is vitally necessary fo r altruism. Thus the
inclusive-fitness concept is m ore general than ‘kin selection ’. (Ham ilton
1975, p p .140-141)
In a later work, H am ilton (1987) was even more direct: “it obviously makes no
difference if altruists settle w ith altruists because they are rela ted ... or because they
recognize fellow altruists as such, or settle together because o f some pleiotropic1 effect
o f the gene on habitat preference.” In other words, the interactions am ong m em bers o f
a population must be clum ped (or grouped) with respect to altruistic traits in order for
altruism to evolve— they m ust be disproportionately concentrated w ithin some groups
and not others, but grouping o f related individuals is ju st one (if the m ost common)
way to generate differences between these groupings.
This is much different than H am ilton’s original notion o f inclusive fitness.
Originally, inclusive fitness (kin selection) was seen as bringing seem ingly group
adaptations back under the m ore parsim onious umbrella o f individual selection. In
contrast, here kin selection is being brought under the broader um brella o f group
effects. It is the positive assortment o f altruists within groups that gives altruistic traits

their “inclusive fitness.” Sober and W ilson (1998 p. 78) point out that in a survey o f

1 Pleiotropic means producing many effects or multiple effects from a single gene. So in other words, if
an altruistic gene also causes a certain habitat to be preferred this would result in a positive assortment
among those with the gene regardless o f genealogical kinship.
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Science Citation Index during 1994, the original version o f H am ilton’s theory from
two papers in 1964 was cited 115 times, but the updated 1975 version was cited only
four tim es .1As they put it:
F or much o f the evolutionary community, the theory o f kin selection was set
in stone during the 1960s and thereafter lost its capacity fo r fundam ental
change— even at the hands o f its own creator! I f this is the situation inside
the fie ld o f evolutionary biology, then it should come as no surprise that
scholars fro m other disciplines who are interested in evolution see group
selection prim arily as a theory that died many years ago, along with the
prospects fo r genuine altruism in nature. (Sober and W ilson 1998 p. 78-79)
As we have seen, the original arguments developed for inclusive fitness took a
gene-level view o f selection rather than the more traditional individual level (Darwin
1859). Richard Dawkins (1976; 1982; 1994; 1995) has taken these beginnings to an
extreme reductionism in which genes are the only true level o f selection. Y et in order
to account for the fact that genes cannot go it alone, Dawkins invokes the concept o f
“vehicles o f selection” in which genes m ust travel together and be selected together.
He uses the m etaphor o f a row ing team in which none o f the rowers can reach the
finish line ahead o f the vehicle in w hich they all travel. This argum ent is used to
account for w hy selfish genes w ould need to cooperate with each other.
If genes were truly free to com pete with each other within an individual, we
would expect more fecund genes to be m ore selfishly fit than others. Y et suppression
o f gene-level selection has been suggested as a necessary step in the evolution o f

coordinated, cooperative genes w ithin individual organisms (M ichod 1996; 1997;

1 To be fair, Hamilton seems to have not promoted his updated views on group selection very forcefully
and this may have been due to its general disfavor among biologists.

Chapter 2—Background

35

M ichod and Roze 2000b; 2000a; 2001). The fair process o f meiosis itself, in which
each allele has an equal chance o f m aking it into a sex cell, is typical o f the
multicellular colonies we generally call individual organisms and m ay be one
mechanism by which the expected competition between genes is suppressed (M ichod
1996). In an article by Leticia Aviles, myself, and A sher Cutter recently accepted to
The American N aturalist, we support this general idea by showing that a lottery
mechanism where helping behaviors are assigned at random can allow m uch higher
levels o f cooperation to evolve among non-relatives than in the absence o f such a
mechanism (Aviles, Fletcher, and Cutter 2004). If vehicles o f selection can rein in
genes so they restrict their own selfish fitness for the good o f the individual, then the
selection o f larger vehicles com posed o f individuals, i.e. social groups, could lead to
cooperation and self-sacrifice by individuals for the good o f the group.
The concept o f the vehicle is an admission o f multiple levels o f selection by
reductionism ’s strongest advocate in evolutionary biology. D aw kins’ (1976; 1982;
1994; 1995) insistence on the prim acy o f genes as replicators is irrefutable, but also
not useful for describing higher level phenomena. Explaining, for instance, the
cooperation o f hum an parents in raising a child only in terms o f gene competition
ignores m any other em ergent levels o f interaction and causation. It is like trying to
explain the G ulf Stream current only in terms o f electrons, protons, and neutrons.
Although it is true that all the molecules that make up the water, air, ocean floor, sun,
and other factors that influence the current are com posed entirely o f these elementary
particles, like the gene-only replicator view, it is not useful for understanding many
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real w orld phenom ena taking place at levels higher than that o f the electron. As I show
in the next section and also in Chapter 5, one o f the biggest challenges to the selfish
gene view point comes from advances in inclusive fitness theory itself—the ability to
use the positive assortm ent among emergent phenotypes rather than genotypes in
H am ilton’s rule.

Phenotype vs. Genotype
Over the years there had been various reports o f H am ilton’s rule failing to make
accurate predictions (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1978; Boorman and Levitt
1980; Karlin and M atessi 1983). David Queller noticed that in these m odels, one o f
two things was true: 1) there was a difference between phenotype and genotype
frequencies or 2) the fitness functions for the benefits o f altruism were non-additive.
H am ilton’s rule assumes both a one-to-one mapping between phenotype and genotype
and additive fitness effects and fails when these assumptions are not met. Q ueller’s
insight was to see that altruism would evolve if there were a positive assortm ent
am ong helping behaviors even in the absence o f any positive assortm ent am ong selfish
genes. Q ueller developed a version o f H am ilton’s rule in which the r term is a measure
o f the assortm ent betw een an altruist’s genes and the helping behaviors (phenotypes)
o f itself and those it interacts with:

r = cov(GA1PQ)
CO v(Ga,Pa)

(2.5)
’
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where GA is the genotype o f the actor, P 0 is the average phenotype o f others, and PA is
the average phenotype o f the actor. This is regardless o f how the behaviors are
genetically encoded in others (notice no Go term) and whether or not these phenotypes
emerge via environm ental interactions (including the behavior o f others) or have a
one-to-one m apping to their genetic basis. In other words, an altruistic gene can
increase in the population if the organism it resides in receives fitness benefits from
others m ore often than average population members— even if these others share no
genes w ith the altruist. This allows H am ilton’s rule to be used to understand the
evolution o f conditional strategies (discussed in the next section) as well as
cooperation betw een members o f different species in symbiotic relationships. Table
2-2 summarizes the historical changes in the meaning o f r in H am ilton’s rule.
Although several other versions o f r have been suggested (see Pepper 2000b for
review), these represent the m ost significant advances in generalizing inclusive fitness
theory.
Table 2-2. Historical Advances in Generalizing the r term of Hamilton’s Rule.

Contribution
Reference
Hamilton
1964

Meaning

Calculated with

Relationship by descent to kin

Genealogical relationship
values

Ham ilton
1970, 1972,
1975

Positive regression (assortment)
between genetic type o f actor
and genetic type o f others

r - cov(G a ,G q )
(Eq. 2.4)
va r(GA)

Queller 1985,
1992a, 1992b

Positive regression (assortment)
between genetic type o f actor
and phenotypic type (behaviors)
o f others

r _ c o v(Ga ,P0)
(Eq. 2.5)
COv (G a ,Pa)
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N otice that each o f the advances in the meaning o f r is m ore general, but does not
loose anything when applied under m ore restrictive conditions. I f one takes Eq. 2.5
and assumes phenotypic frequency equals genotypic frequency, then this becom es Eq.
2.4 (note that cov(X, X) = var(X)). If one further assumes that any positive assortment
in genetic frequency is due to relationship by decent then r as the “coefficient o f
relatedness” in Eq. 2.4 becomes r as the “coefficient o f relationship” used in the
original H am ilton’s rule, Eq. 2.3. In Chapter 5 I use the most general form o f
H am ilton’s rule to show the fundamental similarities between reciprocal altruism
theory (discussed next) and inclusive fitness theory.

Reciprocal Altruism and
Evolutionary Game Theory
W hile game theory was first established in the field o f econom ics as a framework for
studying conflict and cooperation in social systems (von N eum ann and M orgenstem
1947), it also provides an important tool for reasoning about the evolutionary
consequences o f social situations as well as particular interactions betw een organisms.
For instance, Hamilton used it to describe an “unbeatable strategy” in the evolution o f
female-biased sex ratios (1967; 1971) and Price first used it to reason about ritualized
fighting in animals (Frank 1995a). Starting with P rice’s work John M aynard Smith
developed evolutionary game theory including the notion o f an evolutionary stable
strategy (ESS) that aids in reasoning about long term evolutionary outcomes when
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different behavioral strategies interact (M aynard Smith and Price 1973; M aynard
Smith 1982). Robert Trivers (1971) used gam e-theoretic ideas to explain how
seem ingly altruistic behaviors among non-relatives could evolve through an exchange
o f benefits, e.g., “I ’ll scratch your back if you scratch m ine.” He was well aware o f the
potential for cheating in such situations and explored mechanisms that m ight
overcome the tem ptation to defect, including repeated interactions. The political
scientist R obert Axelrod and Hamilton expressed gam e theory’s usefulness in
capturing the tensions involved in the evolution o f altruism this way:
M any o f the benefits sought by living things are disproportionably available
to cooperating groups. While there are considerable differences in what is
m eant by the terms "benefits” and "sought," this statement, insofar as it is
true, lays down the fundam ental basic fo r all social life. The problem is that
w hile an individual can benefit fro m m utual cooperation, each one can also
do even better by exploiting the cooperative efforts o f others
Game theory
in general, and the Prisoner's Dilemm a gam e in particular, allow a
form ulation o f the strategic possibilities inherent in such situations. (Axelrod
and Ham ilton 1981 p. 1391)
N ote that the different levels (groups vs. individuals) are explicit in this quote, yet
Axelrod and H am ilton propose that reciprocal altruism (which they then go on to
model w ith the PD) is a distinct process from inclusive fitness theory (1981). In
Chapter 5 I show that inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism are not fundam entally
distinct processes. That is, the fundamentals o f the evolution o f altruism captured in
the m ost general form o f H am ilton’s rule (i.e., the balance among costs, benefits, and

the assortm ent o f altruistic behaviors) allow it to be applied to reciprocal altruism as
well. In addition, although Axelrod and Ham ilton used the PD as a m odel o f reciprocal
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altruism, in Chapter 3 I show that the PD (in an n-player version) is also a model o f
m ultilevel selection and inclusive fitness.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The prisoner’s dilemm a is the m ost famous and widely used game o f game theory. In
this im aginary situation two prisoners have been arrested for a serious crim e and are
being interrogated separately by the police. The prisoners cannot com m unicate and
neither knows what the other will do. I f they cooperate with each other and keep quiet
there is only enough evidence to convict them o f a lesser crime and they will both do
m inim al jail time. If how ever one o f them turns State’s evidence and rats on (defects
from) the other who remains silent, then the defector does no jail time, but the
cooperator receives a very harsh sentence. In the case where both confess (defect),
they both receive an intermediate am ount o f jail time.
A n exam ple o f the PD is represented by the payoff matrix in Figure 2-1 below
where the num bers represent a positive measure o f utility. It is sim pler to think in
term s o f positive payoffs rather than the negative payoff o f jail time, but the essential
features are the same.

c
D

Player 2
D
C
0/5
3 /3
1/ 1
5/0

Figure 2-1. P a y o ff M atrix for a 2-Player Prisoner’s Dilemm a.
C represents cooperation and D represents defection. The strategies for player
1 are represented as row s and for player 2 as colum ns. The p a y o ff values for
each pair o f strategies that m eet are listed as p la y e r 1 p a yo ff/p la ye r 2 payoff.
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The PD is a non-zero sum game— the sum o f the two players’ scores varies for
different strategy combinations. An essential feature o f this gam e is that there is no
opportunity for the players to coordinate their actions and, m ore critically, there is no
higher-level mechanism to enforce any agreements. The players m ust individually
decide which strategy to play w ithout any guarantees about the actions o f the other
player. To understand the paradox at the heart o f the PD, imagine player one trying to
decide w hat to do and using the p ayoff matrix to reason with as follows: Regardless o f
what player 2 does, I should defect— I will get 5 instead o f 3 if player 2 cooperates, or

1 instead o f 0 if player 2 defects (rem em ber these are positive utility values, not jail
time). Player 2 is in symmetrical situation and rationally also chooses to defect. So
each player follows this dominant strategy and gets a payoff o f 1, but if they had both
cooperated they would have each gotten a payoff o f 3. The essential feature o f the PD
is that the dominant individually-rational strategy for each player leads to a collective
sub-optimal or irrational outcome. This outcome (1/1) is “non-Pareto-optim al”
because there is another outcome (3/3) to the game that increases the utility o f one
player w ithout cost to the other. In fact in this case, both players can do better.

Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
The sim ulation experiments o f A xelrod (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; A xelrod 1984)
addressed the question o f whether individual rationality w ould still favor defection if
instead o f playing just once or at random, players were forced to play a series o f
iterated PD games with a probabilistic (rather than fixed) num ber o f iterations. This
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work extended and modeled the original idea o f reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971).
Axelrod sponsored a tournament in w hich various strategies im plem ented in com puter
programs were played against each other pair-wise in a round robin so that each
program played every other program including itself. Each pair-w ise iterated game
consisted o f 200 interactions and the payoff matrix was the one illustrated above in
Figure 2-1. Therefore two always-defect (ALLD) strategies playing each other would
get a score o f 200 each, two always-cooperate (ALLC) strategies playing each other
would get a score o f 600, and an ALLD playing an ALLC w ould get respective scores
o f 1000 and 0. For a summary o f subsequent studies o f the evolution o f cooperation
and altruism based on the iterated PD see Dugatkin (1997).
Surprisingly the simplest strategy in the Axelrod tournam ent turned out to also be
the best. Proposed by Anatol Rapoport, it is called Tit-for-Tat (TFT). This strategy
cooperates in the first interaction and then always plays the strategy its opponent used
in the last encounter. Consistent with the theory o f reciprocal altruism, TFT players
need the ability to remember previous actions by competitors. The TFT strategy is
willing to cooperate, swift to punish a defection, yet forgiving in that it will return to
cooperation if its opponent makes the sacrifice o f cooperating w hile TFT is defecting.
Axelrod also explored the iterated PD in an evolutionary context. Here
generations o f tournaments were held in which the number o f players o f a particular

type (strategy) in the new generation was based proportionately on its tournam ent
scores from the last round. Interestingly, Axelrod w rote to M aynard Smith in England
for advice about m aking evolutionary versions o f his iterated PD m odels. M aynard
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Smith inform ed him that one o f the preem inent evolutionary theorists, W illiam
Hamilton, was on his own campus at the University o f Michigan. A xelrod wrote a
seminal paper co-authored w ith Hamilton entitled “The Evolution o f Cooperation”
(1981).
Unfortunately, the reason that TFT came out on top in both the tournam ents and
evolutionary models has been w idely misunderstood as being due to its individual
fitness or “unbeatability.” As Sober and W ilson (1998), and even Rapoport (1991)
have pointed out, TFT can never beat an opponent in any pair-wise iterated interaction
because it never defects unless it has already been on the short end o f a defection from
its opponent. As Rapoport put it, “in every paired encounter, Tit-for-Tat m ust either
draw or lose. It can never win a paired encounter” (Rapoport 1991 p. 93). In this sense
TFT is altruistic at the individual level because it often gives m ore utility than it gets
and it never gains more than its opponent does.
The reason TFT won (or was selected for) hinges on the fact that it was often able
to play other TFT or similar altruistic strategies where it could run up its accumulated
score. Even though in individual competition TFT is inferior, for exam ple to ALLD
w hich is the m ost fit un-exploitable individual strategy, pairs (groups) o f TFT
accumulate higher scores than pairs (groups) o f ALLD. In the analysis o f why TFT
was a successful strategy, A xelrod (1984) does note that it tended to score especially

well (close to 600) when it played similar strategies, but he does not recognize this as
a group effect. M aynard Smith comments that, “the programs w ere ranked according
to the total payoff accumulated (not, it should be noted, according to the num ber o f
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opponents defeated in the individual m atches)” (1982 p. 168).Yet neither he nor
A xelrod distinguish the individual and group levels o f competition present in this
tournam ent w hich is obscured by the cumulative m ethod o f scoring. Sober and W ilson
(1998) em phasize the im portance o f identifying and separating out the selective forces
at different hierarchical levels. They argue that much o f the controversy surrounding
group selection is due to a failure to do so.
M ore com plicated versions o f the iterated PD and their effects on the success o f
TFT strategies have also been studied. In one investigation the degree o f cooperation
(not ju st cooperate or defect) was allowed to evolve (Frean 1996). In another the
amount o f sacrifice and payoff evolved (Doebeli and Knowlton 1998). Ecological
extensions sim ilar to those discussed under m ultilevel selection have also been applied
to iterated PD models. For instance Ferriere and M ichod (1995; 1996) have shown the
increased fitness o f TFT over ALLD in spatial models with player mobility. The effect
o f population dynamics on the fitness o f TFT has revealed that boom and bust
dynamics can favor the less individually fit TFT when in direct com petition with
ALLD (Doebeli, Blarer, and Ackermann 1997). There have also been other studies
showing that under different circumstances other (but related) strategies can do better
than TFT (see Brembs 1996; Dugatkin 1997 for reviews).
Up until now the notion that TFT (or similar strategies) does well because o f high
scores received when grouped (paired) with other TFT or cooperating behaviors has
not been well formalized. One o f the innovations o f this dissertation is to demonstrate
how to make this argum ent precise by using Q ueller’s general versions o f H am ilton’s
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rule discussed above. Interestingly, Queller (1985) in his original paper developing his
equations notes that they should apply to reciprocal altruism, but he says this without
offering a dem onstration or example. In two later papers (Q ueller 1992b; 1992a) that
expand this original w ork no mention is made o f its relationship to reciprocal altruism.
There is also no indication that Hamilton ever tried to apply his inclusive fitness
techniques to A xelrod’s models even though, as mentioned, they w orked together on a
paper (Axelrod and H am ilton 1981) which became a chapter in A xelrod’s book
(1984). Also in H am ilton’s collected papers (Hamilton 1996; 2001), the significance
o f Q ueller’s generalization is never noted. A nother contribution o f this dissertation is
to draw attention to Q ueller’s fundamental advance in moving from the assortment
among genes to the assortm ent among behaviors in inclusive fitness theory. This
allows H am ilton’s rule to be applied much more broadly— specifically to situations
where genotype and phenotype differ, as in conditional behaviors. As far as I know,
until now no one has actually demonstrated how to apply Q ueller’s equations to
reciprocal altruism, as I do in Chapter 5.

N-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma
(The Tragedy o f the Commons)
The n-player, as opposed to 2-player, PD offers a straightforward w ay o f thinking
about the tension between the individual and group levels. In real-w orld biological and
social systems the effects o f cooperation or defection are often distributed diffusely to
other members o f a group, i.e., they do not necessarily arise via pair-w ise interactions.
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W hen there is a common and finite resource, each individual benefits by using more
than its share o f that resource, but when all players apply this individual rationality it
can lead to collective irrationality. For example, each country that fishes international
waters can increase its utility by taking m ore o f the fish in this com m on resource, but
as more and m ore countries overfish, the common stock is depleted beyond where it
can quickly replenish (Roberts 1997; Tierney 2000). In subsequent years all have less
and this leads to decreased utility for both countries that over fish (defectors) and
those that don’t (cooperators).
A nother exam ple is the tension between the com mon good that we fund through
taxation and the individual advantage o f paying fewer taxes. The benefit to an
individual tax cheat is paid for by either m arginal increases in tax rates or marginal
decreases in services such as roads, schools, courts, parks, police, etc. There is an
incentive to pay less taxes because the gain is more than the loss due to a slight
increase in the rate or the marginal lessening o f services, but again if the collective
consensus is to pay less and less taxes then all may be worse o ff in the absence o f the
public services m entioned above.
The fishing exam ple is com monly known as a “tragedy o f the com m ons,” (Hardin
1968) whereas the taxation example is called the “free rider problem ” (M cM illan
1979; Aviles 2002), yet both are examples o f an n-player PD. (Som etim es “tragedy o f
the com m ons” is used more generally to refer to both types o f situations.)
Interestingly, even though the equivalence (Hardin 1971; H am burger 1973) between
the gam e-theoretic framework and the less formal notion o f a tragedy o f the commons
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was shown in the early 1970’s (not long after Garret Hardin's seminal paper in 1968) it
is still not w idely appreciated. For instance, a recent entire issue o f Science m agazine
was dedicated to discussing the tragedy o f the com mons “25 years after” H ardin’s
paper, but now here is the prisoner’s dilemma mentioned.
George Price was the first to recognize the connection between social dilemm as
and levels o f selection as demonstrated in the quote at the start o f the next chapter.
W ilson (1977) in an early graphical illustration o f m ultilevel selection presented a
figure and a model satisfying the conditions for an n-player PD, but did not note their
game-theoretic interpretation. Surprisingly, despite these hints in the literature, as far
as I know the n-player PD has not previously been used explicitly to model m ultilevel
selection as I do in the next chapter.
In the next three chapters I delve more deeply into a few o f these issues by
presenting a n-player PD model o f the evolution o f altruism (Chapter 3),
demonstrating that altruism (even strongly defined) can evolve in random ly formed
groups (Chapter 4), and showing how H am ilton’s rule can be applied to reciprocal
altruism (Chapter 5).

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

... the cases discussed where individual selection decreases group fitn ess are
closely and deeply analogous to economic effects recently discussed by
Hardin in a p a p er entitled “The Tragedy o f the Commons ” (Hardin 1968).
George Price, in 1969 grant proposal (quoted in Frank 1995a)

Chapter 3
The Evolution of Altruism:
Game Theory, Multilevel Selection, and
Inclusive Fitness1

Introduction
The evolutionary mechanisms by which altruistic behaviors m ay evolve have been
vigorously debated over the last several decades. The most prom inent explanations are
reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971; A xelrod and Ham ilton 1981; A xelrod 1984),
inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964; 1970; 1975), and multilevel selection (W ilson 1977;
Wade 1978; W ilson 1997a; Sober and W ilson 1998). The iterated prisoner’s dilemma

(PD) naturally lends itself to the study o f reciprocal altruism (Axelrod 1984; Dugatkin

’ This chapter is based on a completed manuscript to be sent for publication and which is coauthored by
Martin Zwick, my advisor.
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1997), yet real-world biological and social systems often do not involve pair-wise
interactions or knowledge o f past actions, and consequences o f cooperation and
defection m ay be distributed diffusely. The n-player prisoner’s dilem m a (NPD) is a
model that captures the diffuse harm to the com mon good that self-interested
behaviors m ay cause. The NPD encompasses both (Hardin 1971) problem s o f
exploitation o f a common resource (“tragedy o f the commons” (Hardin 1968)), and
problems o f inequitable contributions towards a common good (“free-rider problem ”
(M cM illan 1979; Aviles 2002)). Using an NPD model in multiple groups I
dem onstrate that altruism can evolve, despite the higher within-group fitness o f non
altruists, in the absence o f reciprocity, cognition, or memory.
The minimal conditions for the evolution o f altruism are captured in this model
and are: 1) non-zero-sum fitness functions for altruistic behavior, and 2) sufficient
non-uniform population structure with respect to altruistic behaviors. H eritability is
also assum ed in this evolutionary model. The simplicity o f this model allows us to
connect explicitly the NPD to the other two related theories (W ade 1980; Queller
1985; 1992b; Frank 1998; Sober and W ilson 1998) o f altruism evolution: inclusive
fitness and m ultilevel selection, a connection w hich has not previously been made
explicitly, despite hints in the literature. Others (Price in Frank 1995a; Frank 1998;
Leigh 1999; M ichod 1999; Hauert et al. 2002; Bowles, Choi, and H opfensitz 2003)
have com m ented on the similarities between social dilemmas and m ultilevel selection
without addressing them explicitly, as I do here.
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The NPD model here captures essential factors in the evolution o f altruism in
m odel param eters that relate simply to H am ilton’s Rule, the Price covariance equation,
and a useful alternative selection decom position I present here. Contrasting this
alternative decom position with the Price equation, I demonstrate interaction effects
between within- and between-group selection which are not captured in either
decom position alone. This game theoretic model also allows me to clarify essential
similarities between strong and w eak altruism undergoing natural selection and
suggests a framework for unifying different approaches to the evolution o f altruism.
Lastly, in contrast to conventional wisdom, I demonstrate that even strong altruism
can be selected for and m aintained using periodic random groupings o f non
conditional strategies.

Methods
The N-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma Model
In the simplest form o f the model there are only two groups w ith no dispersal (I relax
both these assumptions below). Groups vary initially only in their sizes,
fraction o f cooperators,

and in the

in each group i. There are no strategies besides always-

cooperate (ALLC) and always-defect (ALLD). I follow the frequency o f cooperators
in each group and across the whole population. Figure 3-1 illustrates a simple NPD
w ith parallel linear fitness functions, wa and ws, that gives the fitness p e r individual
cooperator (altruist) or defector (selfish) in the vertical axis and w here qi is the
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horizontal axis. There are two param eters to this NPD: the slope, b, o f the fitness
functions and, c, their difference in intercept. (For simplicity I set the cooperator’s
intercept to 0 so the difference is the defector’s intercept value.) The parallel lines
used in this model are the simplest fitness curves that satisfy the NPD. The cost o f
being a cooperator vs. a defector is the intercept difference c. The benefit provided by
each cooperator to the group is b. To see this note that the added benefit to each group
m em ber (including the focal player) in having one additional cooperator in the group
(vs. a defector) is &/«,• (the change in q, is 1In,) and therefore the total benefit produced
by a cooperator for all group members is n^b/n,) = b.

av

W
C

0

0.5
Qi

Figure 3-1. Sim ple N -Player Prisoner’s Dilem m a.
Fitness functions for individual cooperators (w a) and defectors (vrs) given as a
function o f the frequency o f cooperators in a group (qi). The tw o solid lines
have slope b. The dashed line indicates the average fitness (wav), w hich has a
positive slope. The intercept difference o f the two functions is given by c.

The defector’s fitness line dom inates the cooperator’s at all q, and therefore
cooperation always involves an altruistic sacrifice relative to defection. The deficient
outcome o f the N PD here is the fact that the fitness to defectors when all players in a
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group defect (qt = 0 .0) is lower than the fitness to cooperators when all group members
cooperate {qt = 1.0), that is , b > c and this is the minimum param eter condition for a
NPD. This is also the condition for beneficial non-zero-sumness, i.e., the benefit
created by a cooperator exceeds the cost to the cooperator and the average fitness line
(wav) has a positive slope. Since defection dominates cooperation, this deficient
outcome is an attractor o f the dynamics. Thus in a PD situation w ithin-group selection
does not maximize individual fitness.
A t each generation the num ber o f cooperators (and defectors) w ithin each group is
increased by the num ber o f individuals utilizing this strategy m ultiplied by its fitness
payoff per individual:
a / = a,{ 1 + wa{qf] and

(3.1)

si' = s/[l + ws(qi)l

(3.2)

where at and s, are the num ber o f cooperators and defectors respectively in group i and
prim ed terms represent values after reproduction. These fitness functions can be
interpreted as overlapping generations or as discrete generations w here the fitness
independent o f the altruistic trait is one offspring per individual. Here fitness is
fecundity and offspring counts (including fractional components) are determ ined by
the fitness functions from Figure 3-1:
wa(qd = bqt and

(3.3)

ws(ql) = bqi + c.

(3.4)

To aid in com parisons among runs, each generation the total population size is
proportionally scaled to its original size, preserving each group’s qi value. For
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convenience we define total population variables A = Ea,, S = Z.v,-, TV = H + S and Q =
A/N.

Hamilton’s Rule
In this simple model the condition for an increase in the overall frequency o f
cooperators from one generation to the next, Q '> Q, can be derived starting w ith the
NPD Eqs. 3.3 and 3.4. Appendix A gives this derivation which results in a form o f
H am ilton’s rule (1964; 1970; 1975):
rb > c.

(3.5 ) 1

Here we find that the r value in this derivation can be expressed as the between-group
over total variance in the cooperate trait,

var\{Q)

P -6)

where v a r ^ , ) is the weighted between-group variance and var,(Q) the total variance
among individuals in the cooperator trait. (I will refer to the expression in Eq. 3.6 as
the variance ratio.) This is consistent with previous w ork showing that for altruists that
benefit the w hole group (Pepper 2000b) as in the model above, r can indeed be
expressed in terms o f the variance ratio (Breden 1990; Queller 1992b; Frank 1998).
For altruism to evolve, the benefit b m ust not only be greater than the cost c (the
m inim um N PD condition), but the benefit must be greater than the cost even when the
benefit is discounted by the variance ratio. The more structured the population with

1 Equations will sometimes be repeated for convenience. For instance, Eq. 3.5 is also Eq. 2.1 from
Chapter 2.
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regard to cooperative interactions (i.e. the closer the variance ratio is to 1), the less
non-zero-sum synergy (i.e. b > c) is required.
The m eaning o f r has changed over the years from a sim ple m easure o f
relationship via descent (Hamilton 1964) to various statistical measures o f sim ilarity
(Ham ilton 1970; 1975; W ade 1980; Queller 1985; 1992b; Frank 1998). W hen the
benefits provided by an altruist are divided among only others in the altruist’s group,
then r is calculated differently using the covariance between the frequency o f the trait
in each population m em ber and the average frequency in the others each m em ber
interacts w ith in its group (Hamilton 1972; Pepper 2000b). In either case r specifies
the assortm ent between potential actors and their recipients. As we will see in Chapter
5, a m ore general form o f H am ilton’s rule shows that it is actually the assortm ent
among altruistic behaviors that is most fundamental to the evolution o f altruism.

Results and Discussion
Simpson’s Paradox
Even though Q can increase, i.e. Q > Q, when H am ilton’s rule is satisfied, the
frequency o f cooperators decreases in every group, i.e. qt < qi for all groups. This is
an exam ple o f Sim pson’s paradox (1951), which is key to understanding the role o f
population structure in the evolution o f altruism (Sober and W ilson 1998). Figure 3-2
shows a run (Run 1) in this model where Sim pson’s paradox is evident. All runs used
in Figure 3-2 to Figure 3-4 have a total population o f 1,000 divided into two groups
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with varying N PD param eters and initial population structures. In Run 1 the overall
cooperator frequency Q is initially 0.5 and the group sizes are equal, but the group
cooperator frequencies are qj = 0.1 and q2 = 0.9. This population structure gives a
variance ratio o f 0.64, well above the c!b ratio o f 0.2 for this run, and therefore Q
increases in accord w ith H am ilton’s rule, even though qi and q2 both decrease
monotonically. Figure 3-2(a) demonstrates Sim pson’s paradox in this model by
showing the fraction o f cooperators in the two groups and in the total population for
Run 1. N ote that the fraction o f cooperators monotonically decreases in both groups
while initially increasing overall. This Sim pson’s paradox effect is due to group 2
(cooperator dominated) rapidly expanding, while group 1 (defector dominated) is
shrinking, w hich is shown in Figure 3-2(c). A t the peak o f total cooperation in Run 1,
group 2 comprises over 95% o f the total population.
The Sim pson’s effect is transient without mechanisms for reestablishing variation
among groups, which I demonstrate later. The changes in group size and com position
affect the variance ratio (r)— in the case o f Run 1, the ratio decreases steadily (Figure
3-2(b)). The generation when the ratio variance drops below c/b is precisely the point
when the overall cooperator frequency begins to decline. A vertical dashed lines with
arrows indicate this corresponding point for Run 1 in Figure 3-2.
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Figure 3-2. Dynamics in q, r, and n for a Typical NPD Run with 2 Groups.
Results for Run 1 with a total and constant population of 1,000 and initial
groups sizes of 500 in each group. Parameter values are shown in Table 3-1.
(a) Frequency of cooperators vs. generation for the total population (Q) and
for each group (qj and q2). (b) The between-group over total variance ratio in
cooperation frequency (r) vs. generation. The c/b value is also shown. A
vertical dashed line with arrows indicates the critical point in Run 1—when r
drops below clb in (b), Q begins to decline in (a). Panel (c) shows how the
size of each group changes over the run.

Figure 3-3(a) and (b) are similar to Figures 3-2(a) and (b), but four additional runs
with a variety o f NPD param eters are compared. The param eters from all five runs are
given in Table 3-1. Again, Figure 3-3(a) shows the overall cooperation frequency Q,
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while Figure 3-3(b) gives the variance ratio for each o f these runs. The ratio c!b
chosen arbitrarily to be the same for all runs and is shown by a thick unadorned
horizontal line in both Figure 3-2(b) and Figure 3-3(b).
Table 3-1. Parameter Values for Runs 1-5 used in Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3.

Run
1
2
3
4
5

ai

Sl
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450
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450
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50

50

0.20
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1.00
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50
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450

50

1.00

5.00

0.2

50
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450

50

0.03
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0.2

9

1

1
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Figure 3-3. Results for 4 Runs with Various Parameters (see Table 3-1).
All runs done with 2 groups and total populations of 1,000. (a) Frequency of
cooperators (Q) vs. generation, (b) The between-group over total variance
ratio in cooperation frequency (r) vs. generation. The clb value is also shown.
Vertical dashed lines with arrows indicate corresponding points in runs—
when r drops below d b in (b), Q begins to decline in (a).
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Runs 2 and 3 show the effects o f varying the m agnitude o f b and c, while keeping
c!b and initial population structure (variance ratio) the same as in Run 1. In Run 2 with
higher m agnitudes the increase and subsequent decrease in Q happens m ore quickly;
in Run 3 w ith lower magnitudes, the pattern is stretched out over m any more
generations. Run 4 demonstrates that even w ith low initial Q values (Q - 0.01), a
sufficiently high variance ratio can lead to a dramatic increase in cooperators. Run 4
also shows that the variance ratio need not always decrease (Figure 3-3(b)). Changes
in group size and composition can in some cases cause the variance ratio to increase
transiently w ithout external causes or m ixing1. Finally, Run 5 makes the point that
even w ith an initial high frequency o f cooperators, Q = 0.9, cooperators will not
increase w ithout a sufficient variance ratio. Here the variance ratio is less than c/b and
therefore Q decreases monotonically.

The Price Equation
In the runs discussed so far, the transient increase and subsequent decrease in
cooperator frequency highlights competing forces— the overall frequency o f
cooperators, Q, increases while the between-group selective force dominates and
decreases when the within-group force is stronger. Price introduced a covariance
equation (1970) which allows us to partition the change in overall cooperator
frequency, AQ = Q '- Q , into within- and between-group components:

1 The fact that r can increase from its initial value is critical for strong altruism to evolve in randomly
formed groups. This is discussed later in this chapter and more extensively in Chapter 4.

Chapter 3— Game Theory, Multilevel Selection, and Inclusive Fitness

A Q = cov(wl’ cl >) +

E (w t)

59

(3 .7)

^ or eqUivaientiy

E (w t)

AQ = AQb +AQb,

(3.8)

where w, is a measure o f group fitness, here the growth rate o f each group («,'/«,), E is
the expectation, and AQ t and AQw are the Price between- and w ithin-group
com ponents o f change in overall cooperator frequency, respectively.
As shown in Appendix B, these Price equation components o f change can be
rew ritten as:
AQ b = Q * - Q a n d
&Qw = Q ' - Q* where

(3.9)
(3.10)

(3.11)
N'
The Q* term in AQb plays the role o f an idealized Q ' in which the before-selection qt
values are applied to the after-selection group sizes, n f The corresponding withingroup expression corrects for the ignored changes in cooperator frequency within
groups. This Price equation idealization, as also shown in the Appendix B, can be
expressed in terms that highlight its connection to our linear N PD model,

(3.12)

where wavqi gives values for the average fitness line shown in Figure 3-1. The slope o f
this average fitness line is b - c (see Figure 3-1) or the degree o f non-zero-sum ness in
the N PD model. As a kind o f control, if we do a run o f this model w here both
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cooperators and defectors receive the average fitness (in this case there is no withingroup selection), the change in Q over generations matches the Price between-group
component, AQb, exactly. Thus the average slope o f the fitness functions (degree o f
non-zero-sumness) is a m easure o f the between-group selection force predicted by the
Price equation. That is, groups w ith higher fractions o f cooperators get proportionally
more o f the non-zero-sum advantage and out produce groups that with less
cooperators.

Alternative Selection Decomposition
This presentation o f the Price between-group idealization suggests an alternative
decom position where the within-group component contains the Q ' idealization and the
between-group com ponent is the correction term. This idealization assumes the
frequency o f cooperators w ithin each group changes, but that the relative size (fitness)
o f groups does not— I use the after-selection qi' values and the before-selection group
sizes,

This alternative Q ' idealization I denote as:

Q # _ Eft'”.

(3.13)

N
and the alternative com ponents o f selection can be labeled:
altAQ w = Q# - Q and

(3.14)

altAQh = Q - Q#.

(3.15)
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N ow we can do a symmetrical control to the one above by setting the slope b to
zero. Here there is a difference c between cooperator and defector fitness within
groups but no difference between w hat these types get in different groups (in this case
there is no between-group selection), and the resulting actual AQ for this run exactly
matches the altAQw component given by this decomposition. So again the degree o f
non-zero-sumness (average fitness line) in this model gives the betw een-group
selective force predicted by the Price decomposition, and the cost c o f being a
cooperator (intercept difference), gives the within-group selective force predicted by
the alternative decomposition. The Price within term and the alternative betw een term
act, respectively, as correction terms for these idealizations.
Figure 3-4 shows the change from the initial Q value for Run 1 o f Figure 3-2
(parameters given in Table 3-1). Also shown are the selection com ponents o f Run 1
given by the Price decom position and the alternative. Notice that the two
decompositions give quite different results. In the Price decom position the equilibrium
state (Q = 0.0) consists o f a balance between a strong between-group force, 0.4, even
though group 1 has disappeared (see Figure 3-2 (c )), and a strong w ithin-group force,
-0 .9 , even though cooperators have disappeared. In contrast, the alternative
decom position more intuitively says that the between-group selection force rises as
group 2 initially increases over group 1, but that this force goes to zero as the first
group disappears. The alternative within-group component steadily decreases to -0 .5
to balance the initial Q o f 0.5 as Q goes to zero. W hich o f these two decom positions is
more appropriate will depend on the situation being studied. In the runs illustrated
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here where the within-group selection force eventually dominates, the alternative
decom position provides more insight.

0.4
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0.0
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0
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Figure 3-4. Price Equation and Alternative D ecom positions for Run 1.
Change in cooperator frequency (A Qt) vs. generation for Run 1 o f Figure 3-2
along w ith the betw een- and within-group com ponents o f selection for this
run given by the Price decom position (AQb and AQw respectively) and the
alternative decom position (altAQb and altA Q w).

N ote that neither decom position is necessarily accurate when there is a mixture o f
between- and within-group selective forces acting simultaneously. W hile both
decompositions assume the forces can be decoupled, in reality the selective forces
affect each other. The Price decom position posits in its between-group term that all
change is due to between-group selection and then assumes the difference between
this assumption and the actual change in cooperator frequency is due to the
counterbalancing force o f within-group selection. The alternative decom position takes
the opposite tack. W hen the two approaches give roughly the same answ er (as in the
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first few generations o f Figure 3-4), then the forces are roughly decom posable. But as
change over longer periods is compared the values given by the two approaches
diverge (e.g. compare values at generation 30 in Figure 3-4). This is an indication that
over this tim e period the degree o f between-group selection has been affected by
changes in group compositions (caused by within-group selection); and that the degree
o f within-group selection has been affected by group size changes (caused by
between-group selection). In addition to offering a symmetric decom position that may
give m ore intuitive results in some situations, this alternative decom position is useful
in highlighting when the Price equation’s assumption o f independent effects is
inaccurate.

Selection and Game Theory
In addition to the debate over levels o f selection and how altruism evolves, there is
also disagreem ent about w hat behaviors constitute altruism. In a standard gametheoretic analysis rational self-interest is defined by the behavioral choice that
produces the highest absolute payoff (utility) to a player—regardless o f the effect this
behavior has on the payoffs o f other players (i.e. positive or negative externalities).
Individuals m axim izing their own utility dictate the expected dynamics in this
situation. On the other hand, the engine o f natural selection is differences in offspring
representation in subsequent generations and the dynamics are driven by relative
fitness (W ilson 2004). Applying the standard game-theoretic (or absolute fitness)
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viewpoint to systems under selection leads to contradictory results, as illustrated
below.
I stated earlier that the m inim um conditions for an N PD in our m odel require that
the average fitness line have a positive slope, i.e. b > c, but from the standard gametheoretic view point there is an additional constraint: c > b/nt. That is, the cost o f being
a cooperator m ust be greater than the cooperator’s share o f the benefit it creates for the
group. This second condition marks the boundary between an N PD and a N o-Conflict
(NC) game, or equivalently the difference between what W ilson (1979; 1990) has
termed strong and w eak altruism, respectively. N ote that the same behavioral trait
(with the same values o f b and c) can change between strong and w eak altruism
depending on changes in group size (Pepper 2000b).
The expected dynam ics (from an absolute fitness perspective) in the NC game
defined by w eak altruism is towards mutual cooperation (as cooperation is the
dom inant strategy), but under selection the dynamics o f weak altruism move towards
mutual defection. Again, this is because under selection differences in fitness values
drive the dynamics— not ju st the m aximization o f absolute fitness amounts (W ilson
2004). Several studies have reported “surprising” results when animal or hum an
subjects choose cooperative or altruistic behaviors that do not m axim ize absolute
fitness or utility, but instead seem more concerned with relative fitness or fairness (e.g.
Fehr and G achter 2002; Boyd et al. 2003; Brosnan and de W aal 2003). Y et these
results are not surprising from the perspective o f selection. Ham ilton in discussing PD
situations wrote in 1969:
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But natural selection, the process which has m ade us alm ost all that we are,
seem s to give one clear warning about situations o f this general kind. When
p ayoffs are connected with fitness, the anim al p a rt o f our nature is expected
to be more concerned with getting “more than the average ” than with getting
“the m aximum p o ssib le ” (Hamilton 1971 p. 83)
Still some have ignored or disagreed with this distinction preferring to reserve the
word “altruism ” only for the strong category (Nunney 1985b; M aynard Smith 1998a;
Nunney 2000). For instance N unney has argued that “benevolence” should be used
instead o f “w eak altruism .” He offers the following example:

Suppose that you are offered two fin a n cia l options. Under the selfish option
you receive 10 dollars and keep it all. Under the benevolent option you
receive 10 million dollars, but 6 million m ust be given to a neighbor. Given
that neighbors are random samples o f a large population, the choice is
clearly the benevolent option, a choice based purely on individual greed and
not on the general benefit o f the neighborhood. Replacing m oney by fitness, it
can be seen that benevolence spreads by individual selection because a net
gain o f 4 million units o f fitness is superior to a net gain o f 10 units o f fitness.
(N unney 1985b p. 226)
A lthough it sounds very self-serving to give oneself 4 m illion dollars, the problem
with this exam ple is that it ignores selection among neighbors. If you have a
behavioral trait that helps your neighbor have 6 million offspring w hile it only helps
you have 4 m illion offspring, then only in an infinite world could this trait avoid being
w eeded out (assuming as Nunney does that only individual selection is operating). In
every paired interaction this trait looses ground to its neighbor. On the other hand,
such a trait can evolve if the benefits bestowed by altruists fall m ore to other altruists
than to average population members— but this need for positive assortm ent o f
altruistic behaviors is the same condition for strong altruism to evolve— and in both
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cases H am ilton’s rule specifies the degree o f positive assortm ent necessary given the
fitness costs and benefits.
Returning to our model, in Run 1 (Figure 3-2 and Table 3-1) the first group’s size
shrinks below

= 5 between generation 15 and 16, and thus crosses the boundary

from strong to w eak altruism (b= 1, c - 0 .2 , and altruism is w eak when n ,■< blc or nt <
5). U nder the standard view (focused on absolute fitness), cooperation should now be
favored (by individual within-group selection) because this is now an N C gam e in
which cooperation is the dominant strategy (highest absolute payoff). Therefore
cooperation should increase when «,• < 5 and decrease when n-, > 5 for these model
parameters. Yet, in reality, cooperation (now w eak altruism) continues to be steadily
selected against and we observe that the equilibrium for this group is m utual defection.
This is because even a weak altruist helps every other group m em ber to have more
offspring than itself.
N ote that under selection in a finite population the essential nature o f the PD is
retained even for w eak altruism— the dynamics lead to mutual defection even though
collective cooperation would result in higher average absolute fitness for group
members. In this sense selection converts an N C gam e into a PD (or equivalently weak
altruism to strong) by making the relative am ount o f externalities (i.e. w hat others get
from an altruist compared to what it gives itself) relevant to the resulting absolute
fitness values. These relative fitness effects are ignored in the strong/w eak or PD/NC
classifications, but are central to natural selection. N ote that in the N PD model used
here the population is finite as it is proportionally scaled to its original size each

Chapter 3— Game Theory, Multilevel Selection, and Inclusive Fitness

67

generation, but even in an infinite population the percentage o f altruists (whether
strong or weak) decreases within groups every generation.
To illustrate the conversion from w eak to strong altruism under selection, I start
with a 2-player N C game with a dom inant strategy to cooperate. I then convert it by
asking w hat the payoff values w ould be in the case that differences in absolute values
represented the actual utilities. This idea is sim ilar to “social m otives” in game theory
(Davis 1989)where the given utility values do not represent the actual utilities o f the
players who m ay have other motives than absolute payoff m axim ization, such as
“fairness” or in this case “difference m axim ization.” I illustrate this conversion in
Figure 3-5. W hen two strategies com binations result in the same difference calculation
I add an amount 8 to the one that has the higher absolute fitness. This implements the
idea that when there is no difference between opponents it is preferable to get the
higher absolute amount o f utility (fitness).
N ote that when we start with a NC (No-Conflict) game (first row Figure 3-5),
difference maximization (selection) converts the gam e to a PD. On the other hand,
when w e start with a PD game (second row Figure 3-5), difference m axim ization
(selection) still results in a PD. So strong altruism remains strong under selection, but
altruism designated as weak with regard to absolute fitness values is converted to
strong altruism under selection. W hereas cooperation is the dom inant strategy when
only absolute fitness values are considered in a N C game, selection converts this
situation into a PD where defection is the dom inant strategy— and to cooperate is to
make an altruistic sacrifice.
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Figure 3-5. Applying Difference Maximization to NC and PD Games.
Illustrates effect of converting a game using the differences in original utility
values (left-hand games) to calculate converted utility values (right-hand
games). When two different strategy combinations result in equal differences,
a value 5 is added to the one with the highest original (absolute) utility. The
game-theoretic classification of each game is indicated in the upper left corner
of each payoff matrix—Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) or No-Conflict (NC). The
strategies for player 1 are represented as rows and for player 2 as columns.
The payoff values for each pair of strategies that meet are listed as player 1
payoff/player 2 payoff.

Altruism via Randomly Formed Groups
So far I have explored the simplest case o f multilevel selection w here the within-group
level is represented by only two alternative strategies and the between-group level is
represented by only two distinct groups. As we have seen, in this case the increase in
cooperators is transient because once one group dominates there is no longer a
between-group selection force (the variance ratio goes to zero) and the within-group
more fit defect strategy takes over this single group. In order to illustrate that
m echanism s which reestablish variance am ong groups can m aintain altruism
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indefinitely, I have m odified our model to include periodic random redistributions o f
the population among multiple groups. Between redistribution events reproduction
takes place and group sizes vary w ith cooperator and defector fitness as previously
explained. This modification shares features o f M aynard Sm ith’s haystack model
(1964; W ilson 1987) including that groups exist for multiple generations and there is a
global m ixing phase followed by random distribution into many groups.
Interestingly, even among those that debate whether weak altruism should be
considered altruism, there is consensus that strong altruism cannot evolve in random ly
formed groups (Hamilton 1975; W ilson 1975a; Nunney 1985a; W ilson 1990; M aynard
Smith 1998a; N unney 2000; Sober and W ilson 2000). This conclusion is based on
single-generation models. In Chapter 4 I address this conclusion directly using the
original models upon which this conclusion is based (Fletcher and Zw ick 2004c). Here
I will compare w eak and strong altruism in randomly formed groups that exist for
multiple generations in our NPD model. To guarantee that only strong altruism is
operating (regardless o f changes in group size) I use other-only altruism in which
altruists give nothing to themselves and their benefit is divided evenly am ong the
others in the group. In the other-only case the v-axis in Figure 3-1 w ould be the
fraction o f others cooperating in a group and the qi value for calculating a / in Eq. 3.3
is (a, —1)/(«,■ —1) and for calculating s? in Eq. 3.4 is a Jin, -1 ); that is, the fraction o f
cooperators in others. B y definition, the other-only runs are guaranteed to involve
strong altruism whereas the whole-group runs begin with weak altruism conditions for
comparison.
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I contrast this other-only (strong) altruism with the whole-group altruism we have
used thus far. As mentioned earlier, the value o f r from H am ilton’s rule differs for
these two types (Pepper 2000b). For other-only altruism the expected value o f r when
groups o f size «,■ are formed at random is 0 (Pepper 2000b) so on average no positive
values o f b and c will satisfy H am ilton’s rule (rb > c). For whole-group altruism,
random ly formed groups produce an average r value o f 1/«,- (Pepper 2000b) so the
condition becom es blnt > c which is the definition o f weak altruism. Thus the
consensus that strong altruism cannot evolve via randomly form ed groups. Below I
show this conclusion is not correct when groups exist for multiple generations (as they
do in haystack models (M aynard Smith 1964; W ilson 1987)). I first contrast the
dynamics o f other-only (strong) and whole-group (weak) altruism for individual runs
in Figure 3-6 and then give aggregate results in Table 3-2.
Figure 3-6 shows that the Q values for both other-only and w hole-group altruism
follow the same familiar hump-shaped pattern seen in Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3
except that in the other-only runs Q decreases initially. The sim ilar general dynamics
o f the other-only (strong altruism) and whole-group (weak altruism ) runs is another
indication o f the similarities between strong and weak altruism under selection—
effectively they are both PDs. The initial decrease in Q for other-only runs is expected
because on average r = 0 after groups are formed and therefore H am ilton’s rule cannot
be satisfied. Surprisingly however, w ithin a couple o f generations Q begins to increase
and then follows the familiar hum p-shaped pattern until another group reform ation
event. As I will show in Chapter 4, this is due to the r value increasing from its initial
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value o f 0 over multiple generations w ithin groups. N ote the corresponding points for
whole-group and other-only runs where groups are reformed every 40 generations
(indicated with a vertical dashed line w ith arrows in Figure 3-6). In runs w here groups
are reform ed close to when Q is peaking (e.g. every 20 generations runs), cooperation
can ratchet up to saturation, whereas in runs where groups are reform ed long after the
peak in Q (e.g. every 40 generations runs), cooperation tends to be eliminated. This is
true for both types o f runs in each pair.
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-B-every 20 WG
every 20 OO
-O- every 30 WG
every 30 OO
-© - every 40 WG
-♦ -e v e ry 40 OO
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Figure 3-6. Dynamic Change in Q for Periodically Randomly-formed Groups.
Frequency of cooperators ( 0 vs. generation for 6 runs where an initial
population of 500 cooperators and 500 defectors is randomly assigned to 100
groups and periodically randomly redistributed into groups. Three runs each
are done for whole-group (WG) and other-only (OO) altruistic benefit for
redistribution frequencies of 20, 30, and 40 generations. For all runs b = 20
and c = 1.0. A vertical dashed line with arrows indicates corresponding points
at generation 40 for the whole-group and other-only runs.

Chapter 3— Game Theory, Multilevel Selection, and Inclusive Fitness

72

In Figure 3-6 there are three pairs o f runs each consisting o f an other-only (OO)
run and a w hole-group (W G) run. For each run a total population o f 500 cooperators
and 500 defectors is distributed random ly into 100 groups and then random ly
redistributed periodically. Parameters are the same across runs except the number o f
generations between group reform ation events varies among pairs. In this analytic
model we allow fractional counts o f cooperators and defectors from generation to
generation, but no do not use counts less than one in group reform ation events. This
tends to w eed out residual fractions and because there is no mutation, the extremes o f
0 = 1 . 0 and Q = 0.0 act as attractors and intermediate values do not persist
indefinitely.
The results in Figure 3-6 show typical individual runs done with the same initial
seed for comparison. I also did 100 runs at each reformation frequency w ith the same
parameters but different random num ber seeds. In all cases runs were done until either
cooperator or defector saturation was reached. Table 3-2 shows the percentage o f runs
reaching cooperator saturation for these param eter conditions as well as shorter and
longer periods between group reformations. These results support the trends discussed
above.
Table 3-2. Percentage of 100 Runs Ending in Cooperator Saturation.
The same model parameters as for Figure 3-6 were used.

Whole-group
Other-only

1
100%
0%

Reformation Frequency
10
20
30
40
100% 100%
66%
12%
100%

65%

10%

8%

50
12%
7%
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Again, the results shown here for strong altruism are in contrast to the com m only
held b elief that strong altruism cannot evolve in random ly formed groups (Hamilton
1975; W ilson 1975a; N unney 1985a; W ilson 1990; M aynard Smith 1998a; Nunney
2000; Sober and W ilson 2000). In the next chapter (Fletcher and Zw ick 2004c) I
explore the issue o f strong altruism evolving in randomly-formed groups in more
detail w ith an individual agent-based model and show that this general result does not
depend on kin selection and even holds under fairly high levels o f m igration between
groups each generation. The evolution o f altruism via random associations m ay be one
m ethod by w hich new integrated units o f selection (Margulis 1993; M aynard Smith
and Szathm ary 1995; M ichod 1999) at increased hierarchical levels originate.

Summary
By em bodying non-zero-sumness, population structure (assortment), and heredity in
their m ost basic forms, this NPD model offers a simple framework for understanding
the paradoxical nature o f the evolution o f altruism, integrating such central concepts as
Sim pson’s paradox, H am ilton’s rule, and the Price covariance equation. It also
suggests an alternative selection decomposition which is more intuitive in some
situations and helps emphasizes the coupled nature o f within- and between-group
selection acting over multiple generations. I show that a gam e-theoretic framework is
also useful in understanding the similarities between weak and strong altruism
undergoing selection. Finally, I contrast other-only (strong) and w hole-group (weak)
versions o f the N PD model to highlight both their initial differences im m ediately after
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random group formation and their overall dynamical similarities. This also illustrates,
in contrast to conventional wisdom, that strong altruism can evolve in periodically
random ly formed groups that are multigenerational. In the next chapter I illustrate
more fully the reasons that this conventional wisdom does not hold by starting with
the original analytical models on which it is based (rather than the N PD model used
here) as well as developing modifications to these models that explore, among other
factors, the role o f kinship, stochasticity, and m igration in the evolution o f altruism.
Recently, game-theoretic models have been dem onstrated w here cooperation
increases even w ithout reciprocity. In these cases social interactions are clum ped by
various m echanism s including the presence o f non-players (H auert et al. 2002), the
need for sufficiently similar arbitrary tags (Riolo, Cohen, and A xelrod 2001), and
social institutions for conformity within groups (Bowles, Choi, and H opfensitz 2003).
In the context o f the model presented here, we w ould expect these results with their
various cost, benefit, and population structure param eters also to conform to
H am ilton’s rule, although this kind o f analysis is not usually undertaken in such
papers ((Bowles, Choi, and Hopfensitz 2003) is an exception although the wholegroup version o f r is used for a model which is other-only). R ecent models showing
the evolution o f cooperation among non-kin (Aviles 2002; Aviles, Abbot, and Cutter
2002) are also understandable in the framework presented here. A lthough this model
could be interpreted as containing clonal cooperators and defectors, it is com m on in
gam e-theoretic models o f the evolution o f cooperation (M aynard Smith 1982; Axelrod
1984) to interpret these two strategies as representing social behaviors— w hich m ay be
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based on non kin-related, but heritable, genotypes. The evolution o f altruism does not
actually require either reciprocity or kinship. W hat is essential is: 1) sufficiently nonzero-sum benefits for altruistic behaviors (where behaviors are heritable) and 2)
sufficiently non-uniform interactions among these behaviors. As dem onstrated here,
the necessary combination o f population structure and non-zero-sum ness is specified
by H am ilton’s rule.
This overall framework can help social science researchers who em phasize gametheoretic models to see their results in the context o f H am ilton’s rule and multilevel
selection, while also enabling biology researchers who focus on relatedness to
recognize the inherent game-theoretic character o f their models.

I f costs and benefits com bine additively, and groups are fo rm ed randomly,
then altruism cannot evolve. B ut i f altruists tend to associate with altruists,
and non-altruists with non-altruists, then altruism can evolve. This
conclusion is agreed.
John M aynard Smith, in review o f Unto Others (1998a)

Chapter 4
Strong Altruism Can Evolve in
Randomly Formed Groups1

Introduction
N early three decades ago Ham ilton (1975) and W ilson (1975a) independently
developed models which were interpreted as showing that strong altruism (involving
an absolute cost to altruists) cannot evolve in random ly formed groups. This
conclusion is still generally accepted even among those who debate how best to define
altruism and the mechanisms by w hich it evolves (Hamilton 1975; W ilson 1975a;
N unney 1985b; W ilson 1990; M aynard Smith 1998a; Nunney 2000; Sober and W ilson
2000). Here I challenge this conclusion by exploring what happens when groups exist
for more than one generation. M ultigenerational groups are a central feature o f

1 This chapter is based on a paper published in the Journal o f Theoretical Biology (Fletcher and Zwick
2004c).
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M aynard Sm ith’s classic “haystack” model (1964; W ilson 1987), but the role o f
m ultiple generations within groups was not explored in H am ilton’s (1975) and
W ilson’s (1975a) models. Although the initial conditions after random group
formation favor non-altruists over altruists, paradoxically these conditions can switch
to favor altruists after even one generation o f selection. Thus even though the overall
proportion o f altruists decreases after one generation, it can increase even m ore after a
second generation spent w ithin groups.
Besides single-generation groups, these original analytic models rely on other
simplifying assumptions such as an infinite population and no m igration between
groups. I begin by showing how strong altruism can evolve under the assumptions o f
the original models, w ith the only modification being delayed reform ation o f random
groups. M ultigenerational groups introduce additional issues such as interactions
among related offspring, persistent homogeneous groups o f altruists, and exponential
growth o f population size. I explore model modifications—preventing altruists from
benefiting kin, precluding homogeneous groups from forming, and adding a
population-level carrying capacity— that mitigate each o f these factors. I find that
under all these m odifications (imposed both separately and concurrently) strong
altruism, although dampened, can still evolve in random ly formed m ultigenerational
groups. I then transform the basic analytic model into an evolutionary simulation in
w hich population size is finite and stable. In the simulation model random group
formation from a finite population and migration between groups both reduce positive
assortment and therefore dam pen selection for altruism. On the other hand, increased
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stochasticity in benefit distribution and culling due to carrying capacity can enhance
the likelihood that altruism will evolve compared to processes with m inim um
stochasticity.

Classifications of Altruism
Both the analytic and simulation models discussed here involve w hat Pepper (2000b)
has term ed an other-only altruistic trait because none o f the altruist’s benefits come
back to itself, as opposed to whole-group traits (also called group-beneficial traits)
w here the benefit is divided among all group members including the altruist. W ilson
(1979; 1990) previously classified altruistic traits in a related but different w ay as
either strong (involving an absolute cost to altruists) or weak (involving only a relative
cost to altruists). Other-only altruistic traits are always strong while w hole-group traits
are strong if the cost to an altruist is greater than its share o f the benefit it provides.
N ote that the same whole-group behavior involving the same sacrifice and provided
benefit m ay be strong or weak depending on group size (Pepper 2000b).
In contrast to strong altruism, W ilson showed (1979; 1990) that w eakly altruistic
traits can increase when groups are random ly formed every generation. That is, for an
infinite population where a binom ial trait is randomly redistributed every generation,
the resulting between-group com ponent o f total variance can be enough for weak, but
not for strong, altruism to evolve. Nevertheless in finite populations where fitness is
relative the distinction between strong and weak altruism m ay be less im portant as
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both types are selected against within groups and require selection (or differential
productivity) among groups in order to increase (W ilson 1979; 1990). In this paper I
focus on other-only, strong altruism (the m ost restrictive situation) to address the
random group models o f Hamilton and W ilson directly, but the consequences o f
multigenerational groups and stochasticity also apply to weak, w hole-group traits and
therefore these traits can even more readily increase via random ly form ed groups than
was previously shown (W ilson 1979; 1990). A side-by-side com parison o f the
dynamics o f w eak and strong altruism was given in Chapter 3.

Analytic Model
I focus on H am ilton’s model (1975) because he developed a formal p ro o f that altruism
cannot evolve in single-generation random ly formed groups (W ilson’s model (1975a)
is similar in all important aspects). In this model a haploid infinite population is
random ly subdivided into groups o f equal size, n. Group members interact for one
generation, affecting each other’s fitness (offspring count), before the population is
pooled and then again random ly assigned to new groups. In every generation each
altruist behaves in a w ay that costs itself c offspring and provides a total benefit o f b
offspring divided evenly among the other n- 1 group members. Each non-altruist
receives its share o f benefits, but does not provide any benefit to others. Therefore,
within every group non-altruists have more offspring than altruists, but groups with
more altruists have more offspring per capita than groups with less. This is an example
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o f multilevel selection where here selection within groups opposes selection between
groups.
Ham ilton (1975) using P rice’s covariance equation (1970) showed that under his
m odel’s assumptions, between-group selection (due to the variance between groups in
altruist frequency, q) m ust always be w eaker than average w ithin-group selection (due
to the expected variance in the altruistic trait within groups) and therefore the overall
frequency o f altruists, Q, m ust decrease in every generation. (Capital letters indicate
whole population values; small letters indicate group values.) To illustrate this, I
calculate AiQ for an infinite binom ial distribution, where Ai indicates that the change
occurs over one generation w ithin groups, g = 1. The variable g is the num ber o f
generations spent within groups before each reformation event. (See A ppendix C for
model details.) Figure 4 -1(a) shows how Aj Q depends on the level o f benefit, b,
provided by altruists for different starting Q values. (For convenience, all results
reported in this paper use c = 1 such that benefit b is also the benefit to cost ratio.) The
results shown in Figure 4 -1(a) are the same for any group size n. N ote that as benefit
increases, zero is an upper lim it on Ai£>— hence the conclusion that strong altruism
cannot increase under the assum ptions o f this model for all values o f Q and n
(Hamilton 1975; W ilson 1975a).
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Figure 4-1. Change in Altruist Frequency as a Function of Altruist Benefit.
(a) and (b) compare the effect of different starting Q values on A%Q after one
(g = 1) and two (g = 2) generations spent within groups, respectively, where
founding group size n = 4 (although in (a) the results are the same for all n).
(c) compares the effect of different n for multigenerational groups (g = 2)
when altruism is rare—here initial Q = 0.001. The cost c = 1 in all
calculations.

Y et quite different results are obtained if groups persist for even one additional
generation (g = 2) before random m ixing and the formation o f new groups. Figure
4 -1(b) shows how the change in Q after two generations within groups, A20 , depends
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on benefit values for different starting Q values. The only difference betw een Figure
4 -1(a) and (b) is that the latter measures the change in altruist frequency after an
additional generation spent within groups where the fitness functions are
determ inistically and recursively applied. In this case strong altruism can clearly
increase (A2Q > 0) for sufficient values o f benefit. Figure 4 -1(c) shows that smaller
groups give a larger increase in altruist frequency which is consistent with previous
findings on the relationship between group size and the evolution o f altruistic traits
(Boyd and Richerson 1988; Aviles 1993). Additionally Figure 4-1 (c), for which Q =

0 .001, shows that strong altruism can increase due to multigenerational groups even
when the altruistic trait is rare, although higher benefit levels are needed for A2Q > 0
when Q is low.

Applying Hamilton’s Rule
We can also understand these results in terms o f H am ilton’s rule (1964) w hich states
that the condition for an altruistic trait to increase in the next generation is:
rb> c,

(4.1)

where r is the “coefficient o f relatedness” or more generally the regression coefficient
between the frequency o f the trait in recipients and actors (H am ilton 1972). Thus r is a
measure o f positive assortment— the degree to which the benefits o f altruists fall to
other altruists. The value o f r differs for other-only and w hole-group traits because in
the latter case, but not the former, altruists are recipients o f their own actions (Pepper
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2000b). I use superscripts w and o respectively for whole-group and other-only
measures o f r. For whole-group traits rw is the between-group variance in q over the
total variance in the altruistic trait (Breden 1990; Frank 1995a). For an infinite
binom ial population o f randomly formed groups o f size n, the variance ratio rw = 1 / n
(Pepper 2000b). Thus according to H am ilton’s rule (Eq. 4.1) the trait increases after
one generation if b / n > c, but for w hole-group traits this means that an altruist’s share
o f its benefit m ust be greater than its cost— this is the definition o f w eak altruism so as
W ilson (1979; 1990) noted only weak traits can increase after one generation.
For groups o f uniform size the r values are related by the following expression
(Pepper 2000b):

Therefore r° = 0 for an initial random distribution where rw = 1 In . O bviously there
are no positive values o f b and c that can satisfy H am ilton’s rule (Eq. 4.1) for an otheronly (strong) altruistic trait when r = 0 and such traits must decrease. N ote however,
that any m odifications to the model that m ake r° > 0 can yield an increase in Q, given
a sufficient value o f b. Hamilton noted that any assortment o f altruists beyond that
produced at random could allow altruism to increase (1975). Surprisingly, for many
param eter settings r° increases above zero after one generation o f selection— even as
the proportion o f altruists decreases. That is, this transient one-generation-long
“population viscosity” o f the original models is enough (w ithout any other
mechanisms for creating positive assortment) to create conditions that favor altruism
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in the following generation. If groups are random ly reformed after this single
generation then this gain in positive assortment is destroyed before being used by
selection; r° returns to zero and Q subsequently declines. On the other hand, additional
generations within groups can take advantage o f this increased positive assortm ent so
that strong altruism increases, as shown in Figure 4-1. (W hether altruism actually
increases or not depends on parameters including Q, b, and n.)
N ote that although Hamilton emphasized a ratio o f variances in his proof, in this
other-only m odel the regression coefficient betw een actors and recipients, r°, is an
easier to interpret measure o f the changing conditions affecting altruism as selection
occurs. For instance, after one generation o f selection (starting w ith random ly formed
groups), the between over total variance, rw, can decrease while r° increases. It is the
increase in r° that accurately reflects whether altruism can increase in the next
generation. For m ost param eter settings both measures increase after one generation,
but the range o f parameters where rw decreases is greater than the range in which r°
decreases. In general the r values can decrease w hen there is a com bination o f low Q,
low b, and high n.
According to H am ilton’s rule w hether altruism increases in the second generation
within groups depends on whether r° after the first generation is greater than c / b. O f
course it is not enough for altruism to increase in the second generation for altruism to
increase overall. The increases in subsequent generations within groups m ust m ake up
for any losses in the initial generation(s). Figure 4-2(a) shows the expected dynamic
change in Q values over successive generations when groups persist for one and two
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generations before random reformation and Figure 4-2(b) shows the concurrent
changes in r°.
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Figure 4-2. Calculated Dynamics in Analytic Model Comparing g and n.
Results for one and two generations spent within groups (g = 1, g = 2) for
groups of two different sizes (n = 3; n = 10). (a) shows the dynamics in
overall altruist frequency Q given different starting Q values and different
sized groups, (b) shows the concurrent change in the regression coefficient
between actors and recipients, r°. The critical r° value of c / b is also shown
with a solid horizontal line. Here Q = 0.1, b = 10, and c = 1. Both r° and Q are
calculated at the end of the indicated generation and after group reformation if
it occurs, (a) and (b) use the same legend.

A ltruist frequency Q decreases m onotonically when groups are reform ed every
generation and r° = 0 before each round o f selection. On the other hand when groups
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exist for two generations, Q oscillates (and can ratchet upward). The every-othergeneration saw -toothed peaks in Q correspond to similar (but offset) oscillating peaks
in r° (Figure 4-2(b)). Here r° increases after a generation within groups and the
critical c / b value is indicated with a solid horizontal line. Troughs on the other hand
correspond to global mixing, new group formation, a decrease o f r° back to zero and a
subsequent decrease in Q. In Figure 4-2 I also show a case with the same param eters
except bigger group size (g = 2 ;n = 10). Here, although Q can increases during the
second generations within groups, it is not enough to make up for losses in the first
generations. N ote that when peaks in r° fail to reach the c / b value (after generation 21
in Figure 4-2(b) for g = 2; n = 10), as predicted by H am ilton’s rule, Q can no longer
increase and instead falls during both generations within groups (Figure 4-2(a)).

Analytic Model Modifications
M ultiple generations within groups com plicate the simple single-generation model in
several ways: 1) kin interactions within groups become possible; 2) the contribution
o f hom ogeneous groups o f altruists increases— these groups uniquely retain their
initial (maximal) level o f altruism; 3) the additive frequency-dependent fitness
functions can now lead to exponential growth o f the population. Y et as I dem onstrate
below, w hile not inconsequential, none o f these factors are essential to explain why
strong altruism increases in random ly form ed multigenerational groups— especially
when altruism is initially rare. The following three paragraphs elaborate on each issue

Chapter 4—Strong Altruism Can Evolve in Randomly Formed Groups

87

and describe modifications to the basic model to address them. I follow this w ith a
summary o f the results produced by each modification.

No Kin Selection
In the original model groups are formed by random ly selecting individuals from an
infinite population and therefore groups contain unrelated individuals. In a second
generation w ithin groups, when the benefits provided by an altruist are divided among
other group members, some o f this benefit (in the form o f additional offspring) will
fall to those with the same parent as the altruist. In general the proportion o f benefit
falling to relatives (defined by common ancestry) in subsequent generations will
depend on param eters n, b, and Q, but this proportion is bounded by 1 I n (Appendix
D). This limit is approached for high b and Q, but when altruism is initially rare this
proportion is much less significant. For example, for groups o f size 4, the maxim um
possible proportion o f benefit that could fall to relatives is 1 / n = 25%, but for Q = 0.1
and b = 10 the observed proportion o f benefit given to relatives is actually 0.61%
during the second generation within groups. For the same Q and b the proportion
decreases with larger group size and more generations within groups. To eliminate kin
selection I m odify the model so that altruists only divide their benefit am ong non
relatives (Appendix D).
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No Homogeneous Groups
In the infinite population o f this model, homogeneous groups o f altruists will be
random ly created whenever Q > 0. These groups are unique in being the only group
com position for which q cannot decrease with successive generations within groups.
They are also the fastest growing groups as they contain no free-riding non-altruists.
One m ight suspect that such homogeneous groups account for altruism being able to
increase after multiple generations w ithin groups. To check this I m odify our model
(Appendix D) such that im m ediately after group formation all hom ogeneous groups o f
altruists have one altruist switched to a non-altruist. N ote that this artificially decreases
Q, m aking it even harder for altruism to evolve.

No Population Growth
Even w ith additive (linear) fitness functions, multiple generations w ithin groups can
cause a population to grow exponentially (W ilson 1987). To study the effect o f stable
population size I im plem ent a global carrying capacity by scaling the offspring count
o f all population members each generation by the inverse o f the expected overall
growth rate during that generation (Appendix D). This holds the population size
constant (albeit infinite) at every generation, but allows groups w ith m ore altruists to
have relatively more offspring each generation than groups w ith less.
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Modification Results
Figure 4-3 com pares the results for each o f these modifications with the unm odified
model for two generations w ithin groups, g = 2 .1 also include results for the original
model where g = 1. For each o f the three modifications A2Q is dampened, but still
positive given sufficient benefit. This is true even when all o f the m odifications are
imposed simultaneously. That is, in a model where no benefit is given to kin,
homogeneous groups are always corrupted, and population size is held constant,
strong altruism can still increase after two generations within groups.

g = 2; unmodified
g = 2; no homogeneous groups
g = 2; no population growth
g = 2; no kin benefit
g = 2; all 3 modifications
g = 1; unmodified
0
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Figure 4-3. Calculated Altruist Frequency for Analytic Model Modifications.
Shows altruist frequency (AgQ) after two (g = 2) generations within groups as
a function of altruist benefit, b, for several modifications of the original
binomial model including preventing homogeneous groups from forming,
scaling the population size to its original size each generation, and distributing
altruist benefit only to the non-relatives of an altruist. The results for the
original model after one (g = 1) and two (g = 2) generations are also shown for
comparison. The original Q = 0.25, n = 4, and c = 1 in all calculations.
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In contrast to the unm odified dynamic model shown in Figure 4-2 w here altruism
tends to evolve to Q = 1.0 or Q = 0.0 given enough generations, it does not necessarily
evolve to saturation under all these modifications. Corrupting hom ogeneous groups for
example necessarily keeps Q < 1.0. In the case o f a population-level carrying capacity,
for n = 4, Q = 0.1, g = 2, and b = 15, a stable limit cycle is reached in w hich Q
oscillates every other generation between 0.616 and 0.636. (Yet as shown in the next
section, when stochasticity is introduced populations tend to evolve to one extrem e or
the other in these models.)

Simulation Model
So far, like Hamilton, we have used the assumption o f an infinite population in order
to calculate the expected distribution o f group compositions when individuals are
random ly distributed. But infinity here has two special consequences. First it converts
a seemingly stochastic process (random group formation) to a determ inistic one— the
expected value o f r° is produced by every group reformation event. For any fin ite
population, group reform ation events will produce r° values that fluctuate both above
and below the average value. Second, the expected value o f r° is low er (i.e. less than
zero) for groups formed random ly from a finite population (com pared to an infinite
one). This is because in the finite case where “sampling without replacem ent” is used
we have a hypergeom etric (rather than binomial) distribution. Once an individual o f a
certain type is assigned to a random group, the probability o f assigning another
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individual o f that type is lower than in the first assignment. This results in the
formation o f less homogeneous groups and more heterogeneous groups (than in the
infinite binomial distribution) which decreases the overall assortm ent— thus on
average r° is negative. Based on empirical calculations it appears that the expected
negative value o f r° depends only on population size (not n or Q) and is r° = -1 / (N—
1) for equal-sized groups randomly formed from a finite population o f size N. (I have
not yet found a proof o f this.) Particular random group formation events w ill result in
r° values which fluctuate around this lower value.
In addition, a finite simulation model can incorporate the consequences o f other
stochastic processes including the w ay altruistic benefit is distributed and the way
individuals subject to a carrying capacity are eliminated. I now transform the analytic
model above into a com puter simulation o f a finite evolving population and the
following features and options (see Appendix E for further details):
1. W hen reforming groups each individual is assigned at random to an
unfilled group (rather than by using the expected distribution).
2. The benefit value used by each group, each generation and the distribution
o f this benefit to other group members is done in one o f two ways:
i)

Low stochasticity: the benefit level is the same for all groups during
a simulation run and is divided as evenly as possible (in units o f
whole offspring) with only any rem ainder distributed random ly
among other group members.
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ii) High stochasticity: the benefit level used in a group is drawn from a
Poisson distribution in whole units where the given benefit value is
the mean and each unit o f benefit is then distributed at random to
other group members.
3. Population size is held constant each generation by a global carrying
capacity in one o f two ways:
i)

Low stochasticity: group sizes are proportionally scaled back (as in
the no-growth analytic model), but only w hole organism s are
rem oved proportionally with any rem ainder rem oved random ly (as
below).

ii) High stochasticity: excess population offspring are removed at
random (without regard to the altruistic trait or group membership).
The first options in 2. and 3. above minimize stochasticity while still preserving
the simulation m odel’s integral organisms, whereas the second options introduce more
stochasticity. Figure 4-4 compares the change in altruist frequency after 2 generations
within groups, A2Q, for the no-population-growth run o f the analytic model (from
Figure 4-3), the simulation model with stochastic group formation but minimal other
stochasticity, and each o f the more stochastic choices introduced separately, and then
simultaneously. Each data point represents the average o f 1,000 runs done with
different random number seeds. Note that strong altruism evolves less easily in the
finite simulation with stochastic group formation (than in the com parable infinite
analytic model). From this base, adding more stochasticity in benefit distribution has a
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slight positive effect whereas adding more stochasticity in elim ination due to carrying
capacity has a strong positive effect. The latter case results in an even bigger increase
in altruism than in the no population growth analytic model. U sing both options
simultaneously does even better.
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both stochastic options added
stochastic elimination added
analytic model, no growth
stochastic benefit added
stochastic group formation
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Figure 4-4. Altruist Frequency for Different Levels of Stochasticity.
Shows change in altruist frequency for after two generations within groups
(A2 0 as a function of altruist benefit, b, for several variations of the finite
simulation model with no population growth. The base case is stochasticity in
random group formation, but otherwise minimal noise. To this case I add high
stochasticity in benefit distribution, high stochasticity in implementing
carrying capacity, and both options simultaneously. Each data point is the
average of 1,000 runs done with population size N = 1,000. The other
parameters for all runs are Q = 0.25, n = 4, and c = 1. The results for the
infinite analytic model with no population growth using the same parameters
are also shown for comparison.

These methods o f adding stochasticity are somewhat a d hoc and I do not im ply
that additional stochasticity will necessarily increase A2Q. In fact, the stochasticity in
random group formation appears to dampen selection for altruism— A2Q is less than
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would be expected in an average hypergeom etric distribution. The effect o f a
particular m ethod o f introducing random noise will depend on its relative im pact on
within- and between-group selection. I do how ever show that it is possible for altruism
to evolve even m ore easily in stochastic finite populations than it does in deterministic
infinite models.
W e now explore the long-term behavior o f this simulation. Because here there is
no m utation, em pirically we observe that Q - 1.0 and Q = 0.0 act as stable equilibrium
points and interm ediate values do not persist indefinitely. All runs w ere done until one
o f these equilibrium points was reached and I use the percentage o f 1,000 runs
reaching altruist saturation, Q = 1.0, as a measure o f how readily altruism evolves
under the given conditions. For all runs and figures described in the rest o f this paper
we use the high stochasticity option in im plementing carrying capacity, but minimum
stochasticity in benefit distribution. If the results shown in Figure 4-4 apply generally,
then these settings are more favorable to the evolution o f altruism than the comparable
analytic m odel, but less favorable than if we had used high stochasticity in both
processes simultaneously. As was the case for the analytic model, Figure 4-5(a) shows
that both higher starting Q and higher benefit values favor selection for altruism and
Figure 4-5(b) shows that less altruistic benefit is required to evolve altruism for
smaller group sizes.
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Figure 4-5. Percentage of Simulation Runs Reaching Altruist Saturation.
Shown as a function of altruist benefit, b. (a) compares the effect of different
starting Q values, where the number of generations spent within groups g = 2
and initial group size n = 4. (b) compares the effect of different n where Q =
0.1 and g = 2. The total population size N = 1,000 and cost c = 1 in all runs.
1,000 runs were done for each unique set of parameters with different random
number seeds. All runs were done until Q = 1.0 or Q = 0.0. Here the high
stochasticity carrying capacity option and the low stochasticity benefit
distribution are used.

W e now investigate the effect o f m igration in our simulation model w here the
m igration rate, m, specifies the probability that an individual will leave its group
during each generation, moving to a randomly selected group (weighted
proportionately by group size). The idea here is that larger, thriving groups are
proportionately more attractive to migrants, but sim ilar results obtain w hen migrants
jo in groups at random, independent o f group size. Figure 4-6 shows how the
interaction between the number o f generations spent w ithin groups and the m igration
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rate influence selection for strong altruism. Predictably, migration lessens selection for
altruism (Figure 4-6) by working to dam pen the positive assortment, r°, between
actors and recipients each generation, but for intermediate numbers o f generations
spent within groups, even at relatively high m igration rates (i.e. 30%), strong altruism
evolves to saturation in some runs.
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Figure 4-6. Migration and Percentage of Runs Reaching Altruist Saturation.
Shows percentage of simulation runs reaching altruist saturation as a function
of the number of generations spent within groups g. Compares the effect of
different migration rates, m, where for all runs Q = 0.1, g = 2, b = 10, n = 4, N
= 1,000, and c = 1. 1,000 runs were done for each unique set of parameters
with different random number seeds. All runs were done until Q = 1.0 or Q =
0. For m = 0.4 all runs resulted in Q = 0.0 (data not shown). High stochasticity
carrying capacity and low stochasticity benefit distribution are used.

Figure 4-6 also shows that even w ithout m igration (m = 0.0) interm ediate
numbers o f generations within groups are m ost favorable to the evolution o f altruism.
The advantage o f an intermediate num ber o f generations is consistent w ith similar
findings in haystack models (W ilson 1987) and models o f biased sex ratios (W ilson
and Colwell 1981). Note that in the simulations o f Figure 4-6 it is initially unlikely
that any hom ogeneous groups o f altruists will form. W ith initial Q = 0.1 and n = 4 the
probability o f forming homogeneous altruist groups is one in 10,000 and only 250
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groups are formed (N = 1,000, n = 4) at each group reformation. Yet, in the absence o f
homogeneous groups strong altruism can still initially increase overall even as q
declines in every group. This is because groups w ith a higher frequency o f altruists
grow faster— population Q increasing while every group q decreases is an exam ple o f
Sim pson’s paradox (Simpson 1951; Sober and W ilson 1998). W ith more generations
within groups Q m ust eventually decrease as the altruists are elim inated from every
group. Altruism evolves m ost readily when the num ber o f generations spent within
groups takes full advantage o f the increase in Q due to Sim pson’s paradox, but avoids
the inevitable decline in Q.
Figure 4-7 illustrates this tension. Here representative individual runs are shown
for 2 ,4 , and 10 generations within groups using the same param eters as Figure 4-6
without m igration (m = 0.0). To aid in com parison the same random num ber seed
(same initial group distribution) is used in all three runs. For 10 generations within
groups (g = 10), reformation clearly takes place well after peak Q values are reached
and altruism eventually goes extinct. For g = 4, reformation takes place near peak Q
values and altruism rapidly evolves towards saturation— even though altruism always
decreases in the first generation after reformation. (This is true for g = 10 also, but
harder to see as the rate o f decline after reform ation matches the rate before.) On the
other hand w hen groups are reform ed every other generation (g = 2), the potential
additional increase in Q that w ould result from staying within groups longer is lost and
altruism increases m ore gradually. N ote that the initial increase in Q in these three
runs takes place in the absence o f hom ogeneous groups. For g = 2 and g = 4 no such
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groups are formed until Q reaches about 0.3 (initial Q = 0.1) and in the case o f g = 10
hom ogeneous groups never formed. In contrast, in the infinite analytic model
hom ogeneous groups are always initially present and more generations within groups
can allow these fastest-growing groups to becom e more and m ore dom inant, even if
initially rare.
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Figure 4-7. Dynamics in Q for Individual Simulation Runs with Varying g.
Shows altruist frequency Q for individual simulation runs of g = 2, g = 4, and
g = 10 generations spent within groups. For all runs initial Q = 0.1, b = 10, n
= 4, N = 1,000, and c = 1. To aid in comparison, all three runs were initiated
with the same random number seed (same initial distribution into groups).
High stochasticity carrying capacity and low stochasticity benefit distribution
are used.

Conclusion
The main purpose o f this paper is to demonstrate that strong altruism can evolve in
random ly formed groups and thereby challenge a presumed theoretic lim itation on the
evolution o f altruism. Although allow ing groups to last more than one generation
introduces new complications, I have demonstrated that kin selection, homogeneous
groups, and population expansion are not essential to account for this phenom enon.

Chapter 4—Strong Altruism Can Evolve in Randomly Formed Groups

99

The fundamental explanation is that, for many initial conditions, after even ju st one
generation o f selection in randomly formed groups, the assortment betw een altruists
and their potential recipients increases (above the expected initial value for random ly
formed groups) as measured by the regression coefficient, r°. The groups that are by
chance initially dominated by altruists grow larger compared to other groups and even
though the fraction o f altruists declines in these groups, the absolute num ber o f
altruists poised to benefit other altruists in a subsequent generation increases. On the
other hand, the groups that are by chance dominated by non-altruists do not grow as
large and the relatively few altruists in these groups are elim inated or greatly
dim inished after one to several generations within groups. This also increases positive
assortment as these non-altruists are stuck with each other and will receive less benefit
from altruists than they did in the first generation. O f course the few non-altruists
lucky enough to end up in altruist-dom inated groups are the fittest individuals, but
overall the conditions that favored non-altruists in the initial random distribution can
switch to favor altruists in subsequent generations.
I em phasize again that even when groups are multigenerational, the vast m ajority
o f the benefit provided by altruists will fall to non-relatives— especially when altruism
is initially rare (Appendix D). Altruism evolves due to the positive assortm ent am ong
heritable helping behaviors regardless o f whether there is a positive assortm ent among
relatives b y descent. The regression coefficient used here, r°, m easures the assortment,
not genealogical relationship. This positive assortment can be view ed equivalently
(Wade 1980; Queller 1985; 1992b; Frank 1998; Sober and W ilson 1998) as causing
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selection on the altruistic trait (allele) via inclusive fitness or as causing selection
among groups that vary in their trait composition. While interactions among kin in
nature no doubt often contribute to the positive assortment o f altruistic traits, kin
interactions are not in themselves a requirement for altruism to evolve.
W hether strong altruism evolves in nature via m echanism s sim ilar to those
illustrated here will depend on the degree to which the assumptions o f these models
are representative o f natural conditions. For instance, in both the analytic and
simulation models we saw that strong altruism can evolve even when population size
is held constant by a global carrying capacity. In nature, in addition to population-level
limits on growth there are often limits on group size. W hile not explored here, grouplevel limits will dampen between-group selection for altruism, so further investigation
is needed to elucidate the relative import o f global vs. local levels o f population
control in the evolution o f altruism. A lack o f mutation is also unrealistic. I
experimented with mutation in our models (data not shown), but in the simple binary
genetics used here a mutation that switches behavioral types exerts pressure towards Q
= 0.5 and thus favors altruism when Q is initially low. This is because the more
common type experiences more mutations. Even if this bias could be com pensated for,
low mutation rates are unlikely to alter our basic results, which are robust under fairly
high levels o f m igration among groups and even when homogeneous groups o f
altruists are “mutated” to contain at least one non-altruist.
This model started w ith the original assumptions o f the random group models
(Hamilton 1975; W ilson 1975a) and added the idea o f m ultigenerational groups from
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haystack models (M aynard Smith 1964; W ilson 1987). Just as W ilson (1987) created a
simulation model to study a m ore realistic version o f M aynard Sm ith’s (1964) original
haystack model, I have created a simulation model that adds finite population size,
stochasticity, and m utigenerational groups to the original analytic random group
models. W hereas W ilson’s (1987) haystack simulation corrected the “w orst case”
assumption made by M aynard Smith (1964) that groups would persist until altruism
was elim inated in all m ixed groups; here we correct an opposite “w orst case”
assumption made in random group models that groups only exist for a single
generation. As dem onstrated here and in the haystack simulations (W ilson 1987), an
intermediate num ber o f generations within groups is most favorable to the evolution o f
altruism.
M aynard Smith (1998a) in discussing different views on the evolution o f altruism
recently echoed the original findings o f Hamilton (1975) and W ilson (1975a) and the
current consensus opinion in the quote given at the beginning o f this chapter. M any
m echanisms w hich result in a positive assortment among self-sacrificing behaviors
have been proposed including passive methods such as foraging in non-uniform
resource distributions which can be depleted (Pepper and Smuts 2002), continuous
population viscosity with periodic environmental disturbances (M itteldorf and W ilson
2000a), the coevolution o f group joining and cooperative behaviors (Aviles 2002), and
the presence o f non-participants (Hauert et al. 2002), as well as active m ethods such as
kin recognition (Gamboa, Reeve, and Holmes 1991), conditional strategies based on
past actions (Trivers 1971; A xelrod and Hamilton 1981) or reputation (Nowak and
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Sigmund 1998; Panchanathan and Boyd 2003), policing (Frank 1995b; 2003),
punishm ent o f non-altruists (Boyd and Richerson 1992; Fehr and G achter 2002; Boyd
et al. 2003), the coevolution o f cultural institutions that constrain individual behaviors
(Bowles, Choi, and H opfensitz 2003), and even recognition o f arbitrary tags (Riolo,
Cohen, and A xelrod 2001). Here I have shown in both deterministic and stochastic
models that when groups exist for more than one generation such specific or more
complex m echanism s for creating positive assortment, although certainly im portant if
present, are not needed— the positive assortment that develops between random ly
created m ultigenerational groups can suffice for between-group selection to dominate
within-group selection and thus for strong altruism to evolve.

The reciprocal altruism strategy can be selected fo r the sam e reason as
altruism towards kin: covariance between the perform ance o f the behavior
and the recipients frequency o f the altruism allele.
David C. Queller, in Nature (1985)

Chapter 5
Hamilton’s Rule Applied to
Reciprocal Altruism1
Over tw o decades ago Axelrod and Hamilton (Axelrod and H am ilton 1981; Axelrod
1984) suggested two alternative mechanisms for the evolution o f cooperative
(altruistic) traits: 1) when the benefits o f altruism fall to relatives, inclusive fitness
(Hamilton 1964; 1970; 1972) is the likely mechanism; and 2) when benefits fall to
non-relatives, reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) is the likely m echanism . A round this
same tim e researchers began to show that m ultilevel (group) selection theory (W ilson
1975a; W ade 1978), a third alternative not em phasized by A xelrod and Hamilton, is
m athem atically equivalent (Wade 1980; Queller 1985; 1992b; 1992a; Frank 1998;
Sober and W ilson 1998) to H am ilton’s inclusive fitness theory. This theory shows
that H am ilton’s coefficient o f relatedness can be treated as a m easure o f assortment

1 This chapter is based on a paper accepted into the proceedings o f the Congress on Evolutionary
Computation and will be presented there in Portland, Oregon June 2004 (Fletcher and Zwick 2004b). It
will also be submitted in an expanded form to a biology journal.
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am ong altruistic traits (or behaviors) rather than strictly as a m easure o f kinship
(Hamilton 1972) and that the differential productivity o f groups constitutes a grouplevel selection process (Price 1970). Other researchers have gone further in claiming
that reciprocal altruism also can be unified w ith multilevel selection and inclusive
fitness theories. Queller (1985) originally suggested that a generalization he developed
o f H am ilton’s rule could be applied to reciprocal altruism and m ore recently Sober and
W ilson (1998) have claimed such a unification is possible, yet there has not been a
clear dem onstration o f how to apply Q ueller’s equations to traditional reciprocal
altm ism models. In fact in a subsequent expansion o f his original result Queller
(1992b; 1992a) does not mention its application to reciprocal altruism.
Here I take up this thread o f inquiry and dem onstrate that Q ueller’s equations do
indeed provide a foundation for the unification o f reciprocal altruism, inclusive fitness,
and multilevel selection theories. I do this by using H am ilton’s inclusive fitness rule to
predict w hether a reciprocal altruism strategy will increase or not w ithin a classic
iterated prisoner’s dilemma (PD) model. This model is similar to those used by
A xelrod and Hamilton in their original work. In this way I support the idea that, rather
than relying on alternative mechanisms, these theories offer different w ays o f
understanding a common principle by which self-sacrificing traits can increase. This
principle is that altruism can evolve if there exists: 1) sufficient non-zero-sum benefits
o f cooperation such that on average the benefit provided to others by an altruist exceed
the cost to the altruist, 2) sufficient positive assortm ent among heritable altruistic
behaviors such that on average altruistic genotypes benefit m ore from these behaviors
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than average population members. The “sufficient” positive assortm ent and benefit to
cost values necessary for altruism to increase are given by Q ueller’s generalization o f
H am ilton’s rule. This rule applies whether the source o f positive assortm ent among
altruistic behaviors is due to conditional strategies, higher interaction levels among
relatives, or other causes o f population grouping (even among non-relatives).

Obstacles to Applying Hamilton’s Rule
to Reciprocal Altruism
There are two m ajor obstacles in unifying reciprocal altruism w ith inclusive fitness
and m ultilevel selection theories— one stem ming from the difference between
genotype and phenotype and the other from non-additive fitness functions. The first
obstacle is that by definition there is not a one-to-one relationship between behavior
and genotype in reciprocal altruism models. In contrast, inclusive fitness and
m ultilevel selection models m ost often assume that there is a cooperation or altruism
“gene” (or some additive combination o f genetic determinants) and that the frequency
o f the genetic trait is proportional to the frequency o f the cooperative or altruistic
behavior. W ith reciprocal altruism models, however, behaviors are conditioned on
environmental circumstances (e.g. the behaviors o f others) and are not generally
proportional to genetic frequencies. For example, if there is a trait such that
cooperation is conditioned on what others did in previous encounters, then the
frequency o f this trait does not directly predict the frequency with which an individual
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displays cooperative behaviors. For this one m ust know the previous behaviors o f
those w ith whom the individual interacts.
Because the round-robin tournam ent structure used by A xelrod and Ham ilton
ensures no positive assortment among player types (ignoring the play against ones
“shadow” self (Axelrod 1984)), it seems that altruism cannot evolve via either
inclusive fitness or m ultilevel selection. Both Hamilton (1975) and W ilson (1975a)
(working independently) have shown that strong altruism does not evolve when
groups are formed random ly because there is not enough assortment in the altruistic
trait. Recently, however, we showed that altruism can evolve in random ly form ed
groups if these groups are m ultigenerational (Fletcher and Zw ick 2004c, Chapter 4).
Here I will demonstrate that altruism can also evolve in single generation groups
(pairings) when behaviors are positively assorted— even in the absence o f assortment
between the interacting genetic types.
The second obstacle to unification is that the fitness (or utility) values used in
reciprocal altruism models are not necessarily additive and therefore are not
decom posed into the fam iliar benefits and costs com m only em ployed in inclusive
fitness and multilevel selection models. This non-additivity is true o f the m ost
common payoff matrices used in iterated PD experiments (Figure 5-1), including those
o f A xelrod and Hamilton. I explain this further in the section on non-additivity.
Both o f these obstacles, as I dem onstrate below, are effectively handled by
Q ueller’s generalizations o f H am ilton’s rule. I begin by briefly reviewing the iterated
PD experiments o f A xelrod and Hamilton as well as H am ilton’s rule and Q ueller’s
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contributions. I then demonstrate how H am ilton’s inclusive fitness rule can be applied
to an additive PD experiment involving a conditional strategy, and then finally do the
same when fitness payoffs are non-additive.

The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
The prisoner’s dilemm a (PD) game captures a fundamental problem o f social life—
individually rational behavior m ay lead to a collectively irrational and deficient
outcome. Figure 5-1 illustrates a typical 2-player PD payoff m atrix (and the one used
by A xelrod and Hamilton (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984)). The game is
symmetric and each player has a dominant strategy to defect (D). This m utual
defection results in each player receiving a payoff o f 1, but if they had both cooperated
(C), they could have each received a payoff o f 3. In this game it is presum ed that
players choose their strategy simultaneously and there is no know ledge or guarantees
about w hat the other player will do. The dilemma is that cooperation m akes a player
vulnerable to exploitation— in this case the exploiting defector gets 5 w hile the lone
cooperator gets 0 .
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Figure 5-1. Typical PD Utility (or Fitness) Values for Actor.
Shows actor’s payoff given its own and opponents behaviors. Behaviors are
either cooperate (C) or defect (D).
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An n-player version o f the PD in which cooperators contribute to the common
good (also called whole-group altruism (Pepper 2000b)) models fam iliar social
dilemmas such as the “tragedy o f the commons” (Hardin 1968) and the “free-rider
problem ” (M cM illan 1979; Aviles 2002). Elsewhere I have dem onstrated that an nplayer PD with fixed strategies played across m ultiple groups captures fundamental
features o f the evolution o f altruism via multilevel selection (or equivalently inclusive
fitness) (Fletcher and Zw ick 2000a; 2000b; 2001, Chapter 3). Here I will show that a

2-player game with conditional strategies also fits into this broader framework.
Although in a PD situation it is individually rational to defect in single plays o f
the game, Axelrod and Hamilton (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; A xelrod 1984) showed
that conditional cooperative strategies can do well overall when gam es are iterated.
This combination o f iterated games and conditional play can create positive
assortment among behaviors even when there is none among p la yer types. In their
experiments many different types o f players (submitted by researchers from many
fields) competed in a round-robin tournament in which each subm ission played all
others an average o f 200 times. The m ost successful strategy in A xelrod and
H am ilton’s experiments was also one o f the simplest. Submitted by social scientist
Anatol Rapoport, it was called Tit-For-Tat (TFT). TFT always cooperates w ith an
opponent on the first move and then in all subsequent moves sim ply plays whatever
the opponent did in the last game. Even though TFT never came out ahead in any
single match o f 200 iterated games (Rapoport 1991; Sober and W ilson 1998), its
overall score was superior as it was able to minimize exploitation by defecting

Chapter 5—Hamilton’s Rule Applied to Reciprocal Altruism

109

strategies such as A lw ays-Defect (ALLD), while taking advantage o f m utual
cooperation w hen it m et other “nice” strategies. W hen viewed as an evolutionary
process w here utility payoffs o f the PD are used to determine the num ber o f each
player type in the next generation, Axelrod and Hamilton showed that both ALLD and
TFT are Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS). That is, they cannot be invaded by
individual mutations or migrants exhibiting a different strategy. Since these original
experiments more than 20 years ago, much research has been done on the iterated PD
(e.g. see Dugatkin 1997 for review).

Hamilton’s Rule
H am ilton’s rule gives the condition necessary for an altruistic trait to increase in a
subsequent generation and is deceptively simple (1964):
r b > c

(5.1)

where b is the average benefit provided by an altm ist and c is the average cost to the
altruist. The com plications lie in the meaning o f the r term w hich has been
progressively generalized over the years. Originally thought o f as a simple measure o f
relatedness via descent (Ham ilton 1964), Hamilton (after interacting w ith Price
(1970)) broadened the m eaning o f r to be a measure o f the interaction o f genetic types
regardless o f relatedness:
^ = cov(G ^,G 0 )
var (G a)

(5.2)
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where G a is the genotype or breeding value w ith respect to the altruistic trait for each
potential actor and Go is the average genotype or breeding value o f those that interact
with the actor. A fter several examples o f H am ilton’s rule failing w ere reported in the
literature (e.g. K arlin and M atessi 1983), Queller showed that these were due to
phenotype/genotype differences and that it was the altruistic behaviors o f others and
itself that determ ined whether the actor’s genotype increased, not the genotype o f
others. Queller generalized H am ilton’s r term as follows (1985; 1992b; 1992a):
r _ c o \(G A,P0 )

(5.3)

co v (G A,P A)
where P 0 is the average phenotypic value o f others interacting w ith the actor and PA is
the average phenotypic value o f the actor.
N ote that Eq. 5.3 is more general than Eq. 5.2. In the case o f no
genotype/phenotype difference (P0 = G0 and GA = P a ) Eq. 5.3 reduces to Eq. 5.2. The
absence o f any Go com ponent in this m ost general interpretation o f H am ilton’s r term
by Eq. 5.3 is especially noteworthy because it challenges the selfish gene (Dawkins
1976; 1982) view o f inclusive fitness in which genes encode altruistic behaviors only
because these behaviors help other copies o f the genes residing in those receiving the
altruism.
Based on the definition o f covariance, Eq. 5.3 can also be w ritten as:

(5.4)
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where the sum m ation is over each individual in the population (each potential actor)
and Pp is the average population phenotypic value. I use this equation to calculate r
below. N ote that here there is no mutation and the genetics are haploid, but Frank
(1998) has expanded Q ueller’s equations to accommodate different degrees o f fidelity
in transm ission from one generation to the next.

Applying Hamilton’s Rule to Reciprocal Altruism
Here I provide a simple example o f applying H am ilton’s rule to reciprocal altruism
using a population consisting o f two classic evolutionarily stable (ESS) types, TFT
and ALLD. Because one o f the types (TFT) uses conditional behaviors w e m ust
measure genotypes and phenotypes separately. Figure 5-2 illustrates a general view o f
the PD in w hich an altruist provides a benefit value o f b to its opponent at a cost c to
itself, wo is the base fitness value unrelated to the altruistic trait. The d term is a
deviation from additivity and is discussed in the next section; in this section d — 0 .
Behaviors are either cooperate (C) which has a phenotypic (P) value o f 1 or defect (D)
w hich has a phenotypic value o f 0. N ote that the fitness values in Figure 5-2 depend
only on the phenotype o f the actor (PA) and the opponent (Po), not on their genotypes.
Since we will keep track o f the fraction o f TFT players in the population, GP, we give
the TFT type a genotypic (breeding) value o f 1 and ALLD a value o f 0.
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opponent’s behavior

C ( P A = l)
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D (PA = 0)
sacrifices 0

D ( P o = 0)
contributes 0

C (P o = 1)
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Figure 5-2. PD Utility (or Fitness) Values Based on Individual Contribution.
Shows PD utility (or fitness) values fo r the actor given its own and opponents
behavior. The fitness (or utility) values for the actor are represented as the
sum o f additive contributions from the opponent and its own sacrifice. The w0
term is an additive base fitness value uncorrelated with C and D behaviors.
The d term is the deviation from additivity (addressed in next section).

In this population o f two types there will be three possible parings each w ith set
values for Ga , P o, and P a . Table 5-1 gives the values for each o f the player types when
it is the potential actor (A) and its opponent (O) is either the same type or different. To
calculate r using Eq. 5.4 the overall average behavior o f the actor (P a) and opponents
(Po) m ust be calculated based on the frequency o f each situation in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1. GA and Predicted PA, and P 0 Values
for Individual TFT and ALLD Players.

A ctor (A)
TFT
TFT
ALLD
ALLD

Opponent (0 )
TFT
ALLD
TFT
ALLD

Ga

Pa

Po

1
1
0
0

1
Mi

1
0

0
0

0

Mi

The value 1// in Table 5-1 represents the fact that when playing an ALLD player,
TFT will cooperate once on the first play out o f i total plays in this pairing. To use Eq.
5.4, we need additionally the values o f i, Gp, and Pp. W e take i and GP to be
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param eters o f the model, but the overall fraction o f cooperate behaviors, Pp, can be
calculated from the frequencies if) w ith w hich different pairings occur:
p

fr r li + fw

t

(5 5 )

2i
where the num erator o f Eq. 5.5 represents 2i cooperate behaviors in all TFT-TFT
pairings plus one cooperate behavior in all TFT-ALLD pairings.
I first provide a simple exam ple o f using Eq. 5.4, Table 5-1, and Eq. 5.5 to
calculate H am ilton’s r term for conditional strategies in an iterated PD, and then
provide a m ore general case for an infinite population. For simplicity, first imagine a
population w ith ju st 2 TFT players and 2 ALLD players where each player plays each
o f the other players four times (z = 4) in an iterated PD game defined in term s o f b and
c as in Figure 5-2 (with no deviation from additivity, d = 0). For these 4 players there
are 6 unique pairings and fr r = 1/6, f m = 4/6, and f DD = 1/6. Substituting into Eq. 5.5
gives an overall expected fraction o f cooperate behaviors o f PP = 1/4. GP = 1/2 for this
situation (50% TFT type), GA = 1 for TFT, and GA = 0 for ALLD. Lastly we must
calculate the average PA and P 0 values based on the situation for each type o f actor.
As an actor a TFT player is paired once with the other TFT and once w ith each o f the
two ALLDs. So using Table 5-1, for TFT the averages across the three pairings are PA
- (1 + Hi + \li) / 3 = M2 and P 0 = (1 + 0 + 0) / 3 = 1/3. The averages for ALLD are PA
= (0 + 0 + 0 ) / 3 = 0 and Po = (0 + Mi + 1//) / 3 = 1/6. W e are now ready to substitute
into Eq. 5.4 where the summations are over each player as the actor and the values are
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the same for each o f the two TFT players (listed first) and each o f the A LLD players
(listed second):

(5.4 repeated)

_ 2(1 - 1 / 2Xl/3 - 1/ 4 ) + 2(0 - 1/ 2Xl / 6 - 1/ 4) _ 1
2(1 - 1 / 2Xl/ 2 - 1 / 4 ) + 2(0 - 1 / 2 X 0 - 1 / 4 ) ~ 3

(5.6)

Thus, w ith this degree o f assortment am ong the behaviors o f others and actors in this
4-player population, according to Q ueller’s version o f H am ilton’s rule we would
expect the TFT type to increase (gain m ore utility than the ALLD type) when b/ c> 3.
I confirm this below, but first consider a m ore general case.
The expected frequency o f pairing types in general can be calculated from Gp and
population size for various ways o f form ing pairs (e.g. a binomial or hypergeom etric
distribution). The round-robin tournam ents used by Axelrod and H am ilton are
equivalent to the expectation for a hypergeom etric distribution (sam pling without
replacement) if one ignores the a d hoc m odifications they used o f having each player
play a “shadow ” self as well as an opponent playing randomly. For a round-robin
tournam ent (hypergeometric distribution) o f large population size, the frequencies o f
pair types approaches those o f a binom ial distribution. Here for sim plicity I will
assume random pairings from an infinite population and therefore use a binom ial
distribution. In this c a s e / 77^ (Gp)2, fr o = 2G/>(1 - Gp), and f DD = 0 - Gp)2. W e thus
have Pp(i) and also from Table 5-1, GA, P a (1), and Po(i)- Now using only GP and i as
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param eters to this simple model, I can calculate r from Eq. 5.4 and use it in
H am ilton’s rule (Eq. 5.1) to predict w hether TFT will increase or not.
In order to check the predictions o f H am ilton’s rule, I also calculate the fraction
o f TFT in a subsequent generation, G p, using the frequencies (J) o f pairings and the
PD payoffs (utilities) for each player from Figure 5-2. This assumes that the num ber o f
each player type in the new generation is proportional to the fitness (or utility) values
gained in the previous generation. A generation is defined as one round o f pairings
each w ith i games between paired players. Gp is then given by (derivation in
A ppendix F):
q

f n 2i (w0 + b - c + d ) + f rD(iwQ- c)

’=

^

f n 2z' O 0 + b - c + d ) + f j o (2iw0 + b - c) + f DD2iw 0
where for now d = 0.
For the simple 4-player population example above where r = 1/3, we can confirm
that a b/c ratio o f 3 is the balance point. Using b - 2 >, c = \ , wo = l , d = Q, and frr,frD ,
and foD values o f 1/6, 4/6, and 1/6 respectively (as above), Gp' = Gp = 0.5. If b > 3
while all other param eters are held constant (including c), then TFT will increase as
predicted by H am ilton’s rule; if b < 3 TFT will decrease.
Figure 5-3 shows the change in the fraction o f TFT in the infinite binom ial
population after one generation (or tournament), AGp = Gp' - Gp, as a function o f
benefit level where cost and base fitness are held constant at c = 1 and wo = 1.
Calculation results are shown for a few different starting Gp and i values. N ote the
general trends— A Gp is positive for higher initial Gp and more game iterations.

Chapter 5—Hamilton ’s Rule Applied to Reciprocal Altruism

116

0.05

AG p 0

-0.05

-

—Gp = 0.3

0.1

1

3

5

7

9

11

13

15

b
Figure 5-3. Change in Fraction o f TFT Players for Additive Payoffs.
Sh ow s change in fraction o f TFT players in population after one generation,
A G P, as a function o f benefit level, b. Data is show n for indicated initial Gp
and i. C ost c and base fitness w0 are both held constant at 1.

For our purposes, the main point is to notice that the precise value o f b needed to
get an increase in TFT, AGp > 0, is again given by Queller’s version o f H am ilton’s
rule. Rearranging Eq. 5.1 gives the condition for TFT to increase o f b > d r . Table 5-2
gives the d r values for the five exam ple set o f parameters used in Figure 5-3 (where
cost is held at c = 1). Each d r value in Table 5-2 precisely predicts the boundary
condition for the benefit level needed for TFT to increase, i.e. A Gp > 0.
Table 5-2. H am ilton’s Rule M inim um b for AGP = 0 in Figure 5-3.

Gp
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.1

i
1
5
2
3
2

M inim um b = d r
2.6667
3.5000
4.3333
6.0000
11.0000
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These results from Figure 5-3 and Table 5-2 confirm that Q ueller’s version o f
H am ilton’s rule which utilizes the phenotypes o f others can be used to predict whether
a conditional reciprocal altruism strategy (e.g. TFT) will increase, w hereas H am ilton’s
version o f his rule which utilizes the genotypes o f others does not give the correct
prediction in this situation. Q ueller’s more general version predicts the necessary
balance o f levels o f positive assortment in helping behaviors and the ratio o f benefits
to costs necessary for a conditional trait to increase.

Hamilton’s Rule and Non-Additivity
The version o f H am ilton’s rule given in Eq. 5.1 relies on the assum ption that fitness
(utility) benefits and costs are additive and due to the independent effects o f individual
behaviors. But note that it is not possible to pick positive values for wo, b, and c in
Figure 5-2 that will sum to the values found in Axelrod and H am ilton’s classic version
o f the PD in Figure 5-1. This latter PD (Figure 5-1) is non-additive. One w ay to view
non-additivity is as the presence o f some positive or negative synergy for m utual
action (where defection is considered non-action). As an example o f positive synergy,
imagine a cooperative trait that involves hunting for one’s paired partner— when both
hunt sim ultaneously the catch m ay exceed two times the individual result. Negative
synergy can be seen in terms o f dim inishing returns. In a different ecological context
two hunters m ight interfere w ith each other or be exploiting the same limited
resource— their total m ight then be less than the sum o f individual efforts. The d term
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in Figure 5-2 gives the deviation from additivity. Now we can use the values b = 4, c =
1, wo = 1, and d = —1 to arrive at the familiar PD in Figure 5-1'.
Again we can rely on Q ueller (1985; 1992b; 1992a) who also developed a version
o f H am ilton’s rule that accommodates a non-linear term. In this case the condition for
an altruistic trait to increase is (1985; 1992b; 1992a):
(5.8)
where r is still given by Eq. 5.4 and rdev is given by:

(5.9)

Notice that the difference between rdev and r is that P 0 is replaced by the interaction
term P aP o in the numerator. This rdev term scales the amount o f deviation from
additivity (d in Eq. 5.8) for m utual cooperation (C-C interactions) by the proportion o f
an actor’s behaviors that take place in such mutually cooperative interactions.
Again, to verify H am ilton’s rule in this reciprocal altruism model we will need to
calculate GP' using the deviation in the payoff for mutual cooperation, w hich happens
only in TFT-TFT pairings (see Eq. 5.7). Figure 5-4 shows the effect o f non-additive
deviations on A Gp where param eters are set to resem ble those in A xelrod and
H am ilton’s iterated PD experiments, b = 4, c = 1, wo = 1, and i = 200. Again, when d -1 this corresponds to the PD used in their experiments (Figure 5-1). There are again
general trends such that A Gp is easier to make positive for higher initial Gp and higher

1Note that a negative d value here implies that the classic PD (Figure 5-1) penalizes mutual
cooperation— making it more difficult for cooperation to evolve than in an additive situation.
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values o f d. Note also that TFT can gain in the population even when relatively rare,
given the high num ber o f iterated interactions, / = 200. The m ore linear appearance o f
the curves in Figure 5-4 (compared to Figure 5-3) is due to scale differences— here I
start w ith much smaller Gp values and plot much smaller changes.
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Figure 5-4. Change in Fraction of TFT Players for Non-Additive Payoffs.
Shows the change in the fraction of TFT players in a population after one
generation, AGP, as a function of the deviation from additivity for mutual
cooperation, d. Data is shown for indicated initial GP. Cost c and base fitness
w0 are both held constant at 1, b = 4, and the number of iterated games i =
200 .

To check the application o f H am ilton’s rule under these non-additive conditions
we rearrange Eq. 5.8 to get the condition:
d > (c - rb) / rdev.

(5.9)
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Table 5-3 shows the value o f (c - rb) / rdev for the param eters used in Figure 5-4. For
each set o f param eters, these values precisely predict the threshold value o f d where
A Gp becom es positive, thus, dem onstrating that this version o f H am ilton’s rule can be
successfully applied to reciprocal altruism models, even when fitness values are non
additive.
Table 5-3. Hamilton’s Rule Minimum d for AGP = 0 in Figure 5-4.

Gp
0.005
0.004
0.003
0.002
0.001

M inim um d = ( c - r b ) / rdev
-1.985
-1.735
-1.318
-0.485
2.015

Conclusion
I have dem onstrated how reciprocal altruism can be analyzed using H am ilton’s
inclusive fitness rule. The key is to use general versions o f H am ilton’s rule appropriate
to the situation under study. In reciprocal altruism with its conditional strategies and
repeated interactions there can be a positive assortment am ong behaviors, even when
there is no positive assortm ent among genetic types. Therefore these differences must
be accom m odated in the analysis. Similarly, when the fitness consequences o f
individual behaviors are non-additive, this deviation must be accounted for. Queller
(1985; 1992b; 1992a) has provided versions o f H am ilton’s rule that handle both o f
these situations.
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This example has been minimal with only two different types, a fixed num ber o f
interactions, and predictable fractions o f interacting pair types from an infinite
binom ial distribution. But these techniques can be used for m ore com plicated
situations if one uses the actual frequency o f phenotypes and genotypes observed in all
interactions.
This dem onstration o f an underlying unity in m echanism s for the evolution o f
altruism broadens the meaning o f both reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness.
Fundamentally, the evolution o f altruism depends on the positive assortm ent o f social
behaviors such that “nice” types help each other more than they help average
population members. In this sense, altruism requires reciprocity in order to evolve
whether based on conditional strategies or some other source o f positive assortment.
The notion o f inclusive fitness m ust also be broadened beyond the selfish gene
viewpoint (Dawkins 1976; 1982) when phenotype differs from genotype. For
instance, if one imagines a single A lways-Cooperate (ALLC) individual interacting in
a population where all remaining individuals are TFT, the fitness o f the ALLC player
w ould be equal to the fitness o f a TFT player— not because it selfishly helps copies o f
its own genetic type (ALLC), but because it successfully exchanges cooperate
behaviors with the TFT type. A xelrod and Ham ilton em phasized that symbiotic
interactions were an example o f cooperation between different species that could not
be based on relatedness. In the above example one could view the A LLC and TFT
types as different species. Cooperation across species is a clear dem onstration that the
“selfish-gene” o f kin-selection theory is only a special case o f a m uch m ore general
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phenomenon. Although it sounds strange to say, inclusive fitness as captured by
H am ilton’s rule can involve different species as well as non-relatives o f the same
species.
Reciprocal altruism is not fundamentally different from inclusive fitness or
multilevel selection. As I have shown using Q ueller’s equations (1985; 1992b; 1992a),
inclusive fitness can be generalized to encompass reciprocal altruism as a special case.
As already noted, inclusive fitness and m ultilevel selection have been shown to be
mathematically equivalent. It thus follows that all three theories offer different
accounts o f the same phenomenon. In fact there are m any specific m echanism s by
which altruism can evolve, including passive ones such as foraging in non-uniform
resource distributions (Pepper and Smuts 2002), continuous population viscosity with
periodic environmental disturbances (M itteldorf and W ilson 2000a), the coevolution
o f group joining and cooperative behaviors (Aviles 2002), the presence o f non
participants (Hauert et al. 2002), and m ultigenerational random ly-form ed groups
(Fletcher and Zw ick 2004c), as well as active methods such as kin recognition
(Gamboa, Reeve, and Holmes 1991), conditional behavior based on the reputations
(Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Panchanathan and Boyd 2003) or past behaviors (Trivers
1971; A xelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984; Dugatkin 1997) o f others, policing
(Frank 1995b; 2003), punishment o f non-altruists (Boyd and Richerson 1992; Fehr
and G achter 2002; Boyd et al. 2003), the coevolution o f cultural institutions that
constrain individual behaviors (Bowles, Choi, and Hopfensitz 2003), and even
recognition o f arbitrary tags (Riolo, Cohen, and A xelrod 2001). W hat all these

Chapter 5-Hamilton
5—Hamilton’'ss Rule Applied to Reciprocal Altruism

123

mechanisms
m
echanism s have in common is: 1) sufficient non-zero-sum benefits of
o f cooperation,
and 2) sufficient positive assortment among heritable altruistic behaviors.

Be warned that i f you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals
cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, yo u can
expect little help fro m biological nature.
Richard Dawkins, in the introduction to The Selfish Gene (1976)

The stupid way to be selfish is ... seeking happiness fo r ourselves alone and
in the process becoming m ore and m ore miserable. The intelligent way to be
selfish is to w ork fo r the welfare o f others.
The Dalai Lama, in The Way to Freedom (1994)

Chapter 6
Summary and Discussion
In this final chapter I summarize the m ajor findings o f this dissertation and discuss my
results in the larger context o f how the evolution o f altruism is understood in both
biological and human terms.

Summary of Results
Fundamentals and Theory Unification
The m ajor goal o f this dissertation is to help clarify the debate surrounding the
evolution o f altruistic traits. Identifying the m ost fundamental elements o f the process
allows us to see more clearly the similarities among the major theories on how
altruism evolves. These theories include inclusive fitness with its em phasis on selfish
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genes and familial relationship, m ultilevel selection theory w ith its emphasis on
between- and within-group selection, and reciprocal altruism w ith is emphasis on
conditional strategies and memory. The fundamental requirements for altruism to
evolve are:
1. Non-zero-sum fitness benefits for cooperation
2. Positive assortment among heritable cooperative behaviors
In the preceding chapters I dem onstrate how each o f these theories em bodies these
fundamental requirements in two general ways: by showing how H am ilton’s rule
applies to each theory and by dem onstrating that the PD is inherent in models o f each
theory. I also highlight the w ay m ultilevel selection theory em phasizes the need for
positive assortment in altruistic behaviors and the tension between levels o f selection.
W hile these aspects are implicit in the other theories, the emphasis in inclusive fitness
theory on relatedness p e r se (rather than groupings possibly due to relatedness) and
reciprocal altruism theory’s lack o f distinction between the assortm ent am ong genetic
types vs. assortment among helping behaviors, both obscure w hat m ultilevel selection
theory makes explicit.

The Generality of Hamilton’s Rule
The first dem onstration o f unification is in the general applicability o f H am ilton’s rule.
In Chapters 3 and 5 I show that H am ilton’s rule {rb > c) from inclusive fitness theory
can be successfully applied to models from the other two theories. The reason for the
success o f H am ilton’s rule across these seemingly different explanations is that it
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embodies in its variables the two basic common requirements for selection o f altruistic
traits listed above:
1. The b > c condition (even when r is maximal at 1) expresses the need for
cooperative behaviors to produce non-zero-sum fitness advantages to the
system as a whole.
2. Its r term captures the degree o f assortment among actors’ genes and the
helping behaviors o f others.
Especially noteworthy is the dem onstration in Chapter 5 that a general version o f
H am ilton’s rule developed by Q ueller applies to reciprocal altruism w ith the
phenotype/genotype differences o f its conditional strategies. This dem onstrates it is
the phenotypic behaviors o f others that determine the fitness o f an altruistic trait, not
their genotypes. This thus challenges the selfish-gene notion that altruistic behaviors
between individuals evolve via help given to other copies o f themselves in others. This
broader view allows the same fundamental requirements for altruism to be applied to
cooperation among non-relatives w ith different genes and even to cooperation across
species in symbiotic m utualistic relationships.

The Generality of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The second dem onstration o f unification is the prisoner’s dilem m a as a general model
o f the conditions that must be overcom e for altruism to evolve. In the context o f
altruism, requirement #1 (non-zero-sumness) implies a PD situation and the NPD
evolutionary model with multiple groups can encompasses requirem ent #2 (positive
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assortment) as well. Thus this game-theoretic model captures these fundamental
features and the conditions for altruism to increase in our model are equivalent to
H am ilton’s rule. This model enables me to demonstrate simple relationships between
H am ilton’s rule, Sim pson’s paradox, and the Price covariance equation.
In addition it highlights the fundamental similarities am ong these theories from a
gam e-theoretic vantage point. W hile the PD has long been know n as a model o f
reciprocal altruism, here I show for the first time that it is inherent in fitness functions
for the other two theories as well. The PD defines the problem o f altruism and
H am ilton’s rule gives the necessary balance between the degree o f non-zero-sum ness
in the PD (b > c) and the degree o f assortment in behavioral interactions am ong PD
players (r). H am ilton’s rule can thus be seen as defining the conditions for altruism to
increase, the conditions for a Sim pson’s paradox, or in game-theoretic term s, the
conditions for cooperators to gain more utility than defectors in a N PD situation— that
is, the conditions for overcoming a tragedy o f the commons or free-rider problem.

The Generality of Each Theory
Not only can the m ost general form o f H am ilton’s rule from inclusive fitness theory be
applied to the other theories, but each o f the other theories in turn has universal
aspects when considered in its m ost general form. For example, reciprocity is
universally required for altruism to evolve in that the positive assortm ent requirement
(#2 above) can be interpreted as a need for altruists to exchange m ore fitness benefits
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with each other than with average population members (whether or not this is
mediated by conditional strategies or m em ory o f past actions).
Hierarchical structure in behavioral interactions is also universally required in that
this positive assortment requirem ent #2 can additionally be seen in term s o f multilevel
(or group) selection w here (in the case o f whole-group altmism) r is a m easure o f what
proportion o f the variance in the trait is due to differences among groups (whether or
not these groups are well-defined physical groups). For instance, w e saw in the last
chapter that conditional strategies can group behaviors even when there is no
assortment in pairings or in the num ber o f interactions. M ultilevel selection theory in
its m ost general form includes both physically defined groups as well as grouped
behavioral interactions. In addition, fitness at the group level can be m easured in terms
o f groups that bud new daughter groups or in terms o f the disproportionate
contribution to a global population. In either case the more fit (faster growing) groups
are those w ith a higher proportion o f altruists due to the non-zero-sum advantage (b >
c) o f altruistic behavior #1. Y et at the same time non-altruists are m ore fit within every
group. This tension between selection at different levels that is explicit in m ultilevel
selection theory is also im plicit in the others— that is, inclusive fitness theory and
reciprocal altruism theory specify, respectively, the need for sufficient levels o f
inclusive fitness or reciprocity am ong altruists (measurable w ith r) in order to
overcome direct individual selection for selfish behavior.
The m ost general versions o f these theories m ay diverge from their original, and
more narrow ly conceived, assumptions. For example, well-defined physical groups in
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group selection theory or memory o f past actions in reciprocal altruism theory are not
included in the more general form o f these theories. Again, in the m ost general form o f
inclusive fitness theory (H am ilton’s rule) developed by Queller (1985; 1992b; 1992a),
the original assumptions o f kinship and selfish genes that help other copies o f
themselves are both absent. These more narrow assumptions therefore are not
fundam entally necessary for altruism to evolve.
O f course when conditions do m atch the narrower assumptions, the original
insights hold: kinship in viscous populations is important in producing positive
assortment in behaviors and when there is a one-to-one m apping o f genotype to
phenotype genes m ay encode behaviors that help copies o f them selves in others.
Likewise when conditional strategies are present that allow altruists to m inim ize their
exploitation by non-altruists, this is an important factor in creating positive assortment
among behaviors. And well-defined groups in direct competition for existence that
vary in their proportion o f altruists clearly do experience selection at the group level.
But if the goal is to understand what is m ost fundamental, it is the m ost general forms
o f these theories that help us see w hat is universally necessary for altruism to evolve.
Factors that are not fundam entally necessary include: interactions am ong kin, selfish
genes benefiting other copies o f themselves, physically distinct groups w ith physically
distinct daughter groups, and cognition and memory about past interactions or
reputations.
In the taxonom y o f species there is a long-standing tension betw een “splitters”
and “lum pers” and this may be analogous to the tension between reductionists and
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holists in evolutionary theory. I imagine the “splitters” or reductionists would be
uncom fortable w ith the paragraphs above. They m ight complain: W hat is he use o f
group selection without well-defined groups or o f inclusive fitness when it no longer
involves copies o f genes in others (kin)? It is indeed unfortunate when advances in our
theoretical understanding are hampered by historical terminology. The multilevel
selection m ovem ent o f the last three decades has never shed its group selection
heritage; and instead o f having “Q ueller’s Rule” overthrowing the selfish gene
viewpoint we have “Q ueller’s generalization o f H am ilton’s inclusive fitness rule”—
regrettable and yet understandable.
I have tried to describe the most fundamental features o f selection for altruism
with phrases not necessarily associated with any one o f the current theories, e.g. nonzero-sum ness and positive assortment, while still illustrating how these fundamental
features are embodied in current theories. Hopefully, in this w ay researchers most
comfortable in a particular theory will have a better understanding o f how their
preferred theory relates to the others.

Other Major Findings
The game theoretic analysis o f Chapter 3 is also useful in teasing out the differences
and similarities between strong and w eak altruism. Namely, under the process o f
natural selection (which relies on relative fitness values) this distinction (which relies
on absolute fitness values) becomes less meaningful— the difference is a m atter o f
degree rather than a fundamental distinction about w hat is achievable by within- and
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between-group selection. W eakly altruistic traits are selected against within groups as
are strongly altruistic traits, and H am ilton’s rule describes the necessary conditions for
each to increase. W hile a priori absolute fitness values for w eak altruism do not define
a PD, under selection in a finite environment the actual resulting fitness values do
define a PD— or equivalently strong altruism (i.e. if the population is scaled or if
fitness success is considered in terms o f fractional representation in the whole
population). That is, if fitness (utility) differences rather than absolute values are used,
the game being played changes from a no-conflict (NC) game in which cooperation
would be the individual dominant strategy to a PD in which defection is the individual
dominant strategy. Thus this game theoretic analysis unifies w eak vs. strong altruism
in a m ore general framework that incorporates selection.
Historically, one place w here the w eak vs. strong distinction has been emphasized
is in models involving randomly formed groups. W eak altruism is always whole-group
and because in this case some o f the altruist’s benefits fall to itself, w eak altruism
initially increases more easily than strong. In fact when same-sized groups are
random ly form ed from an infinite population the initial am ount o f assortment
produced is never enough for strong altruism to increase, but can be enough for w eak
altruism to evolve. In chapter 4 I show that although for almost three decades this
finding was thought to hold in general, it actually only applies to single-generation
groups because the amount o f assortment can increase over subsequent generations. I
demonstrate that strong altruism can indeed increase in m ultigenerational random ly
formed groups even under various restrictions including most notably the absence o f
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kin selection. I also show that stochasticity in group formation, benefit distribution,
and culling due to carrying capacity can influence whether altruism will increase
overall.
Finally, in Chapter 3 I provide a unique analysis o f the Price covariance equation
which both simplifies it and reveals its underlying assumptions. This allows me to
develop an alternative selection decom position that makes distinct and symmetric
assumptions about the components o f selection. W hile many biologists assume the
Price equation accurately partitions selection into within and between-group
com ponents, this symmetric decom position makes clear that the Price equation is just
one possible decom position and that it is based prim arily on an idealization o f the
effect o f between-group selection. The alternative decomposition is based prim arily on
an idealization o f the effect o f within-group selection. The differences between the
values given by the two approaches highlights the interaction effects betw een selection
at different levels, which are not accounted for in either decom position alone. In
Chapter 3 I also show how these two decom positions relate to the basic NPD model—
the average slope o f the fitness functions (b - c) is a measure o f the between group
com ponent o f selection given by the Price equation and the intercept difference (c) is a
m easure o f the w ithin-group com ponent given by the alternative decomposition. The
other com ponents are correction terms for the assumptions made in each idealized
decomposition.
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Discussion
In this section I discuss how the findings o f this dissertation fit into the larger context
o f the debate on the evolution o f altruism. This includes unifying several points o f
confusion or contention under a common theme o f causal explanations being offered
at inappropriate hierarchical levels. I also touch on the question o f how com m on or
rare altruism is and w hether cooperation is as natural as com petition when selection
takes place in hierarchical biological (and social) systems. Finally, although this
dissertation does not focus on human altruism, these discussions allow me to mention
some ways in which these issues relate to cooperation among hum an beings.

Causal Explanations and Hierarchy
One o f the things that makes the evolution o f altruism fertile for contentious debate
(and an interesting dissertation topic) is that it embodies several paradoxical features.
We have already seen how the paradox o f the PD and Sim pson’s paradox are
intim ately associated w ith selection for altruistic traits. Here I expand this them e by
reviewing other confusing issues concerning the evolution o f altruism and discuss
them in term s o f common problem s in the study o f hierarchical systems. These
additional issues include the sub-optim ization problem , proxim ate vs. ultim ate causes,
the averaging fallacy, the PD, and the structure/function distinction. These various
ways in w hich our understanding o f the evolution o f altruism is confused can be at
least partially attributed to a common theme— explanations o f causation being offered
at inappropriate hierarchical levels.
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W hile we can understand the tem ptation among scientists to reduce explanations
to lower levels— after all, reductionist science has been phenom enally successful
during the last century— more recently there has been an increased appreciation o f
phenom ena that emerge in systems at higher levels (e.g. K auffm an 1993; Casti 1994;
Zw ick 2004). If a process in a system depends on emergent properties, then
explanations o f this process using only system elements at a level low er than the
em ergent property will never be satisfactory. For example, the selection for alleles
which cause altruistic behaviors among individual organisms will never make sense
only at the level o f genes because this increase depends on the non-zero-sum benefits
o f m utual cooperation and positive assortm ent o f phenotypic behaviors that do not
exist at the gene level. Ignoring the combination o f non-zero-sum benefits and
population group structure necessary for cooperation to evolve (by overpow ering
individual within-group selection) is equivalent to ignoring the dilemma in the
prisoner’s dilemma, the problem in the free-rider problem, or the tragedy in the
tragedy o f the commons.

Averaging Fallacy
In the case o f selection for altruism, by averaging across groups, the existence o f
groups are ignored even though clumped interactions account for selection o f the trait.
As Sober and W ilson put it, this kind o f averaging has the effect o f “defining group
selection out o f existence” (1998 p. 32). They refer to this as the “averaging fallacy”
(1998 p. 31) , but as Lewontin points out, it is not ju st the error o f assum ing the
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probability o f an average is the same as the average o f individual probabilities— it is a
“metaphysical one about causal reality” (1998).
For instance, Dawkins (1982) claims that group selection is not needed to
understand the evolution o f m ulticellularity because individual cells are better off
being part o f an aggregate than they w ould be if they were on their own— therefore
individual selection (at the cell level) is enough to explain m ulticellularity. M aynard
Smith and Szathmary m ake a sim ilar claim in the quote used earlier in chapter 2:
“ . ..the evolution o f cooperation between the parts o f an individual is to be expected”
(1995 p. 53). These assertions rely on a common m isconception that individual
(within-group) selection maximizes individual fitness. W hen the evolution o f altruism
is understood in the context o f the PD, it is clear that this is not true.
One o f the contributions o f this dissertation is to describe the evolution o f
altruism in term s o f social dilemmas w ith which we all have direct experience. The
preceding arguments are similar to one that states: “O f course citizens w illingly pay
their taxes because they would be worse o ff in the anarchy o f no governm ent and no
public services,” or “O f course countries do not over fish international w aters because
the consequences o f over fishing affect them .” W hile it may well be true that
conditions under anarchy or unregulated fishing w ould be w orse for all, it is also true
that each person is better o ff individually to not pay taxes (while hopefully everybody
else does), or each country is better o ff over fishing (while hopefully all other
countries show restraint). In the absence o f a higher level o f organization or control
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(e.g. tax collection enforcem ent or enforceable fishing treaties) this does in fact lead to
mutual defection or a tragedy o f the commons.
The same holds in the case o f m ulticellularity— each cell is m ore fit by not
contributing to the collective good, while other cells do. Only with a higher level o f
selection where groups o f cells that cooperate effectively with each other out-com pete
cell groups locked in an NPD , can the expected m utual defection be overcom e and
these cells end up in a situation w ith higher individual cell fitness. M inim ally this
selection may be driven by random differences between groups o f cells, but m ay also
be enhanced by higher-level m echanism s that penalize defection and thus change the
payoffs (fitness) values at low er levels. M ichod has rightly recognized this tension
between levels and noted the need o f higher levels to evolve m echanism s that suppress
lower-level competition— he has especially emphasized this in the origins o f
multicellularity (M ichod 1996; 1997; Michod and Roze 2000b; 2001). Only by
overcoming the drive towards m utual defection (through this kind o f suppression) can
higher levels stabilize.

Defection Suppression
This tension can also be seen as a sub-optimization problem fam iliar in all hierarchical
systems. Sub-optimization refers both to the fact that optimization o f each subsystem
results in sub-optimization at the whole-system level and conversely that optim ization
at the higher level results in sub-optim ization at the subsystem level (Zwick 2004).
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There is a natural tradeoff between optimization (selection) at the different
hierarchical levels.
The development o f suppression mechanisms and their subsequent refinem ent
allows selection at higher levels to be more effective (Frank 1995b; 2003). For
instance, the process o f fairly allotting alleles (via crossover and m eiosis) to sex cells
is so central to reproduction in higher animals and plants that it is often taken for
granted, yet if genes were actually free to behave selfishly we w ould not expect this
process to be so egalitarian— genes that caused more copies o f them selves in new cells
w ould be m ore individually fit. The fact that suppression o f this lower level
com petition is so integral to sexual reproduction is an example o f w hat Ludw ig von
Bertalanffy has called “progressive systematization” in which each successive level o f
hierarchy requires mechanisms for stabilizing lower levels (von Bertalanffy 1968).
This is also related to M artin Zw ick’s (1978) idea o f a limited num ber o f hierarchical
levels “after which the hierarchy often becomes consolidated in a stable and coherent
whole (w hich m ay becom e a base unit for still higher levels).” Sober and W ilson offer
a similar idea in the context o f m ultilevel selection where initially betw een-group
selection m ay be in strong opposition to within-group selection, but over successive
generations this tension may becom e less pronounced as within-group selection favors
less individually costly ways to accomplish the group-level functionality, while
between-group selection favors mechanisms that more effectively suppress withingroup selection (Sober and W ilson 1998). In the same vein, R obert W right (2000) has
proposed the idea that the development o f hierarchy itself is driven by the non-zero-
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sum advantages available for mutual cooperation at lower levels, but he does not
em phasize the need to overcome the tragedy o f the commons (o f m utual defection)
and in fact does not support the idea o f group-level selection (see W ilson 2000 for
review).
W hen lower level competition is suppressed very efficiently it does not draw our
attention. For instance, returning to multicellularity, we think o f different cell lines
(skin, liver, heart, etc.) as naturally cooperating to m ake a well functioning animal, but
when suppression mechanisms fail the ever-present selection pressures at low er levels
reveal themselves. This is the case with cancer in w hich fast growing individual cell
lines are individually more fit at the expense o f the common good for all cells in being
part o f a healthy body.

Hamilton’s Rule and Hierarchy
One o f the problem s with the simplicity o f H am ilton’s rule and the inclusive fitness
point o f view is that it obscures the tension and interdependence betw een these wholesystem vs. subsystem levels o f causation. That is, the r term captures the population
structure w ithout em phasizing the required grouped interactions in a whole-system
context. Again, partly this is historical in that the r term started as a m easure o f
kinship, yet even when thought o f strictly in terms o f kin selection, r works because
the grouped interactions o f relatives (subsystem) are contrasted against the
background o f a population o f non-relatives (whole-system) (H am ilton 1964). If you
have instead a single unstructured population (one well-mixed group) that is highly
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related (say 99.9% clonal cooperators), cooperation w ill steadily decline to extinction
as the 0.1% o f defectors steadily increase to saturation. The r term is zero in a wellm ixed population (even composed o f relatives) because it m easures how clumped or
grouped interactions are compared to the average, or how m uch altruists benefit other
altm ists com pared to what they give average population members. If behavioral
interactions are not grouped (no assortment) then altruism will not evolve even where
relatedness is very high.
Although the r term o f H am ilton’s rule captures the assortment or group structure
o f interactions, the interpretation o f inclusive fitness (caused by differences between
groups) as being equivalent to within-group individual fitness (caused by differences
within groups) obscures this hierarchical tension. H am ilton’s rule asks a question: Is
there enough group structure for altruism to evolve given a certain benefit to cost
ratio? But it does not emphasize that the answer involves opposing vectors o f
causation. M ultilevel selection theory on the other hand makes this tension explicit by
em phasizing each com ponent o f selection, as in the Price covariance equation or the
alternative decom position presented in Chapter 3.

Proximate vs. Ultimate Causation
This dissertation uses a strict evolutionary biology definition o f altruism— behaviors
that cause an organism to have relatively less fitness (offspring) while causing others
they interact w ith to have relatively more are altruistic. Yet, this definition does not
match our com mon use o f the term which involves physiological or emotional factors.
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For instance, if it brings some one emotional pleasure to cooperate w ith another (even
if there are fitness costs) would we call this behavior altruistic? In their book Unto
Others Sober and W ilson (1998) separate phenotypic traits and their fitness
consequences from the proxim ate m echanism s within an individual that may lead to
the behavior. This is similar, respectively, to the Aristotelian distinction between fin a l
cause and efficient cause.
Presum ably natural selection m axim izes fitness (final cause) by constructing
proxim ate mechanisms (efficient causes) for every selected behavioral trait, but
whether it is initiated by nerve reflex, hormonal cascade, or a m em ory o f pleasure is
not directly relevant to the fitness consequences (assuming the proxim ate mechanisms
are equally efficient in eliciting the behavior). If the behavioral trait with fitness
consequences (final cause) is to forage for food when biochemical energy stores are
low, the exact m echanism that triggers this behavior (an uncom fortable sensation o f
hunger or fond memories o f food) is o f no consequence. In the same way, if an
altruistic behavior lowers individual within-group fitness while raising the fitness o f
other group members, w hether the proxim ate mechanism is a pleasurable emotion or
nerve m ediated reflex, the fitness consequence for the behavior is the same.
This distinction is also related to the function vs. structure distinction that is
common to hierarchical systems (Zwick 2004). Each system can be seen as a whole
with its own properties that interface with the external environment. For instance, an
organism interacting w ith its environm ent has a particular fitness. A system can also
be viewed as a collection o f interacting subsystems. The subsystems and their

Chapter 6—Summary and Discussion

141

interactions account for the w ay the system as a whole interacts w ith its environment,
but it is not usually necessary to understand these lower level interactions to describe
the higher level ones. For instance, organisms m ay contain subsystems such as
nervous, circulatory, pulmonary, hormonal, and genetic, but D arwin (1859) was able
to describe the process o f natural selection in w hich individual organism s interact with
their larger environm ent (including other organisms) w ithout relying on the workings
o f these subsystems to describe this process. Focusing on structural detail often
obfuscates the prom inence o f function when exam ining behavioral traits. This is
related to the genotype/phenotype distinction. Selection am ong individuals can only
act on functional phenotypes and where the trait in question is altruism towards others,
only the external consequences o f this altruism are relevant to fitness m easures, not
their structural (genetic) underpinnings. Again, this is what Q ueller’s version o f
H am ilton’s rule illustrates— altruistic traits gain from the phenotypic behaviors o f
those they interact with, not their underlying genotypic basis.

Emotions as Proximate Mechanisms
One the other hand, the existence o f proxim ate mechanisms in organism s leads us to
ask: w hat ultim ate (final) behaviors are being selected for? For instance, recognizing
the proxim ate mechanism o f hunger in animals (including ourselves) helps us
appreciate the historic selective pressures for behaviors such as food foraging and
consum ption o f high caloric foods. Similarly, there is a growing body o f evidence for
proxim ate m echanism s in humans and other primates that support the idea that traits
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for self-sacrificing, altruistic behaviors have been selected for. In a recent study
capuchin monkeys were trained to perform a simple task for w hich they were
rew arded w ith a piece o f cucumber. This all w orked fine (perform task— get
cucum ber) until a test subject was placed next to another capuchin m onkey receiving a
m ore desirable grape for performing the same task. In this situation m any test subjects
threw dow n their cucumber and had a tem per tantrum (Brosnan and de W aal 2003).
Similarly, in studies o f human cooperation involving small groups playing “public
goods” games (equivalent to an NPD ) subjects reported experiencing the proxim ate
m echanism o f emotional anger towards defectors in the game to such an extent that it
m otivated them to give up some o f their own financial rewards in order to punish the
defectors— even though these defectors were anonymous an unlikely to be
encountered by the punisher in the future (Fehr and Gachter 2002) (also see Fehr and
Fischbacher 2003 for review). These studies suggests both that we (and other animals)
may have evolved to be more concerned w ith relative than absolute fitness (why give
up m oney in your pocket or a perfectly good cucum ber?) and that we are w illing to
m ake altruistic sacrifices to help discourage cheating in others.
Finally there is also new physiological evidence for proxim ate emotional
m echanism s in humans. Areas o f the brain associated with pleasure have been shown
to “light up” (increased blood flow) on functional CAT scans when subjects act (or
reason about acting) altruistically in games involving cooperation and defection and
brain areas associated with anger light up more w hen subjects are subjected to the
selfish behaviors o f others (Greene et al. 2001; Sanfey et al. 2003).
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Are the Conditions that Produce Altruism Rare?
The textbook viewpoint o f the last few decades is that group selection (although
theoretically possible) requires special circumstances that are rarely seen in nature and
therefore altruism (except among close relatives) m ust also be rare (M aynard Smith
1964; W illiam s 1966; Nunney 1985b; M aynard Smith 1998a). This dissertation
supports a reassessm ent o f this traditional view in several ways. As discussed above,
understanding the underlying PD nature o f the evolution o f altruism (illustrated in
Chapter 3) helps to avoid m isidentifying situations that require self-sacrificing traits as
due to individual within-group selection. In addition, we have seen how the common
view that altruism must be defined in absolute term s does not make sense under
selection (Chapter 3) and that even when defined this way, strong altruism can evolve
via random ly generated associations, rather than requiring special circumstances or
additional organismic capabilities as previously believed (Chapters 3 and 4).
The answer to this question o f altruism rareness o f course also depends on how .
realistically these models and param eter values map onto natural situations. Yet
H am ilton’s rule helps us see that there is a possible tradeoff. If the positive assortment
o f interactions is less than w e have assumed, then this can be com pensated for w ith a
greater benefit to cost ratio. And while it m ay seem excessive to have benefit values
several tim es higher than costs, it is actually easy to imagine such situations if one
considers the benefits involved in, for instance, division o f labor and econom y o f
scale. For example, the chances that a prairie dog sentinel (Sherman 1977) giving a
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warning call is actually captured by a predator may be very small, but the act o f
w arning others may reduce their chances o f being caught m any fold. Or as another
example, altruistic Pseudomonas bacteria (Rainey and Rainey 2003) that exude a
sticky polym er reproduce slightly less often than bacteria that do not make this
substance, but the benefit to other bacteria in being held close to the air/liquid
interface by the polymer allows them to reproduce much fa ste r than they w ould
otherwise (stuck in the anoxic liquid). Finally, the slime m old cells (Strassmann, Zhu,
and Queller 2000) that make up a spore stalk m ay not survive anyw ay as
environmental conditions deteriorate and so give up relatively little fitness, but they
m ay increase the chances o f survival (and subsequent offspring production) o f other
cells in the spore body from alm ost zero to substantial.
A nother important point about benefit levels is that none o f the exam ples used in
this dissertation embody the non-linear benefits we normally associate w ith the
synergy o f collective cooperation and these non-linearities can contribute to the more
common occurrence o f altruism. The only model that deviates from additivity is the
traditional PD payoff values used in Chapter 5, which actually have a negative
deviation for mutual cooperation. The b > c non-zero-sum requirem ent implies a
certain kind o f synergy—more benefit is produced than what it costs, but these
additive models assume that each additional cooperator contributes an equal am ount to
the fitness o f others. So synergy in the different sense o f non-linearity is not invoked.
For example, imagine a food-sharing trait where an altruistic hunter consumes
energy and risks injury that on average amounts to one rabbit’s w orth o f calories in
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order to catch 4 rabbits. The hunter then gives these rabbits to its group or tribe where
they are divided evenly among all tribe members. Here the b/c ratio is 4. The additive
models presented here assume that if the tribe contains 3 such altruistic hunters that
they w ould collectively produce 12 rabbits at a cost o f 3— still a b/c ratio o f 4. But
what if 4 hunters expending their efforts collectively are enough to bring hom e a
buffalo! N ow the ratio o f benefit to cost jum ps dramatically and makes this altruistic
hunting trait more likely to evolve, but still only via the positive assortm ent o f
altm ists— now it ju st requires less positive assortment (r) because the b/c value is
higher. N ote that if w e assume the buffalo is shared equally am ong group members
and we put ourselves in the position the fourth hunter, we m ight m istakenly believe
this hunter joins the hunt for purely selfish reasons— a slab o f buffalo is better than its
share o f the 12 rabbits. But remembering that fitness is a relative process w e see that
the other, say, 10 members o f the tribe that stay in camp and do not hunt are even
more fit— they get their share o f the buffalo without paying the one rabbit’s worth o f
cost. This is similar to the exam ple involving neighbors with m illions o f dollars
discussed in Chapter 3.
The point here is that the models used in this dissertation w hich show how
altruism can evolve have done so without using a known and strong m echanism that
promotes cooperation. It is easy to imagine in nature (and society) m any non-linear
synergies for collective action— in acquiring food, shelter, protection from predators,
raising o f young, etc. This kind o f non-linear benefit while not m odeled here and not
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typical o f other evolutionary models, m ay be very important in determ ining the actual
level o f self-sacrificing cooperation in hierarchical natural (and social) systems.

Is Nice Necessary?
The goal here is not to propose a Pollyannaish view o f nature in w hich cooperation
dominates, but rather to em phasize that competition is only h alf the picture. One
would expect that selfish behaviors would increase when there is less higher-level
competition (and less selection for suppression o f local competition discussed earlier),
whereas increased levels o f altruistic behavior w ould require m ore strife at higher
levels. For a biological system to effectively compete in natural selection it m ust
engender some level o f cooperation and sub-optimization among its parts
(subsystems), while at the same time selective processes at lower levels will select for
m ore local optimization. Those systems with more cooperative, self-sacrificing parts
are likely to be m ore fit than systems with more selfish parts.
A t the level o f an individual cell cooperation among cell organelles including
genes will be selected for; at the level o f individual organisms, those w ith cooperating
parts (e.g. cells) have a selective advantage; and at the level o f groups o f individuals in
com petition, cooperation and altruism among individuals w ithin groups is selected for.
Steven Gould has even suggested that as species either go extinct or fill new biological
niches, there m ay be species-level selection (Gould 2002). In this sense natural
selection is a kind o f fra cta l process that can be taking place sim ultaneously on
m ultiple hierarchical levels. Paradoxically, selection for selfish individual fitness at
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any particular level may be opposed by selection for altruism b y the selective
pressures at a higher level. In this since altruism and selfishness are linked in a kind o f
ying-yang relationship o f mutual dependence that allows natural selection to bootstrap
cooperation up the hierarchical structure o f life via competition at yet a higher level.
In addition to increasing our understanding o f how selection and hierarchy
interact in biological systems for the sake o f scientific understanding, establishing a
more balanced view o f the role both cooperation and selfishness play in biological
evolution m ay provide m ore balanced metaphors borrowed from biology about the
natural tensions between self-interest and the common good. D arw in’s view o f natural
selection that em phasized com petition between organisms has been used to justify
everything from genocide and eugenics to laissez fa ire capitalism. This dark view is
echoed by D aw kins’ quote at the beginning o f this chapter, but m ay be based on an
incomplete picture o f nature— and therefore support an oversim plified view o f society.
For example, political rhetoric both in support o f smaller or bigger governm ent rarely
acknowledges the natural tensions between market forces encom passing individual
choices and governm ent’s role in protecting the common good. As the
environm entalist D avid Orr has said: “The market is how we say T ; governm ent is
how we say ‘w e’” (Orr 2004). W hile both forces are im portant in society, it is the
same averaging fallacy (discussed above) to believe that com petition in free markets
alone will maximize individual utility or lead towards the com m on good. One o f the
roles o f governm ent is in fact to help solve the PD situations that m arket or m arket
like individual actions cannot solve.
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Conversely, it m ay also be true that social and environmental conditions have
influenced our scientific understanding towards one that em phasizes the selfish h alf o f
the equation. As Gould put it: “W e all have a tendency to spin universal theories from
a limited dom ain o f surrounding circum stances” (1988 p. 16). For instance, Daniel
Todes (1987) has argued that both the abundance o f the tropics in w hich Darwin did
m uch o f his research, and the more crowded conditions o f London and England that
influenced M althus (1798) (from whom Darwin drew influence), help account for the
emphasis on direct competition, whereas the under populated and harsh environmental
conditions o f Russia led m any there, m ost fam ously Petr Kropotkin (Kropotkin 1902),
to question both M althus and D arw in’s emphasis on competition. They instead
emphasized the need for— and the ubiquity o f—cooperation or “mutual aid” in
confronting the “struggle for existence” especially where the m ore formidable
opponent was bleak environmental conditions rather than other organisms. In gametheoretic term s this latter idea is referred to as a “game against nature,” w hich is the
subject o f “decision theory,” when distinguished from game theory (Luce and Raiffa
1985).
Studies o f mutual cooperation in humans have em phasized this m utual aid side
rather than direct competition in situations where mutual defection m ay spell disaster
for all. For exam ple, James Scott’s study o f subsistence peasant farmers found that
mutual help in m inim izing risks from crop failure were more prom inent than
maximizing individual benefit through direct com petition (1976). Similarly
cooperative system s have been documented in the sharing o f a lim ited and vital
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resource such as fresh w ater on the island o f Bali (Lansing 1994). Interestingly when
mutual defection brings mutual elimination, this may be thought o f in game-theoretic
term s as an n-player game o f chicken (Oosterhout 1996), rather than a PD. In twoplayer chicken it is individually more fit to cooperate if the other player defects and
there is no dominant strategy. In the n-player case it can be fitter to cooperate when
m ost players are defecting. W hen levels o f cooperation rise to levels sufficient enough
to avoid disaster, the gam e again becom es an NPD. This produces a stable equilibrium
point that is intermediate between total defection and total cooperation (even in the
absence o f group-level selection). For instance, Gretchen Oosterhout (1996) has
shown that a fishery can be m odeled as a NPD (tragedy o f the com mons) or n-player
Chicken depending on the severity o f the consequences o f over-fishing. W hile an NPD
captures altruistic cooperation, depending on the circumstances cooperation m ay be
self-serving. Only by distinguishing between these situations (i.e. determ ining if the
fitness functions describe a PD or game o f chicken) can their underlying selection
forces be assessed. W itnessing seemingly cooperative behaviors by themselves is not
enough to decide w ithout knowing the fitness consequences.

Future Studies
A lthough I have m any research ideas that I have not had time to pursue, here I just
mention a few direct extensions to topics covered in this dissertation.
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The discussion o f chicken above highlights that there are other games
besides the PD in the study o f cooperation. W hile the PD captures
altruism, other game-theoretic frameworks such as decision theory and
coalition theory could be used to assess the boundaries beyond the strict
definition o f altruistic behavior. This m ay be im portant in investigating
absence/persistence boundaries under harsh conditions as touched on
above.

•

In Chapter 5 I used Q ueller’s version o f H am ilton’s rule to analyze a
reciprocal altruism situation, but only two alternative types (TFT and
ALLD) were used. One goal is to develop a w ay to apply H am ilton’s rule
to three or more types involving conditional strategies.

•

W hile I have argued that Q ueller’s equations challenge the selfish-gene
view point and could apply to symbiotic relationships across species, I
w ould like to develop a model explicitly involving different species and
show that this version o f H am ilton’s rule can indeed predict when
symbiotic cooperation will increase.

•

In the analysis o f the Price equation and developm ent o f an alternative
decom position in Chapter 3 , 1 noted that neither decom position gives an
accurate picture o f the interaction effects between within-group and
between-group selection. It seems as if a m ore accurate decom position lies
between the two and it m ay be possible to find some general w ay o f
averaging them to arrive at a better decomposition.
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All o f the models used here could be m ade m ore realistic both ecologically
(e.g. more flexible population structures and environmental factors such as
food resources) and evolutionarily (e.g. mutation, sexual reproduction,
polygenetic traits).

•

One o f the problem s o f talking about non-linear synergies for cooperation
as I did in this chapter is that by definition they are not decom posable to
independent effects o f individual participants. Yet, only using linear
fitness functions is very unrealistic and does not capture m uch o f what we
m ean by the benefits o f mutual cooperation. It w ould be nice to develop
m odels that encompass non-linear synergies in order to investigate how
such fitness relationships influence the evolution o f cooperative behaviors.

•

Although I only touched on it in this concluding chapter, I am very
interested in the w ay metaphors derived from our understanding o f nature
influence our understanding o f society. It would be interesting to think
about the best w ay o f presenting this more com plex picture o f coupled
competition and cooperation in nature to a general audience.

Part o f the appeal in pursuing the research behind this dissertation lies in the fact
that the evolution o f altruism is so controversial. This debate o f course has historical
and social roots, but I believe it is also fueled by a lack o f com m on understanding as
to w hat is in dispute, as well as at times rather em otional support o f particular
viewpoints. It is m y hope that this dissertation can provide a helpful fram ework for
understanding the most fundamental conditions necessary for altruism to evolve and
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that this will increase the level o f useful discussion among those that com e from
different traditions or find a particular theory m ore appealing. Only by conducting this
debate from a common foundation can we hope to form testable hypothesis that are
capable o f influencing the thinking o f all, and thereby advance our com mon
understanding o f how evolutionary processes shape our natural world. I look forward
to being part o f this discussion in the future.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Hamilton’s Rule Derivation
Here I derive H am ilton’s rule starting with the basic NPD fitness functions and the
condition that the fraction o f cooperators in the population increases.

Starting w ith Q ' > Q we get:
A_

A_

N'

N '

By the fitness equations 3.3 and 3.4:
A + ' Z alqih

N+

^ A

E aA$> + E si(<?ib +c)

N

Cross m ultiplying and isolating c/b on the right side yields:
c
NQS

b'

W e cancel N and expand terms to give:
Y^ajgj-IAQ-AQ ^ c

A{l-Q)

b'

and then:
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- 2Q ' L n# i - Q 2Y / ii y c
A - 2 A Q + AQ
b'

This w e rew rite as:
- 2 Q q t + Q 2) ^ c
A - 2 A Q + NQ2

b ’

w hich gives:

Y nMi-Q)2
_________ N _________
A (\-Q )2+ S ( 0 - Q f

b ’

N
or:
varb(q,) ^ c
var,(Q)

b

This is H am ilton’s rule for a whole-group trait where r is the betw een-group over total
variance:
rb > c.
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Appendix B: Price Equation Derivations
Here I show how the Price Covariance equation can be interpreted in term s o f
idealized Q' and how this relates to our NPD fitness functions.
Starting with the Price between-group term,
covO ^)
E(W,)
where iv, is the growth rate o f a group,
AQ = E{wiqi)

By definition we get:

EjwJEjq,)

E( wt)

E(w,)

This can be written as

_ N _1

e.
N

Canceling U N and using the definition o f w, we get:

^b

AT

^

w hich gives

A& = 0 ‘ -G
where

AT
N ow given A g = Q' - Q and AQ = AQb + AQW, it follows that AQw = Q'
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Starting with

N'
from above w e expand n / to get
0 * _ ZbA(1+w«vfr)]
N'
or
0*

Ik O

+ WcnA,)] _ A*
N'
N''

where A * is the idealized A ’ given by the Price between-group com ponent o f selection.
That is, the Price equation’s idealization about the new number o f altruists in the
population is given by adding the existing num ber in each group, a,-, to the am ount
each receives based on the average fitness line in the NPD model (Figure 3-1).

Appendix C: Random Group Analytic Model
Here I describe H am ilton’s original model with recursion added to accommodate
multiple generations w ithin groups. If a$, ss, and ng are respectively the num ber o f
altruists, non-altruists (selfish individuals), and total individuals in a group after g
generations spent within groups, then:

(C .l)

(C.2)
v

V i - 1;

(C.3)

In H am ilton’s model g is always one, but in our model I vary g by using these
equations recursively— inputting the results from one generation into the calculations
for the next. N ote that w hen first formed all groups are size n, but after reproduction
group sizes vary. (Terms w ithout g subscripts indicate initial values, i.e. n is «0.)
The overall number o f altruists, A g, and individuals, jVg, in the population after g
generation within groups is then the num ber contributed (after g generations) by
groups o f every possible original com position (a = 0 to n) times the num ber o f such
groups expected in a random binom ial distribution. If Y is the total num ber o f groups,
then the expected count o f groups with a initial altruists out o f n group m em bers is:
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rn\

h(a) = Y

Qa( i - Q )

(«-«)

(C.4)

\ ad
The total population values after g generations spent within groups are then given by:
/i

A g = Y * h ® a g ( f ) and
/=o

(C.5)

1=0

where ag(f) is the ag value from Eq. C .l given the particular starting a value specified
by the index i and similarly for ng(i). Although Y is infinite, it cancels in the
calculation o f Qg = A g / Ng and A%Q = Qg - Q.

Appendix D: Random Group Analytic Model
Modifications
Here I describe m odifications to the analytic model such that altruists do not give
benefit to kin, hom ogeneous groups are disallowed, and the population size is kept
constant.

No Benefit to Kin
The m odified fitness functions for when altruists only give to non-relatives are
im plem ented by substituting the size o f altm ist kin groups, k, for the m inus-one term
in Eqs. C. 1 and C.2. The minus-one term subtracted the altruist from the num ber o f its
beneficiaries; here we subtract the altruist’s kin (those having a com m on ancestor) as
well. A preceding superscript k is used to designate fitness calculations that subtract k
instead o f one from a group’s altruist count and group size:

*« =V

ka
V 1 -- k
A 1
g

^

1+ b

^
(D .l)

Vi “■
**-i
hs = sVi 1 + 6 V

a g-1

\
(D.2)

- A i 1

where the size o f a kin group o f altruists in generation g is given by:
a.
g

k g -1

(D.3)
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This is the size o f the kin group in the last generation times an altruist’s clutch size for
this generation. The initial k value ko= \ (altruists are only related to themselves).
Shifting benefit from kin to non-kin in this way does not affect the total group size and
Eq. C.3 works for calculating ng.
N ote that in the unm odified model the average proportion o f a group that is
related to an altruist, kg / ngi can never be above 1 / n and therefore the proportion o f an
altm ist’s benefit that falls to kin (kg - 1)/ (ng - 1) is also bounded by 1 I n. To see this
note that kg / ng will be largest within homogeneous groups o f altruists com pared to
m ixed groups. In such groups (given our convention that c - 1) kg is m ultiplied by b
each generation and total group size also increases w ith b. Therefore the proportion kg
/ ng rem ains at its original value o f 1 / n. In all other groups this proportion falls with
successive generations. Only when Q is high (so that homogeneous altruist groups are
common) or when b is high (so homogeneous altruist groups grow proportionally
bigger than other groups) is this limit approached.

No Homogeneous Groups
In an infinite population there will always be some homogeneous groups w henever Q
> 0. For this modification, each time groups are random ly form ed we eliminate
homogeneous groups by simply converting all groups w here the altruist num ber a = n
to groups w here a = n - 1. In this w ay all homogeneous groups o f altruists have one
member switched to a non-altruist. Because non-altruists always increase faster than
altruists, groups becom e more non-homogeneous w ith each successive generation.
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Note that this modification causes Q to decrease, but this effect is small when Q is
small.

No Population Growth
The global carrying capacity is im plem ented by scaling back all offspring numbers
each generation by Ng-i / Ng where N g is first calculated without scaling. We use a
preceding asterisk to denote values calculated w ith scaling. For instance, the num ber
o f altruists in a group after g generations w ith scaling is,

(D.4)

and sim ilarly for group size *nu, where scaling is im posed at each recursion
♦

*

*

(generation). W hole population values w ith scaling A g and N g then sum over ag and
ng instead o f ag and ng respectively in Eqs. C.5 and C.6 and Qg = A g / N g.

Appendix E: Random Groups Computer Simulation
Model
For each run o f the model, individuals (N = 1,000) are initially random ly distributed
into groups o f size n using a random num ber generator to assign individuals to unfilled
groups. The proportion o f altruists and non-altruists is determined by the starting Q
value. The sequential steps o f the simulation are then:
1. In each group the new num ber o f altruists and non-altruists (to the closest
w hole individual) are determ ined (using either the low or high stochasticity
m ethod described in the text).
2. Individuals are elim inated (using either the low or high stochasticity
m ethod described in the text) until the original population size N is
reached.
3. I f g generations have passed within groups since the last group
reformation, all individuals are random ly assigned to new groups o f size n\
otherw ise if the m igration rate, m, is greater than zero, m N individuals are
chosen at random from the whole population and m oved to new random
locations in the population array which is ordered by groups—
consequently larger groups are proportionately m ore likely to send out and
receive migrants.
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These steps are repeated until an equilibrium at Q = 0.0 or Q = 1.0 is reached. For runs
where n = 6, TVwas 1,002 instead o f 1,000 and initial Q = 0.0998 instead o f 0.1000 to
allow an even distribution into groups.

Appendix F: Derivation of G p 'fo r Conditional
Strategies in TFT I ALLD Population
Here I derive a formula for the frequency o f TFT players in the next generation (GP')
based on the fitness (utility) values gained in the previous generation. These values are
calculated using the PD payoff values o f Figure 5-2, the frequencies o f each type o f
pairing, and the number o f iterations played. Figure 5-2 is repeated here for reference.
opponent’s behavior

J-H

0
1

C ( P A = 1)
sacrifices c
o
D (Pa = 0)
c3
sacrifices 0

C ( P 0 =1)
contributes b
wo + b - c
(+d)
wq + b

D (P0 - 0)
contributes 0
Wo - c
Wo

The idea is to calculate a numerator that represents the total fitness (offsping) for TFT
players. This is their fitness in TFT-TFT (77) and TFT-ALLD (TD) pairings scaled by
the frequency o f each type o f pairings. In the TD case the TFT plays C on the first
m ove and gets the sucker’s payoff, but for the next (i - 1) m oves TFT plays D as does
its opponent. The denom inator is the total o f all payoffs for each pairing (77, TD, D D
scaled by frr, fro , and f DD respectively) over i iterations.
• = _________ fr r 2 i( wo + b - c + d ) + f m (w0 - c + ( i ~ l)w 0)__________

q

p

f r r 2 i( w0 + b - c + d ) + f rD( w0 - c + 2 (/ - 1 ) w0 + w0 + b) + f DD2 iw0

This can be reduced to:
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G

which is Eq. 5.7.

f n 2 i( W° + b ~ c + d ) + f r p O o ~c)
f i r 2i(w 0 + b - c + d ) + f m (2iw0 + b - c ) + f DD2iw0

